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
STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE

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THE 1960 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

The first annual *Studies* award of \$500, for the most significant contribution during 1960 to the literature of intelligence, has been made to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] issue. Although other contributions were considered more significant in the historical sense, of broader general interest, or more immediately applicable in the work of the community, [REDACTED] submission represents best the kind of constructive thinking that the *Studies* especially desires to promote. Among the several other candidates earnestly considered for the 1960 award, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] printed in the Winter issue, is distinguished as particularly meritorious.

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The evolution of intelligence as knowledge demands a redesigning of intelligence as organization.

**GREAT FRUSINA REVISITED:
The Problem of Priority Positive Intelligence
Wallace E. Seidel**

In 1949 Sherman Kent referred to strategic intelligence as "the intelligence of national survival"¹ and elsewhere, more lexicographically, as "high-level foreign positive intelligence."² This paper is focused in its particulars on one aspect of the highest-priority positive intelligence problem of today, that of the Soviet long-range ballistic missile, especially the ICBM. In a larger sense, however, its subject is the change that has taken place during the past decade in the kinds of knowledge that constitute strategic intelligence and the meaning of this change in terms of what kind of organization and activity is needed to produce the intelligence of national survival.

The New Knowledge

When we first visited Great Frusina with Mr. Kent, the evaluation of her strategic stature was presented as requiring knowledge of "the situation, the non-military instrumentalities, the force in being, and the war potential" of the state.³ Now, little more than ten years later, the development of thermonuclear weapons and missiles able to carry them half way across the earth in a matter of minutes has put a different face on the last two of these concepts: the Soviet force in being has taken on overriding significance as a constant threat to our national survival; and the mobilization of war potential, on the other hand, is now largely bereft of meaning in the context of the general war. The enemy's military research and development programs and his plans for making new

¹ *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 212.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

weapons operational have replaced his mobilization potential as a factor in his strategic stature.

The effect of these changes on the nature of strategic intelligence activity is to elevate the strategic importance of getting what used to be considered military departmental information—order of battle—on the force in being, and to reduce radically the time factor in all our intelligence-policy equations, both for force in being and for weapons under development. In “the long-range intelligence of . . . grand strategy”⁴ the time range has been greatly compressed, both for those who decide the policy and to an equal or even greater degree for the collectors and producers of the intelligence. The U.S. decision makers are currently faced with the prospect of nuclear missile forces which can effect virtually immediate delivery of an almost annihilative blow and for which there is as yet no active defense.

Mr. Kent could state a decade ago that “as a general proposition every country knows a great deal about all other countries’ forces in being and a great deal about most of their weapons.”⁵ As every intelligence officer concerned with the problem today knows, the verity of this generalization with respect to Soviet guided missile systems leaves much to be desired. The critical thing is that the decline in the quality and quantity of our information on the enemy’s weapon systems, in being and under development, is occurring at just this time, when U.S. policy makers require a more immediate and greater fund of information than ever before. This was the point of President Eisenhower’s statement of 25 May 1960, following the loss of the U-2 and the collapse at the Summit:

Our safety . . . [demands] effective systems for gathering information about the military capability of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free world security.⁶

Another time compression in the new strategic intelligence, besides the prospective suddenness of attack and potential

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁶ *New York Times*, May 26, 1960, p. 16.

brevity of war, is the continuing acceleration of change in military technology. To the policy maker this brings a two-fold problem—higher rates of obsolescence and increased costs for weapon systems. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery has pointed out:

The statesman of a century ago was given more than a generation to adjust national policies to the change from coal to oil in the world's navies. But today such adjustment must occur, in historical terms, overnight. An example: National security planners had scarcely begun to adapt policy to the fact of fission weapons in the world's arsenals, when the vastly more destructive fusion weapon entered upon the scene. . . . While the pace of technological change has quickened, the cost of failure to make appropriate policy adaptations has risen—exponentially.⁷

These "appropriate policy adaptations" are dependent upon information which only the intelligence community can provide. An intelligence problem of such magnitude and complexity cannot be solved with the order-of-battle apparatus of a decade ago.

A third point at which time is a factor is in the process of translating a weapons system idea into the reality of a field capability. Here management control techniques and planning have succeeded, despite greatly increased complexity and an esoteric technology, in compressing the development-production-operation cycle in varying degrees, according to the state of the art and the urgency of the requirements. The USSR, as well as the United States, has employed such organizational techniques in its missile programs and thus further shortened our lead time in the strategic intelligence problem.

Although we have been thinking here primarily about immediate prospects in the ICBM field, it must be recognized that our new strategic intelligence problems are neither unique thereto nor likely to diminish. The ever accelerating rate of technological change has already thrust similar problems before us in such areas as anti-submarine warfare, anti-missile weapons, and space systems for war and peace.

⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Report No. 1026, 86th Congress, 2d Session, "Organizing for National Security," (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 13.

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Great Frusina Revisited

Organizational Patching

A recognition of the fundamental change in the character, increase in the importance, and decrease in the availability of the positive intelligence necessary for the strategic equation leads us to revisit the analysis of intelligence as organization. In doing so we may profit by using Mr. Kent's criteria to ask ourselves some pertinent questions. Have we been "willing to undertake heartbreaking reorganization when the balance sheet so indicates"? Have we permitted units or organizational forms to achieve "a vested interest" in what is no longer pertinent to our priority problems? Have we achieved the "fluidity of structure" and "the ability to shift power . . . as unforeseen [or even foreseen] peak loads develop"?⁸

The organizational history of intelligence research components under the impact of the Soviet missile problem does reveal an effort to adjust to the new situation. In CIA, for example, the question of Soviet technical developments in the missiles field was attacked ten years ago by organizing a Guided Missile Branch within one of the divisions of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and before the decade was half over that branch had itself become a division. Outside the field of technical development, in order to meet the more pressing need for knowledge of the Soviet missile force in being or in immediate prospect, there was meanwhile organized a small Guided Missile Staff in one of the economic research divisions of the Office of Research and Reports to study Soviet production of the weapons for issue to the armed forces, and by the end of the decade this staff had become one of the largest branches in that Office. It managed to harness enough experience to supply some of the information of broad scope required for national estimates on the Soviet missile program. And most recently there has been an effort to pool both scientific and economic intelligence resources in a Task Force devoted to the Soviet LRBM program, particularly the ICBM threat.

Helpful as these adjustments are, I submit that they represent half-way measures, an ad hoc response of vested interests rather than the heartbreaking reorganization for a unified weapons system approach to the whole strategic problem that would demonstrate fluidity of structure. Even the "Task

⁸ Kent, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

Force," really only a coordinating mechanism, is not a device that can weave together the scientific and technical research done by one component and the study of weapons system programming, costing, production, and operational deployment done by another. The continued division of line control and supervision still prevents any integrated approach to the research problem.

To conceive the kind of organizational measures that could, and in my view should, be taken, we might draw by analogy from outside of intelligence, from the typical development program for the missile system itself. This, like the missile intelligence problem, has all the attributes of complexity, specialized knowledge, high priority, and unmatched urgency. Here specialists organized according to their component of the problem work on assigned tasks with no certainty whether and how soon they will be accomplished. Nevertheless the requirements for each task are so organized and the specifications for each component product so calculated that all will be compatible in the final assembly, the finished system. It is therefore necessary, as the program proceeds, continuously to modify the design of the overall system as the original requirements for individual components cannot be met or on the other hand are modified by favorable findings that had not been foreseen. *To carry out such a program requires centralized planning and line control of contributing components working as an integrated team, so supervised as to assure that all elements being developed at any given time will be compatible in the system as then conceived.*

The missile intelligence problem, indeed the entire Soviet strategic intelligence problem, requires a similar set of organizational controls. The endless adjustment of its interwoven elements can be achieved only by *central definition of the objectives of individual intelligence components engaged in research, support, and collection* and a constant evaluation of their progress toward these objectives. The integration of the complex and specialized tasks involved cannot be relegated to a committee, a special assistant, or a "gadfly" with any hope of carrying out an effective program. It can be accomplished only by a working organization composed of specialists from the several components and *a management center with the power of direct control.*

The House Divided

We have seen that the nature of strategic intelligence knowledge has changed considerably, particularly in its time component, and that the compression of time has been accompanied by an increase in substantive complexity and specialization which our research organizations have failed to counter with a planned and integrated program. We have also noted a decline in the quality and quantity of information on the enemy's strategic capabilities in the weapons field, a decline for which there has been a tendency for those engaged in intelligence research to blame those engaged in collection activities, and vice versa. The fault lies rather in an imperfect understanding of the nature of the problem.

At the heart of this problem, as far as the CIA effort is concerned, lies the fact that the Agency is a house divided between intelligence collection and intelligence research. Mr. Kent noted a decade ago that the segregation of covert collection activities was dictated by the need for secrecy, and he pointed out that "unless this clandestine force watches sharply it can become its own worst enemy. For if it allows the mechanisms of security to cut it off from some of the most significant lines of guidance, it destroys its own reason for existence."⁹ In today's highest-priority intelligence problems, I suggest, the segregation of intelligence collection from research is a luxury we can no longer afford.

The difficulties of integration are undoubtedly manifold and great, but they cannot be more cogent than those of continuing to stumble along our separate ways. First among these is that of compensating for the time compression we have noted, of meeting the urgency of the key problems. Segregation requires the interposition of a duplicative liaison structure, with an inevitable loss of precious time and in many instances an attenuation of the specialized substantive data required for the intelligence product. Second, collection resources cannot be brought into full play on the esoteric, complex, and changing requirements for data without interaction between the progress of the research effort and the peculiarities of collection tradecraft. Finally, the insulation of research specialist from collection specialist prevents the comparative analysis of

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

collection resources essential to an integrated, centralized, problem-oriented effort and to coordinated planning research for such an effort.

In a word, the segregation of the collection activity can but prevent a truly integrated approach to the priority strategic intelligence problem. Its need for secrecy must be weighed against the urgency of this problem. In the integrated research and collection effort with the best-known accomplishments of the recent past, the U-2 program, the risk to our national security was considerably greater than in any ordinary covert collection operation one might conceive. Yet secrecy was forced to yield to need, and relatively large numbers of both research and collection personnel worked together on the centrally directed task.

Agency and Community

The change in the character of strategic intelligence has had a marked effect on departmental intelligence organizations, activities, and policies, and these would be fruitful subjects for separate discussion in detail. After more than a decade of central intelligence, however, CIA is legally and by established precedent the only organization whose primary business is intelligence coordination and integration. It is therefore the proper one to take the lead in solving the strategic intelligence problems of today, which, however analogous to the order of battle of a bygone era, transcend in their implications and complexity the responsibilities of any single departmental intelligence organization. If the Director of Central Intelligence is to advise the National Security Council on these topmost questions of national security, he must have an organization capable of providing him with the results of integrated collection and research. The matter has become too large and complex for post facto integration through the intuitive applications of staff officers and the ad hoc considerations of joint committees. As the Director of Naval Intelligence wrote recently, "This is a critical level of intelligence production . . . where intelligence usually triggers the broad changes in defense policy that can set off a whole series of national programs."¹⁰

¹⁰ Laurence H. Frost, "Intelligence as a Support to and a Responsibility of Command," *ONI Review*, Vol. 15, No. 9 (September 1960), p. 388.

In our quite proper concern in recent years with the threat of Soviet economic and political offensives, we should not lose sight of the ultimate fulcrum of strategic power, as pointed out by a recent study prepared for the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate:

As long as the cold war continues, American foreign policy must be based on a defense policy designed to ward off Soviet threats against the free countries of the world. While military defense needs to be supplemented by economic, psychological, and other policies, the provision of adequate appropriate military strength is the precondition of free world security."

The provision of adequate military strength is in large part dependent upon adequate intelligence about Soviet weapons systems, present and prospective; and the provision of this intelligence, we have suggested, requires a problem-oriented program bringing together existing research and collection resources into a centrally controlled unit.

There is still one further requirement. This unified organization must contain, as an integral part, a working-level group concerned with problem analysis and planning. This type of unit, analogous to the R & D and "Advanced Projects" units in the creation of weapon systems, has been conspicuous in the intelligence community by its absence. There has been a tendency to put the planning function on the policy management level, in isolation from the detailed substantive realities. The planning group here contemplated is one of experts, conversant in detail with the problems of today and of tomorrow. It must be not only substantively qualified but at the same time cognizant of the comparative capabilities of the resources it can call upon to accomplish its objectives. Its work must be at a tempo corresponding to the urgency of the problems it has to deal with, and its solutions must be given force by representation in policy management.

"U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 1st Session, *United States Foreign Policy*, "Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy," A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations by The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University, No. 8 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 1.

Such an integration of intelligence planning, production, and collection should provide for the definition of objectives, a rapid response to requirements, the constant evaluation of progress, and adequate control over a dynamic process. It should make possible a more economical and thorough exploitation of our finite resources. It would not, of course, guarantee success; but with current organizational forms clearly an impediment to success, a refusal to reorganize would augment the possibility of failure, along with the prospect of higher expenditures and greater risks.

It is time for us to give new meaning to the production of "high-level foreign positive intelligence" and bring all our resources to bear on the first-priority national intelligence objective through positive action. Soviet security is only half our enemy; the other half is the flight of time, our most precious commodity. Whether we shall waste it or use it wisely seems in large part to depend upon our ability to recognize the deficiencies in our current efforts and overcome our parochialisms. Upon our success or failure could ultimately hinge the survival of the nation.

*Exemplary but unusual history
of the detection and reconstruction
of a Soviet missile-guidance system.*

**THE YO-YO STORY:
An Electronics Analysis Case History
Charles R. Ahern**

Electronic components are a critical part of modern weapons systems, less dispensable than some of their more obviously important features. It is possible to conceive of an air defense system without interceptor aircraft, for example, but it is not possible to conceive of one without electronic devices, systems, and techniques. Intelligence on the electronic portions of Soviet weapons systems has therefore become a key item in our knowledge of these systems. Here is a case history of community teamwork in gaining such intelligence on an unprecedented type of radar control for surface-to-air missiles in the Soviet air defense system. The story features a concerted effort to obtain observations, an imaginative analysis, a lucky break, and an excellent follow-through by research and development.

Herringbones and Ventilators

In the early 1950's U.S. and British intelligence posted a lookout for signs of the Soviet deployment of surface-to-air missiles in readiness for defense against air attack. Toward the end of 1953 some unusual road networks were seen outside of Moscow, which, although they did not have the anticipated configuration of missile sites, were at least located at points where missile installations might be expected. As the pattern of these locations began to develop a more intense search for them was made. By the autumn of 1954 quite a number of reports consistently described the networks as comprising three more or less parallel roads a mile long intersected by some ten cross roads about a half mile in length in a herringbone pattern. There was nothing in the reports that would particularly excite the curiosity of the specialist in electronics intelligence.




Figure 1. Herringbone Road Complex

During the last quarter of that year U.S. and UK attachés began to report details of other features around the herringbone complexes in the Moscow area. In September a British observer, without making specific reference to it in the body of his report, indicated in a sketch that there was a "barracks area" some distance away, more or less in line with the axis of the herringbone and connected with it by a road. After a couple of weeks this report was amplified and a different possible barracks area located. The original "barracks," according to the revised description, seemed to be a long grass-covered bunker with a concrete hand-stand at one end. The observer noted that large ventilators at this end of the bunker flapped with what seemed extraordinary violence, even when the fairly high wind blowing at the time was taken into consideration.

A week later, when two U.S. attachés were a half hour out from Moscow on a plane bound for Leningrad, one of them noticed an unusual installation on the ground. It had a look of newness and activity about it. He didn't get a very clear impression of any buildings on the site; his eye was caught by the motion of two large wheels installed in a pit with a ramp leading down to them. Each wheel, he reported, was like a thin yo-yo, with twin flat disks spinning at an angle to the horizontal. He estimated their speed at about 60 rpm and said they appeared to wobble on their axes. He had difficulty describing the nature of this wobble; it appeared to be a kind of "even undulation throwing the outside edges [of the disks] a foot or two from their planes of rotation." His sketch is shown in Figure 2.

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


Figure 2. Observer's Sketch of Yo-Yo

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This report proved to be a remarkably accurate description of the device thereupon nicknamed the Yo-Yo,¹ considering that the observer had only five or ten seconds to take in the details of something never before seen or heard of. His companion on the flight, seated on the other side of the plane, had in the course of the trip spotted one of the herringbone sites, and when he returned to Moscow a few days later he reported it in response to the standing order for observations on these. When the two men checked their observation times they realized that the Yo-Yo and the herringbone had been seen simultaneously, and that there might be a connection between them. They astutely guessed that the Yo-Yo might represent some kind of missile guidance system, and this comment in the report brought it to the attention of electronics intelligence analysts.

A month later, about the beginning of December, British observers riding on a train southeast of Moscow noticed a fenced area with a microwave antenna on a pole at one end. In the center of the enclosure there was an earth bunker with one open end facing the pole. There they saw a "double rotating disk array," each disk, they judged, about ten feet in diameter and making about 120 revolutions per minute. The plane of the disks was inclined at about 45 degrees from the horizontal. The observers had the impression that the disks either had serrated edges or were polygonal structures given a disk-like appearance by the rotation.

In February 1955 this same site was observed and photographed by U.S. personnel. Their photography was not of a scale or quality to convey any clear idea of the shape of the Yo-Yo, but their observations, erroneous in part, did correct and refine some of the earlier information. They reported that the two disks were each about 20 feet in diameter and about 12 inches thick. They thought them both vertical, at right angles to each other. They were not sure whether they were double, and if so whether the two halves rotated in the same or opposite directions. They estimated the rotation to

¹ Soviet Bloc electronics items are assigned *nicknames*, as opposed to code names or cover names, to provide a common nomenclature in the collection and production of intelligence. These nicknames are selected and agreed upon on a tripartite basis among electronics intelligence representatives of the United States, the UK, and Canada.

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


Figure 3. Sketch of Disks Seen One on Edge and One Full-face.

be about 40 rpm and stated that there was no wobble, an optical illusion of one being given by the viewing angle and the serrated edges. Figure 3 is a sketch supplied with this report.

At this stage it was by no means clear that the herringbone complexes had anything to do with missiles. No missile had been seen on the sites, and the road arrangement would have been equally suitable to housing development or crop or ammunition storage. Even if they were surface-to-air missile sites, it was not firmly established that the Yo-Yo was uniquely related to them. Further, there was nothing about the Yo-Yo to indicate that it was an electronic device; the reports on it did not even convey any clear idea of what it looked like. One offhand opinion received from British experts was that it might be a rock crusher.

Nevertheless, under the good-humored assumption that "if no one can figure out what it is, it must be electronics," the Yo-Yo reports were laid before the joint gatherings of community electronics specialists at that time sponsored by the old Military Electronics Working Group. Beginning in January 1955, the Yo-Yo was brought up at each meeting of the MEWG for many months. For the present, however, there was little that the electronics analyst could do but speculate as to what the observers had really seen and request more detailed information, especially photographs.

By the summer of 1955 it had become more or less clear that the Yo-Yo did bear a specific relationship to the herringbone complexes. The herringbones were arranged so that their length was always along a radial line from Moscow. The Yo-Yo bunker was situated on this same line, centered on the herringbone, and always about a mile nearer to Moscow. The

Yo-Yo itself was invariably at the herringbone end of the bunker. But the true shape and appearance of the Yo-Yo remained uncertain.

Early in August 1955 a packet of photographs was brought to CIA electronics analysts. Picturing a Yo-Yo southeast of Moscow, they had been taken, happily, from several different angles. These photographs revealed, at last, what the Yo-Yo really looked like. The observers had for the past year been more or less correctly and accurately describing what they had seen, but the descriptions were incomplete. The "disks" were truncated equilateral triangles assembled in pairs in the Star of David configuration. There were two such assemblies, one in the vertical Moscow-herringbone plane and the other (of which an edge is visible in the accompanying reproduction) at right angles tilting up 45 degrees from the horizontal toward the herringbone. The early "violent flapping of the ventilators" and wobbling wheels were now comprehensible optical interpretations of the two assemblies in rotation.

Analysis and Synthesis

The analyst, as is usually the case in electronics intelligence, thus found himself confronted with a fully developed Soviet device deployed in the field. In these circumstances his task is one of unravelling what the Soviet designer was




Figure 4. Photograph of Bunker with Yo-Yos at Right End

attempting to achieve, the reverse of the original design process. Whereas the Soviet designer is given a set of performance specifications and proceeds by selecting available techniques, components, and production processes and by making the inevitable technical compromises to reach his final design, the analyst must work backward from the finished design to arrive at the designer's objective. In this process he must also take care that his thinking is not controlled by concepts of how an item would be designed in the United States: the Soviet concept of equipment use is usually quite different from ours, at least in electronics.

In the absence of any similar, previously known piece of equipment from which to extrapolate, the analysis of the Yo-Yo problem had to begin with a basic assumption as to the general purpose of the device—that it was designed to control surface-to-air missiles launched from the herringbone area (though no missiles had yet been seen). Granted this assumption, the problem became that of figuring out how missiles could be guided by an apparatus with such an appearance as that shown in the photos and the placement and behavior described in the observer reports. The analytic point of departure was the consideration that, however the Yo-Yo worked to guide the assumed missiles, it would have to provide information with sufficient accuracy on both the missile's target and the missile itself in three coordinates—range, elevation, and azimuth.

In virtually all surface-to-air missile guidance systems this tracking of the missile and its target is done by a system of radar antennas, say of parabolic form, that point toward missile and target and focus beams of radio energy on them, much as a searchlight does with its visible beam. Before the Yo-Yo photos were received the possibility could not be ruled out that it too was such a large parabolic reflector imperfectly observed and poorly described; but the form shown in the photos was clearly no conventional variety of antenna system. All the available descriptive information indicated that the Yo-Yo disks retained their relative position while rotating. This meant that only the edges of the disks could point upward and away from Moscow, the direction in which radar antennas should be looking for enemy aircraft and should guide missiles to attack them. The straight sections of these

edges seemed the most likely portion for antenna apertures. This reasoning provided the germ of a solution.

The straight sections were about 20 feet long and perhaps 8 inches wide. An aperture of these proportions could be expected to produce a transverse fan beam about 30 times as broad in the plane of its short dimension as in that of its length.² Given the orientation, arrangement, and rotation pattern of the disks, it appeared that on each rotation of each two-disk assembly six of these narrow beams, one from each straight edge, would scan a volume of space extending above and beyond the herringbone complexes. The size and number of the apertures had apparently been one of the requirements on the mechanical designer: since six would have made a huge, unwieldy single disk, he had divided them between two Star-of-David triangles.

The six beams from the tilted Yo-Yo would thus scan the air approaches to Moscow in azimuth and those from the vertical assembly would scan it in elevation. Both sets could provide range data on any target or missile in the volume of space scanned. With the whole volume covered, the antennas would not need, like a searchlight or parabolic radar, to stop scanning in order to follow a target or the defense missile, but would provide position data on these in the course of continued scanning. In such a system, therefore called "track-while-scan," memory devices would be needed to develop the track by maintaining continuity of information during the intervals between the individual antenna scans. Such devices were considered possible.

A series of calculations, based on guided missile performance requirements as well as radar needs, were then undertaken. Guided missile analysts furnished estimates of the probable range of Soviet surface-to-air missiles and the size of their warheads. The former provided limits for certain technical characteristics affecting the range requirement of the radar; the latter helped define its accuracy requirements. In all, two dozen or more technical factors entered the calculations. These had to be weighed against one another in reaching the compromises that are always forced upon the system designer:

² The dimensions of the beam are inversely proportional to those of the aperture that produces it.

for example, if the operating frequency were too low, accuracy would be poor and transmitter power requirements excessive; if it were too high, the rapid scanning rate of the antennas and the narrowness of the beams would make too few pulses hit the target.

As the design for a missile guidance system evolved from this process, a check was made with analysts in the field of vacuum tubes and other electronic components to insure that it did not call for techniques or components beyond Soviet capabilities. Finally a design was established that took into consideration the missile, the operating principle of its guidance, the technical characteristics of the radar, the accuracy of the system, and its anticipated capabilities.

One task remained—to re-examine the entire solution against any possible alternatives in the light of all reports and photographs, inquiring whether everything reported could be accounted for in the solution and whether anything required by the solution and not reported would seriously weaken it. Each alternative solution that came to mind failed to account for some aspect of the reported data or required a capability on the part of Soviet technology that appeared unreasonable. One suggestion, for example, was that the Yo-Yo antennas would simply radiate energy to illuminate the target for a homing system in the missile. Such a system might work, but because of the discontinuous nature of the radar signal it would require the inclusion of memory devices in the homing gear of each missile. This elaborate provision seemed unlikely. Furthermore, the homing illumination theory was inconsistent with the configuration of the Yo-Yos: a single pair of disks should give adequate illumination, so the two at right angles to each other would be an unnecessary complication.

Testing the tentative answer to a problem is a fairly standard procedure, but testing this answer was a particularly demanding task because of its startling implications. If it was right, the Soviets had not continued in the direction taken by the original German wartime development of surface-to-air missile guidance nor in that of postwar Western efforts, which were based on extensions of the German work. Instead, making a clean break with precedent, they had arrived at a design that was inherently capable of dealing with multiple

targets simultaneously. The data on the target or targets were apparently translated automatically into missile command guidance; there were no indications of a homing system on the missile.

This analysis, which required some three weeks from the time the photos were received, was made the basis for a Provisional Scientific Intelligence Report incorporating its conclusions and presenting a list of probable technical parameters.³ The publication of the report would ordinarily have been the end of the matter; but the Yo-Yo story is unique. For one thing, the report found, with its unprecedented conclusions, a by no means unanimous initial acceptance among the elements of the intelligence community concerned with electronics and guided missiles. For another, it was brought in December 1955, through a series of steps initiated by Army intelligence, before the Technical Advisory Committee on Electronics of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, and the Committee recommended that a project be initiated to build a prototype or mock-up of the Yo-Yo as therein conceived. The mock-up technique, used during World War II, had led to an assessment of the capabilities of the German radars and was invaluable in developing electronic countermeasures to foil them, but its use had not been common in the decade following the war.

In March 1956, at about the same time it became fairly well established that missiles were actually emplaced on the herringbone complexes, the mock-up contract was let through Army Ordnance and work on it begun.

Exploitation of a Break

Meanwhile the Dragon Returnee Program had been working on repatriated German scientists and technicians who had been taken to the U.S.S.R. after the war. Many of these gave information of some value to electronics and guided missile intelligence, but it appeared that the Soviets had carefully kept the German electronics specialists insulated from developmental work in military electronics, especially in the heavy radar field, where the results of Soviet efforts were becoming increasingly evident from other sources. After sev-

³ Provisional Scientific Intelligence Report, CIA/SI 51-55, 6 Oct. 1955, "YO-YO, A Possible Soviet Missile Guidance System."

eral years of experience with returnees, the chances of finding one who knew about the development of specific high priority electronics items were privately judged at about one in ten thousand.

In the fall of 1956, however, a year after the publication of the Yo-Yo analysis, one of the Dragon returnees, Christian Sorge, who it was thought might have information on a different missile system, called attention during his routine preliminary debriefing to a new development on which he had worked from 1950 to 1952, a system for guiding surface-to-air missiles called the B-200. He said that it used a very strange-looking antenna system, which he then sketched on a sheet of paper for the interrogator. The interrogator, looking at




Figure 5. Sorge's Sketch of B-200 Antenna

the superimposed equilateral triangles Sorge had drawn, recalled the published Yo-Yo analysis and realized with considerable excitement that Sorge had knowledge more important than had been supposed. As the preliminary debriefing continued, the identity of the B-200 with the analytic conception of the Yo-Yo was established at some dozen points.

The intelligence community now organized a team of specialists to assist in Sorge's debriefing. Their efforts brought out more and more technical details, especially of the memory portion of the system, the complex electronic tracking circuitry made necessary by the adoption of a guidance system dependent on the discontinuous data of scanning antennas. It was this critical part of the B-200 system, fortunately, that Sorge had worked on. By the time his debriefing had

been completed he had provided many new insights, as well as having confirmed some 25 or 30 facts hypothesized in the analytic reconstruction. One curious reaction to the initial correlation between the analytic report of October 1955 and Sorge's information had been the suspicion that the report might have fallen into KGB hands, who through Sorge were now feeding it back to the interrogator. This fear was quickly dispelled by the amount of detail and consistency in Sorge's data.

Sorge said that he and several others, having signed contracts with the Soviet authorities for additional work in 1950 and 1951, had been assigned tasks on the B-200 system, which had apparently been conceived by 1949. In addition to the details of circuit designs, he described some of the testing programs for the prototype that began in 1952, and his information was supplemented by that from some of the others who had returned. But in 1952 they had all been removed from B-200 development and placed in non-sensitive activities for a cooling-off period of three or four years prior to repatriation.

Follow-Through by R&D

The group of specialists assisting in the debriefing of Sorge included personnel from the Diamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratory, the contractor for the Yo-Yo mock-up project. As details of the tracking system and other portions of the B-200 were brought out by interrogation, they were promptly included in the development work, effecting important changes in its direction. As a major example, although the analytic report had hypothesized a separate computer for each missile-target engagement, the DOFL people had decided that the Soviets would use a single large digital computer. Sorge's statement that separate analog computers were in fact called for in the design now brought about a timely reorientation in the mock-up project. It was fortunate that the project was already contracted for and under way when Sorge appeared: at least a year and perhaps more was saved by having a research team assembled and working on the problem before being overwhelmed by such a volume of detailed information.

As it was, the development project, begun in April 1956, did not yield a prototype installation that could be tested until early in 1958. The results of the test program showed the

Soviet B-200 to constitute a major technological advance in radar tracking systems. An additional surprise was that it performed much better than expected when tested against electronic countermeasures, jamming; but the technique of dropping chaff was effective against it if properly employed. The B-200 was found to have an angle accuracy as great as 0.05° on strong targets and a range accuracy of 25 yards; this meant that missiles in the range of 20 to 25 miles would not need a homing radar of their own. Its low-altitude capability was much better than the Germans had estimated, being limited only by the terrain around the installation.

The ability of the system to cope with multiple targets was confirmed; the ability of one installation to direct as many as 20 or 25 simultaneous target-missile interceptions, as claimed by the Germans, seems to depend only on whether the Soviets choose to provide the necessary computer for each interception.

Thus the Yo-Yo story, which began with the reports of a few alert observers who noticed some unusual installations in 1953 and 1954, ends with the tests of the mock-up system in the autumn of 1958. It raises some interesting questions, for example how quickly the Sorge information would have been believed if the Yo-Yo sites not been seen, reported, and analyzed. Even with the analytic report in hand, some of the specialists involved in the debriefing doubted much of what Sorge said in the early stages. The approach of the analytic report itself, the setting out to design a Soviet electronic system on the basis of its physical appearance, was unique; it succeeded largely because the design was so different from anything theretofore developed.

The concern of electronics analysts about the new Soviet guidance system has remained undiminished, because our information on its internal workings ends with the 1950-1953 period, and what the Soviets may have done in the intervening years to improve its performance is a continuing problem. Several studies have considered what improvements *could* be made in the B-200, but no intelligence information has come to light on any that *have* been made. And now the recent appearance of a second-generation missile guidance system, Fruit Set, which might be loosely described as a mobile Yo-Yo, is tending to push the original B-200 into the background.

Case study of how the Sino-Soviet Bloc intelligence services provide black support for overt psychological warfare themes.

PSYWAR BY FORGERY

Alma Fryxell

There is nothing new about the use of forged documents in the psychological warfare operations of the Sino-Soviet Bloc intelligence services, especially in pursuit of particular aims within a single country; West Germany, for example, has been flooded with them for years. But the years 1957 and 1958 saw a noticeable increase in internationally distributed propaganda-by-forgery supporting the general Bloc objectives of discrediting the United States and other Western countries and of promoting division in the West. For these two years and the first half of 1959, 18 such forgeries surfaced in facsimile have been discovered, and a number of other instances wherein the text of a purported document was quoted without attempt at reproduction or a document was at least falsely reported to exist makes a total of 32 cases available for study from this period.

Some of these were sniper shots at individual important targets, without relation to any of the others and usually without any further follow-up; but most of them—25—were interconnected into nine distinguishable series, and some formed rather elaborate progressions in prolonged campaigns given heavy play in the overt propaganda media. The false documents were many of them originally surfaced in the overt Bloc media, but a greater number were planted, especially in the underdeveloped countries, in small "independent" newspapers subsidized for such purposes or otherwise controlled. Several were transmitted to their targets through diplomatic channels and a few by covert mailing.

The orchestration of these varied media in a coordinated campaign requires central direction. We know that black propaganda is a function of the Bloc foreign intelligence services under close direction from high Party echelons. It is

possible that the entire Bloc show is directed by a unit of the CPSU Central Committee and run by the KGB through its liaison officers with the other services.

Single Documents

An example of the isolated false document is provided by the most recent of the cases in this period, the only one concerned with Black Africa. On 4 March 1959 the Hungarian press agency MTI transmitted in French to its outlets in Europe the purported text of a document signed by the prime minister of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky, and by the "head of the European organization of Central Africa, Alfred Finsent,"¹ which declared that it had been officially decided to transfer African nationalist prisoners "to another concentration camp where all those who would not express their resolution to break with African nationalism would be exterminated." MTI explained that this meant the Hola camp in Kenya, and reported further:

The African prisoners involved number about 80,000. If, after interrogation, they refuse to disown the Nationalist movement they will be thrown into ditches called "poison wells" filled with poisoned water. Within a few days the poisoned water will penetrate the body and kill. . . . The Cairo bureau of the Kenya African Association states that according to their knowledge, 35 Africans have already been exterminated "experimentally" by this procedure . . .

MTI's sensational disclosure of this perhaps too heinous plan was not picked up and used, as far as we know, in other media during 1959.

A more ambitious single-shot effort was made in June 1958 by the Czech intelligence service. It forged, with accurate duplication of format and style, an entire issue of *Ceske Slovo*, a bona fide newspaper published in Munich by Czech émigrés, and mailed it black from Munich and Vienna to current and former subscribers, using one genuine mailing list it had acquired some years earlier by unknown means and another recently obtained by burglarizing the *Ceske Slovo* offices. The

¹ Apparently a bad transliteration from Cyrillic through Arabic, along with a garbled title. Alfred Vincent was chairman of the Organization of European Members of the East African Central Legislative Assembly. Neither Cyrillic nor Arabic has a *c*, and Arabic has no *v*.

forged edition carried anti-West propaganda and announced that the newspaper was going out of existence because its editors were disillusioned with the West. In an exceptional follow-up, articles from it were quoted as authentic not only by the official *Rude Pravo* but by Party papers in Austria and Luxembourg and a non-Party Chicago monthly, *Svobodne Ceskoslovensko*, that follows the propaganda line of the Czech regime. The Western CP organs are generally not used in the distribution of Bloc forgeries.

A particularly dangerous kind of forged document was put into the mail on 5 July 1957 by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung, the East German equivalent of the KGB, which in January of that year had been assigned psychological warfare as a major operational responsibility. In France that summer one of the biggest news stories was the killing of the Strasbourg police chief's wife on 17 May by a bomb mailed her husband in the guise of a gift package. There had been mailed at the same time and in the same Paris post office a batch of particularly vicious hate-letters to French officials and private citizens in Paris and Alsace-Lorraine, and the conviction was growing that these and the terrorist bomb stemmed from the same source. The letters, demanding the return of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, were one of several series of Nazistic letters and leaflets signed "Kampfverband fuer ein Unabhaengiges Deutschland," an organization since determined to have been invented by the HVA for agitatory purposes (and given a fraternal plug in a May 1958 broadcast from Radio Moscow warning the French against it and implying that it was secretly supported by the West German government).

The single document mailed on 5 July 1957 was a deep and dexterous thrust evolved from the fictitious Kampfverband's campaign. Addressed to a high French official in West Germany, it was a forged letter from Elim O'Shaughnessy, head of the Political Division of our Bonn embassy, calling the State Department's attention to the activity of German reactionary and ultranationalist groups and recommending that the U.S. Government support these groups and use them. Having been delivered thus simply to its target, the French government, the forgery was never published or replayed in any way. It was convincing enough to have caused genuine damage in U.S.-

French relationships—except that it had been typed on the same machine as some other HVA psywar productions.

The remaining four individual cases were mere allegations of the existence of incriminating documents, made once and not repeated. One concerned the Near East: on 1 December 1958 the Czech press agency CTK attributed to "the Cairo press" a report that the new Sudanese government had found among the old government's papers some secret documents showing U.S. bribery of high Sudanese officials. The other three were targeted in the Far East and appeared in the *Bombay Blitz*, a Soviet-controlled "independent" weekly—a State Department directive to Ambassador Bishop in Thailand that he "screen the loyalties of the King and his government members"; a secret pact between Premier Kishi and Secretary Dulles "to permit use of Japanese troops anywhere in Asia"; and a letter from Chiang Kai-shek to President Eisenhower warning that "every third soldier" in the Nationalist army was disloyal.

The Taipei Cables and Indonesia

Blitz was also the vehicle for an extended if not very sophisticated series of facsimile forgeries devised to take advantage of the 24 May 1957 riot at the American embassy in Taipei. On 14 September it prepared its readers for the forgeries by reporting rumors that Ambassador Rankin was in trouble and might be dismissed because some of the embassy's important secret documents had been lost when the premises were raided by the rioters. In its issue of the following week it reproduced the first of these documents, two cables to Washington wherein Ambassador Rankin discusses with some obliquity the methods to be used in assassinating Chiang and others in his entourage and recommends the murders be disguised as accidents. The text was couched in allusive terms for the sake of verisimilitude, but in its accompanying comment *Blitz* removed any uncertainty its readers might have had about its meaning and left nothing to their imagination. This is the usual Bloc practice in the surfacing of verbatim forgeries; but the rest of the Taipei series used less subtle texts.

The next issue of *Blitz*, 28 September, reproduced the heading and first lines of two fabricated cables from Ambassador

SECRET

Allison in Indonesia to the Department, as "repeated to Taipei," and quoted their full texts. One urged increased aid, including combat units from Formosa, for dissident Indonesian movements; the other reported progress in intrigues to overthrow Sukarno and gave directions for packaging arms shipped from Formosa and Malaya to the Darul Islam. The same treatment was given the final item in the series, in *Blitz*' 12 October issue. Beginning on the same page that disclosed the Kishi-Dulles secret pact, there was reproduced

US PLOT TO MURDER CHIANG

BLITZ

ASIA'S FOREMOST NEWSMAGAZINE
EVERY SATURDAY PRICE 25 NAYE PAISE

TELEGRAM SENT

To: SECRETARY WASHINGTON
Date: April 4, 1957
Code: OTF
Charged to: Embassy

508, April 4, 5 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Your telegram No. 1348 of April 2, 1957, to carry out version No. 1, which you apparently wish to give to the people in Gimo's entourage, is being carried out completely. There is also a possibility that at the moment some of the successors will not lose heart and tell Gimo everything.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek continues to maintain complete control of the secret service. Report by his agents, Chiang Kai-shek's secret service, is being carried out. Chiang Kai-shek's secret service, therefore, is being carried out. Chiang Kai-shek's secret service, therefore, is being carried out. Chiang Kai-shek's secret service, therefore, is being carried out.

I consider therefore version No. 5 preferable, although its details are more carefully worked out. Its execution will depend on proper timing if a decision is to be taken. In any case I agree that a final decision should be taken as soon as possible.

Ranika

TELEGRAM SENT

To: SECRETARY WASHINGTON
Date: April 9, 1957
Code: OTF
Charged to: Embassy

561, April 9, 5:30 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Latest reports from very reliable sources on the attitude of Gimo's entourage indicate that the plan outlined in your telegram No. 1348 does not solve the problem.

In my opinion, it is necessary to go further and, besides the plan outlined in your telegram, to take similar steps against the persons mentioned in your last report. These measures are necessary to ensure that the old guard might not seriously compromise the services we are fully aware of the special situation.

Meanwhile we shall continue to "screen" officers and appointees of reliable individuals to positions in the Army and Air Force. This has to some extent been done in the Navy already.

In view of the general opinion prevailing here I have drawn up certain measures to be taken before carrying out the actions authorized in your telegram No. 1348.

Ranika

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

a cable from Washington which deplored the tendency of SEATO members exhibited at its Canberra session to use the pact to obtain economic aid, reminded U.S. ambassadors that "control over the armed forces of the Asian members of SEATO remains our prime objective," and outlined steps to keep the local governments in line. *Blitz* apologized that the



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
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From A Correspondent
British Military Authorities in Bahrain

American Plot To Overthrow Sukarno



PROOF POSITIVE FROM TAIPEH DOCUMENTS

HONGKONG: The machinations of American gangster-diplomacy which has made concerted bids to overthrow the government of President Sukarno in Indonesia and replace it by military and communal stooges early this year were reported in *BLITZ* at that time.

Now irrefutable proof comes to hand in the shape of documents which were lost by the United States Embassy at Taipei following the riots in May. (Photocopies of the documents relating to the US plot to liquidate Chiang Kai-shek were published last week in *BLITZ*—Editor).

The first of these is a copy of the telegram from the American Embassy in Djakarta to the State Department which was sent to the American Embassy in Taipei. The telegram is No. 473 of March 18, 1957 received in Taipei on March 19 at 5:30 P.M. Its text is as follows:—

The following telegram has been sent to the Department and is repeated to Taipei:

473, March 18, 5 p.m.
Masjumi leaders again insist on the necessity of increasing military aid to the DI and TII forces now operating in Sumatra, West Java and elsewhere in Indonesia. In view of the grave deterioration in the position of these forces they request that such aid should not be limited to the delivery of arms and ammunition and suggest the transfer of units from Formosa to help the DI forces.

Can our Ambassador in Taipei ascertain if it is possible to expect a favourable decision on this question?

ALLISON.

* * *
The second telegram is No. 490 of March 26, 1957.

The following telegram has been sent to the Department and is repeated to Taipei: 490, March 26, 9 p.m.
Your telegram No. 1176 of March 22, 1957.

Masjumi leaders have already taken the additional measures to deepen the political crisis. With the support of the individual already known to you in overturning the National Party and in forming a new government under the control of the Masjumi and their supporters, and also in the move to discredit Sukarno. As already reported, a joint consultative

committee to unify and co-ordinate these efforts will be set up in Djakarta in the very near future. It will include representatives of the central executives of the PSI and Masjumi.

I think that with the help of his agents in the armed forces Sjahrir will be able to get control of the army and replace Nasution by Subroto. Simbolon is suggested as Deputy Chief of Staff. In my view, assistance to the military councils in Sumatra must be increased through the available channels. In the event of the Masjumi's failure to seize power, a Sumatran government could be formed which would then break with the central government. The individual known to you will on my advice tour Sumatra next month to establish personal contacts with the leaders of the Banteng and Garuda military councils of the DI and TII forces. He was supplied with additional money for this purpose.

Please inform the appropriate quarters of the Darul Islam leaders' request that arms sent to them from Formosa and Malaya must carry no trade mark and should be used in containers used locally for agricultural machinery, textiles, canned food and the like.

ALLISON.

These copies of the telegrams speak for themselves. Not only does US diplomacy seek to subvert the government of Indonesia by buying off stooges but by "transfer of units from Formosa to help the DI forces." Even such a minor detail as the camouflage to be used for packing American arms is not omitted.

SECRET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From: DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON Date: March 21, 1957 No: 1109
Code: OTT Received: March 23, 11 a.m.

**AMERICAN EMBASSY
TAIPEI**

1109, March 21, 12:55 p.m.
SECRET

The Manila Pact: Results of the Canberra Session.

The recent session of the Council of the Manila Pact has revealed a tendency on the part of some of its members such as Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines to use this organization primarily as an additional source of economic aid.

**Proof Of Subversion
In Taipei Document**

**International Gangsterism
Of American Embassies**


HONG KONG: "We must strengthen the positions of our friends in local governments and support those who are being less affected by nationalist ideas" directs a telegram from the State Department of the United States to its embassies in Asian countries.

The copy of this telegram No. 1109 dated March 21, which was lost by the American Embassy during the riots in Taipei last May, shows the extent to which diplomatic privilege is being abused.

**Military Nature
Of Treaty**

The other four important points the instructions make are:

- 1: "the strengthening of contacts with leaders of the opposition parties who show understanding of the tasks facing the free world;"
- 2: "impress upon those in power that their position directly depends on their loyalty to the United States."



THE SOVIET BABY MOON, revolving round our earth at nine hundred kilometers in the virgin space and completing each revolution in approximately ninety-six minutes heralds a new age in the history of human race. With the fitting of the rocket which sent the Baby Moon in the outer space an epoch ended. A long, long age when humans were bound to the earth has passed away.

The glory of this epochal achievement goes generally to the vitality and vigour of human hand and human mind. However, particularly it is to the eternal credit of the Soviet science and engineering, of the countless men and women in the Sovietland that this dream of the Vodos and Havitukada has come

LONDON: Startling information has reached London that Japanese Premier Kishi and U.S. Secretary of State Dulles signed a secret military agreement during Mr. Kishi's visit to Washington in last June.

I can reveal exclusively to BLITZ that the agreement allows use by mutual consent of Japanese armed forces in military operations in any part of the Far East.

The U.S. in return, threw a sop to the Japanese Government by agreeing to the establishment of a U.S.-Japanese Joint Security Committee to supervise military co-operation between the two countries.

The actual signing of the agreement between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Kishi took place on June 20th, but I understand discussions on such a pact had been going on many months before. Probably this agreement is

what Mr. Dulles said when he said at a press conference after Mr. Kishi that results of the talks "much more" than the joint communique. Japan's recent election of a new Prime Minister under American patronage is a violation of the "agreement" by which the Central European should have had a seat on an American reward for good behaviour.

Any such agreement is a parallel for the A. E. B. doctrine for the Far East, bringing an end to the entire American substitute its own infamy for Britain's cost.

The recent visit to the Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama got a very here, in spite of his of the purpose of the to, first Anglo-Japan ship and co-operation. keeping a wary eye o protestations of fire should India.

UP-TO
ELEG



text was incomplete because "the lower portion of the second page of this telegram was torn off during the riots."

After some months' delay the items in this Taipei series were given further play to vulnerable selected audiences. The story of Rankin's plot against Chiang was broadcast to Taiwan by Radio Peking on 30 December. The State Department's cabled views on SEATO were picked up at the turn of the year

by the pro-Communist weekly *La Patrie* published in Bangkok, the capital of the only proper Southeast Asia mainland member of SEATO. On 3 February 1958 Radio Moscow added details implicating Ambassador Cummings in the U.S. subversion of Indonesia documented in the forged Allison cables and broadcast an account of it to the United Kingdom. On 6 April the Djakarta *Berita Minggu*, another controlled "independent" weekly, announced that the authenticity of the Allison cables had been confirmed, and Peking's news agency NCNA carried this confirmation in its English-language transmission for Europe.

This late replay of the Allison cables merged them into another series concerned with Indonesia. The outbreak of open rebellion there in early 1958 brought new specific and heavily played charges that the United States had planned the revolt and was covertly giving it military support. On 22 March *Blitz* told its readers that U.S. officers at SEATO headquarters in Bangkok had been ordered to submit immediately an opinion on the construction of U.S. atom bases in Sumatra:

It is known here that a Top Secret agreement has been concluded by the Indonesian separatists with the SEATO and American groups, which provides for both SEATO and U.S. bases in "free" Sumatra. This agreement was finalized after secret talks which took place recently in Tokyo between Col. Sumunal, representing the "Separatist Government" of the Ussain-Shafruddin rump, and representatives of the U.S. Embassy.

This report was followed up on 15 May, in the Rangoon weekly *The Mirror* (a third controlled "independent"), by the text of a letter said to be from rebel leader M. Sjamsuddin to Ambassador MacArthur, evidently on the subject of implementing the atom-base agreement. It began:

Your phone call proved to be real magic. The meeting . . . was very useful. We have agreed on practically all the details. Now, I hope, ties will remain permanent and we will receive all necessary materials without delay.

Soon, however, it became necessary to counter the effect of the United States' publicized friendly negotiations with the Sukarno government, and a new forgery was promptly launched to show that the U.S. public attitude was merely a smoke-screen. On 8 June *The Mirror* printed the text of a purported letter from naval intelligence chief Rear Admiral Lau-

SECRET

rence Frost to the rebel leader Kawilarang, telling him "not to despair just because the U.S. issued statements expressing on the surface 'no interference' in the Indonesian civil war. We will continue giving assistance to you through Taiwan and the Philippines and other channels." After two weeks this story was repeated in a chronic Indonesian vehicle for plot charges, the "independent" Djakarta *Bintang Timur*, and its version was carried by the Chinese NCNA and a week later in Soviet domestic broadcasts.

We happen to have some details on the mechanics through which such counterfeit texts would be placed in *The Mirror* or another of the half-dozen receptive Burmese papers. The KGB rezidentura at the Rangoon embassy would receive them from Moscow in Russian, translate them there into English, and pass them in this form to the more or less controlled press outlets. The papers would do their own translating into Burmese, but the rezidentura would check the published texts against the original Russian and report any variations to Moscow.

Expansionist Israel

A most complex and enduring misinformation series using the full orchestra of rumor campaign, diplomatic whispers, planted intelligence information, press allegations, and published forgeries began half a year after the abortive British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. In mid-March 1957 rumors began circulating in official and diplomatic circles in Paris that the French and Israeli General Staffs were working together on a plan for a new joint action against Egypt. When the rumors were traced it was learned, first, that they had no foundation in fact and, second, that all traceable such tales had a single local point of origin—one André Ulmann, director of a small "independent" weekly, *La Tribune des Nations*, but notorious as a pro-Soviet propagandist. During the first weeks of April these rumors were complemented by intelligence reports received from Lebanon and from Italy to the effect that France "was launching a plot in cooperation with Israel." The Italian report said that "the Israeli press has not mentioned the matter, but details are being discussed publicly."

On these subtle foundations the campaign was openly elaborated in the fall. On 12 October the Bombay *Blitz* carried

a long article exposing "Israeli plans to dismember the Arab states and organise an empire":

A *Blitz* correspondent in a West Asian country had an opportunity of getting acquainted in detail with a secret strategic plan of the Israeli General Staff. We may be able to publish the plan in full in future. . . .

It envisages military operations against the countries bordering on Israel. . . . In general, the Plan provides for the annexation of the territory bounded by the Suez Canal, the River Litani and the Persian Gulf. . . .

The scheme takes into account the circumstance that Israel will not be able to rely on victory if she acts alone. In this connection, assistance on the part of the U.S.A., Britain and France is envisaged beforehand. The Plan especially emphasizes that "the U.S. is interested in a clash between Israel and the Arab States" and that "the U.S. interest in the strategic points of the Middle East is explained by the striving to strengthen her positions in this oil-rich area."

A month later, in fulfillment of its promise, *Blitz* put out a 78-page booklet, entitled *Dagger of Israel*, containing the "Strategic Plan of the Israeli Army for 1956-57, translated from the original in Hebrew." This document, an obvious fraud, is a rambling, badly written tract with the details given in the October article as its propaganda climax. The book had been in preparation, according to its introduction, since March, i.e., the time when the "French-Israeli General Staff" rumors had appeared in France.

After this the drive apparently went into winter quarters, but it was renewed the following spring. On 4 April 1958 Mikhail Stepanovich Rogov, Counselor of the Soviet embassy in Paris and a KGB officer, told a Western diplomat—who of course told his government—that the USSR was currently "worried about increased French-Israeli political and military cooperation." The next day *Blitz* took up the refrain, with slight variations:

Diplomatic circles at Tel Aviv report that the Israeli Armed Forces command is elaborating jointly with the French Army General Staff a so-called "Plan of Preventive Hostilities" against the UAR. . . . Meantime, Israel is frantically seeking other alliances. . . . The Americans are now helping her to an alliance with the anti-Arab NATO member Turkey.

U.S. involvement, not to be left thus subordinate, was the main burden of another *Blitz* article on 19 April reporting

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that Secretary Dulles had announced in a closed session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee "that the United States would support the demands of the Ben Gurion Government on enlarging the territory of Israel at the cost of the Arab lands." Recounting the year-old rumors of secret joint planning by the French and Israeli General Staffs, *Blitz* said that the U.S. Government had been kept fully informed of the plan by both the French and the Israeli government.

In October the secret Israeli strategic plan surfaced a year earlier by *Blitz* was included, as a ten-page excerpt, in a 147-page book published by the State Publishing House for Political Literature, in Moscow, under the title *The State of Israel—Its Position and Policies*. Presented as a "history of Israel and the Zionist movement," the book as a whole is a vicious propaganda attack, of the misinformation variety, against the State of Israel, all of its political parties except the CP, and "the Zionist bosses"—the United States in particular and the West in general. It seems to have been designed for use in Communist study groups, assuming a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint on the part of the reader. But its similarity in other respects to *Blitz*'s less comprehensive *Dagger of Israel* is great enough to present the possibility that both manuscripts were prepared in the same place, if not written by the same individual. It is notable that rather crude material like this Israeli plan and Admiral Frost's reassurance to the Indonesian rebels, designed for unsophisticated targets in Asia and the Near East, is deemed suitable for the more knowledgeable but carefully warped Soviet audience.

In November a new edition of the book *Arab Dawn* published by *Blitz* carried the author's statement that he had learned in October, in Beirut, "of the latest in the series of Anglo-American plans to 'cut Nasser down to size,' which France has since endorsed." The plan, "scheduled to take place next spring or earlier," provided for Western action against Lebanon, Iraq, and the Sudan. In addition, however:

A supplementary plan has been attached to the main project. The supplementary document introduces the latest plan of the Israeli General Staff to take over the West Bank of the Jordan River by means of a swift blitzkrieg. The Israeli plan, which apparently has the approval of the CIA, the British Ambassador in Beirut and the U.S. Ambassador in Tehran . . . is built around the

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possibility of either the flight or the assassination of King Hussein of Jordan in the near future.

The "Israeli General Staff" canard, now enshrined in an official Soviet publication, can continue indefinitely with variations its role as a part of the Bloc psychological warfare arsenal. On 13 April 1959 the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied with protest a report published in the Moscow *Red Fleet* that the Chief of the Israeli General Staff had come to Ankara toward the end of March and held secret talks on the question of Turkey's support of Israel for an attack against the Arabs, especially against the UAR, in the near future.

Other Near East Forgeries

Alleged U.S. intrigues against the UAR, a side-line in the elaborate Israeli effort, were the whole theme of a shorter but equally important series of forgeries. On 9 April 1958 the clandestine Bizim Radio, located in Leipzig but broadcasting in Turkish as from Turkey, carried the following "news item":

Report from Cairo—The American State Department has sent a secret directive to its envoys in the Middle East with a view to overthrowing the UAR. The directive points out that Soviet influence in the Arab countries has increased owing to Soviet recognition of the UAR and urges the envoys to use every means to spoil Soviet-Egyptian relations.

On 26 July, a fortnight after the Iraqi coup, a document answering to this description was published in facsimile by the Cairo daily *Al Ahram*. It purported to be a State Department "circular letter" over Assistant Secretary Rountree's signature, cabled on 17 April to diplomatic missions in the Middle East. Explaining that any apparent softening of U.S. policy toward the UAR was merely a tactical device, it stated that one of the principal aims in the Middle East was to destroy the UAR by splitting it into its original Syrian and Egyptian components, to stop the growth of Egyptian influence, and to spoil Soviet-UAR relations.

This forgery was apparently thought convincing enough to be given rather wide play in the overt Bloc media, most heavily to domestic and Near East audiences but also to Europe and South Africa. On 2 August *Blitz* carried it, making explicit the supposition that the incriminating document had come to light in Bagdad as a result of the Republican coup. In De-

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خلاصة ما رأيته ، أنني بعيني ، باذني ، وجدتنى وجها لوجه امام الحرب
في أحد المطارات ، كنت أستطيع ان اعد أكثر من ألف طائرة .
كلها من ذلك النوع الاستراتيجي ، الذي يستطيع ان يحمل اعلى القنابل
فيها حيث يتعين عليها ان تهوى
وفي أحد الطرق ، كانت الحشود تتدفق ، دبابات على القطار ومد
اول لها ولا آخر
وفي أحد المكاتب رايت مارشالات ، وجنرالات ، ولقد احسست ان اصا
وعودة - في اللحظة التي تصلى البشرية كلها الا تجيء - فان لمسات خف
نالتها قوى مدمرة لا يستطيع خيال على الارض ان يتصور مدى آثارها
وقال لي احد جنرالات الجو وهو يشير الى دائرية من الطائرات تصعد الى

ING TELEGRAM

AMERICAN EMBASSY, BAGHDAD

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

POLAFF (2)

CONTROL 2279

RECD: April 18, 1958
10 40 AM

FROM: WASHINGTON

ACTION: BAGHDAD, CIRCULAR 11 April 17, 5 30 PM

This circular letter is being sent by the State Department to all U.S. diplomatic representatives in the Middle East on the subject of the United States' policy in regard to the United Arab Republic.

The State Department reaffirms that the basic objectives of the U.S. policy in relation to the U.A.R. remain unchanged. It stresses anew that expansion of Egypt's sphere of influence is counter to the Joint Resolution of the Congress on the Middle East, strengthens Arab nationalism, encourages anti-Western and particularly anti-American tendencies in the Middle East and Africa, undermines the Baghdad Pact, an important link in the strategic network of the free world, and impairs the position of Israel the interests of which the U.S. can in no way ignore.

2. The fact that actual control over the transportation of Middle East oil to Europe both through the Suez Canal and via all the pipelines to the Mediterranean is now concentrated in Cairo seriously endangers American interests in this area. The U.A.R. is now in a position to exert pressure upon the U.S. and other western powers. This possibility can become a formidable weapon in the hands of President Nasser if he happens to fall back on the Soviet bloc in the future.

وثيقة سرية من سفارة أمريكا في بغداد

FIRST PAGE OF ROUNTREE CIRCULAR

cember, when Rountree visited the Near East, Radio Cairo and NCNA revived the story again.

The Rountree circular, like the Taipei cables, did look more or less like the real thing, but it could not stand up under close examination. Its "Confidential/Security Information" classification was one discontinued in November 1953; there is no "circular letter" in Department nomenclature, and a "circular instruction" is not transmitted by cable; its numbering was bad, a real Circular 11 having been transmitted nine months earlier; the form on which it was typed had been replaced in August 1955; State messages are not signed by an Assistant Secretary but only by the Secretary or Acting Secretary. Operational carelessness is also evident in Bizim Radio's having described it eight days before its purported date and three months before the Bagdad coup was supposed to have made it available.

The Rountree forgery was followed up in late March and early April 1959 by one other, sent anonymously in photostat to some papers and parliament and government members in the Near East and passed around in intelligence circles there. It was ostensibly a letter from Under Secretary Robert Murphy assuring Ambassador McClintock in Lebanon that "Nasser is not the man we shall support" since "you are right to note that we have nothing in common with Nasser and his kind" and adding, with obvious reference to the UAR and Iraq, that "You certainly are aware of what I have in mind when I say that after the snakes devour each other, the jungle becomes safer!" It was never published or otherwise replayed.

The presence of U.S. troops in Lebanon in 1958 had been the occasion for another brief false document campaign. On 11 August Radio Bagdad reported that "in Lebanon, Saeb Salam has received a cable from four American paratroopers expressing their desire to volunteer for service in the people's forces." The cable was never produced nor the story elaborated, but on 25 August the outlawed *Beirut Al-Masaa* surfaced a forged letter addressed to members of the U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon and signed "John H," purportedly an officer in the 79th U.S. Engineer Battalion. This American officer, after a salutation which showed that he was given to the use of Britishisms like "79th Engineers" and "officers and

other ranks" and to solecistic military abbreviations, wrote as follows:

I arrived together with a group of American officers from Munich on 27 July in a Globemaster aircraft. . . . A few days ago we received orders to remain in Lebanon for 15 months to safeguard the peace and security of the United States.

There are also plans to undertake large scale works with the object of transforming the airfields of Rayack and Koin't into American atomic bases; furthermore, 5 rocket launching pads will be erected along the Lebanon-Syrian border. More atomic weapons will be dispatched soon to Lebanon, and Beirut harbor will be transformed into America's principal naval base for its Near Eastern Fleet.

One cannot fail to realize that the object of all these preparations is to wipe out the millions of Arabs who are struggling for their national independence. . . . That is why I am asking you, my comrades, to demand that we be withdrawn from Lebanon to the United States quickly, and if we truly love our country we should return there without further delay. American officers and troops: Don't allow yourselves to be fooled; don't allow yourselves to become involved in military adventure for the benefit of any of the war-mongering factions!

The Chinese NCNA, picking up this story, credited the illegal *Beirut Al-Masaa* for it; but Soviet media—TASS, the *Daily Review of the Soviet Press* distributed by the Soviet Information Bureau in Moscow, and a widely broadcast Radio Moscow commentary—introduced it with only the phrase, "It has become known here," and they gave the writer's name as "Johnson" rather than "John H," apparently having been furnished a different draft of the forgery.

Irresponsible U.S. Atom Pilots

The black support of propaganda campaigns aimed at Europe was more sophisticated. The principal series began with a Khrushchev statement possibly designed for the purpose, possibly only later recognized as exploitable. In his interview with Hearst and two other American journalists on 22 November 1957, Khrushchev stressed the danger inherent in a continuous airborne, nuclear-armed SAC alert and continued, according to TASS:

When planes with hydrogen bombs take off that means that many people will be in the air piloting them. There is always the possibility of a mental blackout when the pilot may take the

slightest signal as a signal for action and fly to the target that he had been instructed to fly to. Under such conditions a war may start purely by chance, since retaliatory action would be taken immediately. . . .

In such a case a war may start as a result of sheer misunderstanding, a derangement in the normal psychic state of a person, which may happen to anybody. . . . Even if only one plane with one atomic or one hydrogen bomb were in the air, . . . it would be not the Government but the pilot who could decide the question of war.

Some five months later, on 7 May 1958, the official East German *Neues Deutschland* reproduced what purported to be a letter dated 27 March from Assistant Defense Secretary Frank B. Berry to Secretary McElroy reporting that 67.3 percent of all USAF flight personnel had been found to be psychoneurotic, a condition which led to all sorts of phobias, unaccountable animosity, and other irrational behavior. Excessive drinking, drug-taking, sexual excesses and perversions, and constant card-playing were mentioned as further evidence that "moral depression is a typical condition of all crew members making flights with atomic and H-bombs."

Although perhaps convincing to the man in the street, this forgery was full of errors. The letter format would hardly have been used for this kind of report. The vague "group of experts" said to have reached the medical findings would have been named, and no such obscure and ineffectual corrective measures as "further improvement of aircraft equipment" would have been proposed. There is much wrong military terminology—*Internal Zone*, *Air Force Command* and *AFC*, *the Patuxent River AFB (Md)*, *the Cooke AFB (Calif)*. More esoterically, Dr. Berry happened to be away on an official trip on the date of the letter; and finally, it was typed either on a machine assembled in composite from several different makes or one of unknown foreign manufacture.

The letter was widely publicized in the overt media, especially to European audiences. After a month the *Delhi Times*, perennial purveyor of Bloc propaganda, replayed it, and this gave TASS and *Izvestia* reason to run it again, crediting the *Delhi Times*. After almost three months more, on 30 August, the Bombay *Blitz* carried it, explaining that it had been published "early this month" in *Neues Deutschland*: the replay copy fabricated for *Blitz* had apparently been delayed in

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neurotiker , Rauschgift- gen

Prozent, das heißt mehr
loten an Psychoneurose
Besatzungen jeder Flug-
stoffbomben an Bord
kreisen, von der Arktis
Sowjetunion fliegen
dem Alarm anstehen.
taufsekretär Perry er-
unzureichend in der
kontrolle zu helfen.
folgenden Wortlaut:

ing der Fälle von chroni-
insprechung der Neurosen
Piloten und Navigatoren
den Luftwaffe ergibt, daß
nen, die zu einem de-
geführt haben, folgende
Anpassung, vor allem als
interkontinentalen Flügen;
und systematischer Genuß
einer häufig selbst während
genüß markierter Drogen
Opium- und Marihuana-
exuelle Ausweifungen
ten, extreme Müdigkeit als
indirekter Kartenspiel. Zu-
stische Depressionen ein
typischer Besatzungsmitglied.
Atem- und Wasserstoff-
gehalten (siehe auch Seite
Beizugabe des beigefüg-
ten der medizinischen
Union meine Kollegen und ich
streiter der Luftwaffe dar-
t, mit welchen Mitteln der
(Fortsetzung auf Seite 2)

chindern rieg" gegen DDR

Insensierung eines mit klei-
nen Atomwaffen geführter
die DDR gerichtet ist.
spricht in seinem Artikel
chkeit eines „Jugens“, also
evolutionären Putsches in
ser Kontroversion, sagt
man, werde zunächst die
sivere „zu Hilfe eilen, aber
Truppen über die Grenze
n werden, worauf Streit-
antipaktos eingreifen“.
swungen, es könnte sich bei
nerlichen Erklärungen nur
ste einiger Journalisten han-
die „Welt“ selbst mit der
diese Lehre von begrenzten
beginne „die herrschende
Weltens zu werden. Auch
ch in seinem jüngsten Auf-
reien Affairs“ in die Lehr-
möglichst begrenzten Atom-
phie“.
herzigen Erklärungen, so
end in Kopenhagen erklärt,
sch, warum Bomb eine Clip-
und das Zusatzdokumen-

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish to inform you that the medical examination carried out in accordance with your instructions of all USAF officers and airman stationed overseas and in the Internal Zone has been completed. I enclose herewith the detailed report on this matter prepared by a group of experts.

Availing myself of the opportunity I wish to make several personal observations in this connection and draw your attention to the following:

According to the estimates made by the experts, 67.3 per cent of all crew members that have undergone the examination suffer from psychoneurosis. It is an impressive figure and cannot fail to cause alarm. The report indicates that the situation is especially serious among the officers and airman serving overseas as well as among those in the Strategic Air Command of the Internal Zone. (My further observations will deal only with the latter category.)

2. Most striking in general is the condition of psychoneurosis which in majority of cases finds its expression in excessive impressionability, in actions inadequately controlled by the subject's will, in all sorts of phobias, particularly in "flight phobias" as well as hysterical syndromes and fits of unaccountable animosity.

3. After an additional thorough study of the data on this problem we have ascertained that the accidents that have occurred during the last six months on Midway Island, at the Cooke AFB (Calif.) and at the Palomares River AFB (Id.) as well as opening of fire on the civil population (Wisc.) and a number of similar cases have occurred not so much for the reasons of technical failures as due to psychic deficiency of the crew members.

4. The study of the cases of the chronic overstrain of the nervous system among the pilots and navigators of the Strategic Air Command indicates that the chief factors conducive to such a condition are the following: a great strain particularly due to intercontinental flights, excessive and systematic use of alcohol (quite often even in flight), use of narcotic drugs (particularly cigarettes containing opium and marshalline), sexual excesses and perversions, extreme fatigue and constant hard playing. At the same time moral depression is a typical condition of all crew members making flights with atomic and H-bombs. (See p.p. 17-24, special section of the enclosed report.)

5. During the medical examination progress my colleagues and I consulted a number of representatives of the Air Force regarding the means on how to improve the physical condition of pilots and navigators. These representatives insist that the flight personnel must be thoroughly retrained. I believe you will agree, however, that this is practically impossible to do.

Our repeated attempts since early 1953 to raise the physical requirements of persons entering the USAF have encountered the resistance of the Air Force Command. The APC fears, and I believe not without reason, that in that case the number of USAF personnel would be far below the necessary minimum of officers and airman. Moreover the number of young men entering flying schools, as you are aware, has drastically decreased lately and the tendency is continuing.

6. I am no expert in aviation technique and engineering, yet I hold that certain measures proposed by experts i.e. further improvement of aircraft equipment, brighter lights of the ground signal systems and beacons, installation of additional direction signs, etc. will no doubt decrease to some extent the number of accidents. On my part I would ask for more time to think over suggestions on how to improve medical service in the USAF. I must admit with all sincerity, however, that the proposed engineering measures as well as any possible measures concerning medical service will not solve the problem of radical improvement of the physical condition of the USAF personnel as a whole which according to the data supplied by the last medical examination is far below the contemporary requirements.

I would deem it expedient to acquaint the USAF Chief of Staff, the Commanders of Strategic and Tactical Air Commands, the USAF Commanders in Europe and the Pacific Zone as well as Commanders of the Units with the report of the experts and particularly with their conclusions and suggestions.

Sincerely yours,

Frank S. Barry, M.D.
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health and Medical)

Vergleichen wir mit dem des Jaf offenbar, daß der stützweigen und schaft erfolgreich g wohlgegründete A gesamten Volksv überzuerfüllen.

Wir haben im wesen, in der Chci schinenbau, in der anderen" Zueigen chen drei Mona cimen Produktions schnittlich 10 Pro sere Chemiegroß Trunswerke. Wa Chemischen Werke chemische Kombi ser Kalibergbau u. bergbau haben he nisse erzielt. Einn gibt es auch bei In gen, die unser Ma hat Erfolgreich e die Landwirtschaft daß das Weiter in e ginn der Bestellu gezeigt hat, werd politische und zahl der LPG Vorausw ökonomische Ergel

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Die Zahlen des raten aber auc gen Gebieten, so von Rohstahl, Ber den Werkzeugmas wirtschaft und bei sumgutern im II gutzumachen haben

Nehmen wir den gibt es auch hier e gerung gegenüber t vor allem infolge Projektierung der des Nichtvorhande baureifer Unterlag wesen u. a. in der burg, Rostock, Noul Marx-Stadt und St beteiligmannen der l der Brückfabrik .. feste Spezialkohle werke zu liefern t weil die Bauarbeiter deutet aber weniger um für den Wohnu schinenbau dringend Ähnlich ist es au

transit. By August several more installments in the serial had appeared.

Having provided official evidence that Khrushchev's "pilot who could decide the question of war" was by a two-thirds majority mentally unstable, the planners of the campaign soon fell into an unplanned (one hopes) bit of luck. A mechanic on a USAF base in the UK managed to get into the air in a non-operational Air Force bomber he was neither au-

thorized nor qualified to fly and crashed shortly after takeoff, killing himself. This dramatic example of irresponsibility, reported in the press on 14 June, was seized upon by Radio Moscow and linked with the Berry letter on 17 and 18 June.

The next installment was offered on 3 July: the Soviet embassy in London handed the British Foreign Office and released to the Western press a letter from a USAF pilot stationed in England threatening to drop an atomic bomb off the English North Sea coast in order to alert British opinion to the danger of accidentally triggering a nuclear war. Radio Moscow of course immediately linked this aberration with the Berry letter and the crashed bomber, and the sensational character of the forgery together with its solemn official transmittal aroused extensive comment in the non-Communist press throughout the Western world. No doubt in the hope of repeating this delightful burst of publicity, the Soviet embassy on 9 July released two more letters along the same lines but varying in detail and on 15 September still a fourth; but these were virtually ignored by the press.

The last act of the campaign began on 2 October, when *Neues Deutschland*, reentering as the chief protagonist, claimed to have learned through the indiscretion of a USAF officer stationed at Kaiserslautern that SAC commander General Power had recently issued orders forbidding any planes carrying atomic or hydrogen bombs to make flights over U.S. territory. During the next two months the dire implications of this prohibition, together with the Berry letter, were widely played by Bloc media, including the clandestine Radio España Independiente, first to Europe and then to the Near and Far East. By the end of November even *Blitz* had received and printed its copy.

France, Germany, and the Sahara Oil

On 22 January 1958 *Neues Deutschland* reproduced, partly in facsimile, a devious and rambling forged letter which it said had been written by former Under Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr., to "the American capitalist Curtis, who is now in Venezuela." Its purpose was clearly to recruit Curtis for the job of wresting control of the Sahara oil fields away from France and obtaining ownership for U.S. oil companies in or-

SECRET

USA-Monopole greife

Aufschlußreicher Brief

Washington, D.C.
October 18, 1957

My dear friend,

Your letter was certainly a disappointment to me. Frankly I should hate to lose a friend so full of life and vigor and instead acquire a contactably grumbling acquaintance who would call on me only to complain about his luggage or to gossip about the latest events in Mi vaca y yo or Pasapoga.

Believe me, I would never have bothered you had I not known your true calling. My recent frank talk with the Secretary convinced me that he still retains his ability to see far ahead. He insisted that we need a truly experienced man for this project, an expert with a talent for administration, even a diplomat, if you wish. The happy fusion of all these qualities in your person would no doubt serve our common interests.

Now as to your doubts on the political side of this matter and primarily the attitude of the French to all this business. I must say that they proved far more conciliatory than we expected as regards our participation in exploiting Sahara oil. Though the row that occurred last fall, because they managed to seize some documents compromising Avenne, made Paris more capricious in selecting partners, it didn't, however, close the Sahara to us. It seems only natural. You can't spend billions on war in Algeria and expect to have enough free money to develop Africa. Sinclair and Newmont Mining are already working in partnership with three French firms there. Not bad for a start. We agreed because we were sure that it was only a start.

We may be able to get something from the preliminary talks with Shell started on my initiative with the purpose of acquiring its share in the Petrole d'Algerie and Petrole de Sahara.

There is some basis to your apprehension that under the impact of Russia's impressive technological advance the French might try, at the expense of Atlantic unity, to balance their relations with the East in an effort to rid themselves of the German nightmare and settle their affairs in North Africa. Similar concern exists in the State Department as well. When I last saw Foster he said with his usual abruptness that such developments might have an unfavorable bearing on US policy in Europe. Our new Ambassador in Paris also reports that he has serious grounds to worry about a tendency in certain French quarters to follow a "more independent course."

Additional information received from our friends in Paris confirms our Ambassador's apprehensions and is causing much anxiety here. The Quai d'Orsay may have scented a rat and learned about our latest negotiations with the Chancellor.

Billon is right, of course. He once told me that North Africa provides a wing for France. If these wings are not clipped the Gallic rooster will always strive to get away. These may be harsh words, yet they convey the essence of our diplomacy rather accurately.

I may as well tell you that Foster is rather busy these days. Macmillan is about to arrive in Washington. You will understand, of course, that I am not in a position to tell you

all the details, but you will soon hear about a big NATO reorganization plan which, I am sure, will dispel your doubts.

I can also assure you that during the forthcoming Eisenhower-Macmillan talks the possibility of joint action in North Africa will be discussed in detail. You may conclude from this that our energetic policy in this area is already decided on in principle. It is quite possible that at this stage of the working out of our policy you will have to pay considerable attention to the political aspects of the problem besides your main line of work.

Don't lose any sleep over the complexity of your task. If my proposal is O.K. with you, you will be dealing with

"Neues Deutschland" ist heute in nischen Ölmonopole in die von den zu Algerien gehörende Sahara den veröffentlichten wir den Wortlaut ei vertretende USA-Außenminister und

Washington, D. C.
18. Oktober 1957

Mein lieber Freund,

Ihr Brief war ja eine Enttäuschung für mich! Wirklich, ich würde nicht gern einen so lebendigen und energischen Freund verlieren und dafür einen ewig nörgelnden Bekannten eintrauschen, der sich nur an mich wenden würde, um über seinen Hoxenschuß zu lamentieren oder um mir den neuesten Klatsch aus Mi vaca y yo oder aus Pasapoga zu erzählen.

Glauben Sie mir, ich hätte Sie niemals behelligt, wenn ich nicht gewußt hätte, was Ihre wahre Berufung ist. Das offene Gespräch, das ich neulich mit dem Minister hatte, hat mich überzeugt, daß er immer noch seine Fähigkeit zu weiter Voraussicht besitzt. Er bestand darauf, daß wir für dieses Projekt einen wirklich erfahrenen Mann brauchen, einen Experten mit organisatorischer Begabung, einen Diplomaten sogar, wenn Sie wollen. Die glückliche Vereinigung all dieser Qualitäten in Ihrer Person würde zweifellos unseren gemeinsamen Interessen dienlich sein.

Sie werden mir niemals einreden, daß wir jemand Besseres für die Arbeit an dem Projekt finden könnten. Glauben Sie ernstlich, daß es jemand gibt, der es wie Sie versteht, die gute alte Wüste Sahara zu greifen und festzuhalten? Man hält viel von Ihnen in Washington und schätzt Ihre Fähigkeiten hoch ein.

Als ich Foster von Ihrem spleen erzählte, sagte er: „Sie haben noch Zeit, versuchen Sie, ihm das auszutreiben. Sagen Sie ihm alles, was Sie für nötig halten.“

Ich brauche Ihnen nichts über die Wichtigkeit afrikanischen Öls zu sagen. Wir haben viel darüber gesprochen, als ich im Außenministerium tätig war. Ich könnte noch hinzufügen, daß jetzt, wo infolge der russischen Intrigen die Lage im Nahen Osten verworren ist, unser Interesse daran noch wächst.

Nun zu Ihren Bedenken wegen der politischen Seite dieser Angelegenheit und vor allem über die Haltung der Franzosen zu dieser ganzen Sache. Ich muß sagen, daß sie sich hinsichtlich unserer Beteiligung an der Ausbeutung des Saharadöls weit konsequenter gezeigt haben, als wir es erwartet hatten. Zwar sind Sie in Paris seit dem Krach vom vorigen Herbst, als sie ein paar Dokumente schnappten, die die Aramco kompromit-

der to clip the wings of "the Gallic rooster." There were references to German-U.S. conniving against France and to a "big NATO reorganisation [sic]." Other Bloc media picked up the story and publicized it for several days, especially to Europe and North Africa.

About a month later a forged letter to Secretary Dulles from Ambassador David K. E. Bruce in West Germany was mailed

anonymously to some prominent journalists and other individuals in France and England. It read in part:

It is no secret for the Germans that our policy in Europe is based on the principle the more pressure Germany brings on Britain and France in Europe, the more reasonable they become in Asia and Africa. The West Germans share our view that the sick woman of the Seine is no longer capable of being a good housewife. However, it is possible to discern a certain anxiety in the business community here as to whether German banks will have the future opportunity to expand their exports of capital to French Africa, particularly to the Sahara. Do you not therefore consider it expedient for us, Sir, to give the Germans emphatic assurances that we will continue to help them in the matter of the Sahara, as in other matters, since only a common effort will make it possible for us to consolidate our own positions in this area?

This covert thrust, rather like the O'Shaughnessy forgery of the preceding summer urging U.S. support of neo-Nazi movements at the time of the Kampfverband letters, was never carried into the open, and no kind of follow-up has been reported.

The Summit Conference

Later in 1958 there was another campaign of brief duration centered on U.S. policy, but this was targeted world-wide. On 22 May *Rude Pravo* printed the text of a letter allegedly written to Chancellor Adenauer by Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, reading in part:

The highest representatives of the West German armament industry support Adenauer's policy of remilitarization without reserve and emphatically ask Adenauer to frustrate all attempts toward a relaxation of international tension, to prevent the convening of the Summit Conference, and to reject, along with the United States, the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Publicity for this item was confined to Czech media, but on 7 June the East German press agency ADN published what it claimed to be the German translation of a "secret instruction from the U.S. State Department sent to the chiefs of U.S. missions abroad" laying down a U.S. policy of sabotaging negotiations for the summit conference. During the following week this forgery was carried to audiences all over the world by Radio Moscow and other Bloc media, and it was revived again a month later for the Near East.

Rockefeller-Dulles Views on World Domination

The most ambitious of the black propaganda campaigns of the 1957-59 period in point of intended world impact, and the last to be described here, used as its main exhibit a forged letter from Nelson Rockefeller to President Eisenhower outlining a plan for U.S. domination of the world through use of economic assistance as a wedge and cloak for military pacts and political control. It was surfaced by *Neues Deutschland* in facsimile excerpts and full-text translation on 15 February 1957. Subheads inserted into the translated text by the paper give an idea of the message its forgers wished to convey:

American prestige catastrophically lowered
What is good for Standard Oil is good for the U.S.
How we established NATO
State Department counted on war with China
Iranian foreign policy under our control
Economic "assistance" leads to military ties
Egypt will bog down and need our "assistance"
The hooked fish needs no bait
Forcing neutral states in the desired direction
Bringing others' colonies under our control
About the "selflessness" of American assistance
The objective: to secure military alliances

The forgery was a credible one in general tone and phrasing (one passage has been spotted as taken almost verbatim from a *New York Times* article), but its execution was really quite unskillful. There are the usual British spellings—*favour*, *economising*, *emphasising*—and some British phrases—"the Flag follows trade," "the hooked fish needs no bait," "ramming home." There are bad translations, apparently from German—"my friends" used in the sense of *Parteifreunde* or *politische Freunde*; the writer's "tiresome" discussion with the convalescent President, where *ermuedende* should have been rendered "tiring." Purportedly written in January 1956, the letter refers in past tense to the visit of Sir Anthony Eden, who did not arrive until 30 January. Worst is the slipshod typing job—indented salutation, uneven touch, ragged margins, strikeouts, errors in punctuation and spelling. It

UNGEHEUERLICHES Z

Berlin. „Neues Deutschland“ ist in der Lage, heute unserem Volke und der Weltöffentlichkeit den authentischen Text eines geheimen Schreibens zur Kenntnis zu bringen, das der Erbe des größten amerikanischen Öltrusts, Standard Oil Corporation, Nelson A. Rockefeller, im Januar 1956 an den Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, Dwight D. Eisenhower, gerichtet hat. Der Text, der uns in englischer Originalfassung und in vollem Wortlaut vorliegt, stammt aus einer unbedingt zuverlässigen Quelle.

My dear Mr. President,

I am reluctant to revert to that lengthy and tiresome discussion which took place in Camp David in connection with my proposal regarding a bolder program of aid to under-developed countries. However, recent political developments have shown that our discussion was not a sterile one and that the time has now come when I should state some points that have occurred to me which though they do not pretend to be original may all the same be of some help in approaching one of the most important problems of our foreign policy.

First of all I would like to express my deep satisfaction with the new Bill increasing the allocation for aid to underdeveloped countries. If I am not mistaken the Bill obtained your approval following Sir Anthony Eden's visit to Washington. The Bill was well timed, particularly in the light of Ambassador Cooper's recent reports emphasizing the catastrophic drop in American prestige in India especially after Mr. Llewellyn's statement that Portugal should keep Goa.

I am sorry to have to point out that my arguments in favour of expanding our economic measures were misinterpreted. I have not, and never have had, any fundamental differences with the Administration as regards the general line of our foreign policy. I appreciate as much as anybody does the importance of military alliances, but I believe that they call for an approach different from that of the State Department so far. We should not shut our eyes to the fact that military alliances are becoming increasingly unpopular.

Ausschnitt aus dem vertraulichen Schreiben Rockefellers an Eisenhower

Bonn fürchtet Wiedervereinigungsprogramm der SED

Bonn (ND). In zunehmendem Maße wird in westdeutschen bürgerlichen und adenauertrauen Zeitungen gefordert, im Wahlkampf nicht die Frage der Wiedervereinigung zu behandeln. Das Stichwort für die CDU-Zeitungen gab das Klerus-Blatt „Christ und Welt“ am 9. Februar. In einem ausführlichen Kommentar zu den Deutschlandvorschlägen des Zentralkomitees der SED verlangt es

gramm für die Sicherung einer friedlichen Zukunft Deutschlands und die demokratische Wiedervereinigung besitzt. Das ist inzwischen auch vom Ausland her bestätigt worden, nicht zuletzt durch die Botschaft Bulganins an Adenauer. Gerade durch die Konfrontierung des Programms der SED mit der zur gleichen Zeit im Bundestag vorgetragenen aggressiven Konzeption

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Berlin (ND) Nationalrats führte am 13. Sitzung von Prof. eine Beratung Deutschland Nationalen Fr. bert Norde einleitenden R

was done on a prewar machine made in eastern Germany. Mr. Rockefeller's real correspondence is done on an electric typewriter with particular attention to neatness and carefully correct spelling and punctuation. The forger was also clearly

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In Europe we started with economic aid. It is quite possible that without the Marshall Plan we would have found it much more difficult to form NATO. That in fact happened in this case was that a coordinated foreign policy, using every available U.S. program, resulted in the creation of what we hoped was a solid military union. Even critics within NATO itself say that it suffers from undue emphasis on the military aspect at the expense of the economic factors which played such a big role in its formation.

In Asia our efforts were far less successful. The principal reason for this can, I believe, be clearly stated: the conception of force was too nakedly shown... too much stress was laid on the military side while we largely ignored the importance of preliminary economic preparation for the alliances we wished to make.

This underestimation of the vital economic aspects on the part of the State Department has led to the creation of JIAFO and the Baghdad pact on a foundation of sand. And I would prefer to see the sand cemented. The American tradition has been that "the flag follows trade". In spite of this we tried to sell our energy, as directed to building the Suez Canal, to JIAFO. It is hardly plausible, however, that the Americans and JIAFO should be involved in a war against communist China, with the US backing Chiang Kai-shek. Yet this apparently was the State Department's calculation.

alliances we must draw up a program of economic development extensive enough for us to have in Asia, Africa and other underdeveloped areas a political and military influence as great or greater than that we have in Europe. We must also make it clear to the underdeveloped countries that our foreign aid is not a substitute for their own efforts. In the flow of our foreign aid, for underdeveloped countries should be channelled through bodies set up to serve our military alliances. This should serve to make the alliances themselves more attractive. It is necessary to make certain changes in the form of these alliances should be considered.

In other words wherever possible we should, emphasize the economic aspects of our alliances. We should widely and wisely make use of economic aid to those countries which we intend to draw into alliance with us, but we should do it more flexibly and carefully than hitherto. In the past we have sometimes tied up the provision of economic aid with the demand to join us in a formal alliance, in a small number of cases that many potential allies were alienated. It is necessary for us to act morefully and patiently, and in the early stages confine ourselves to securing very modest political concessions in exchange for our economic aid in such exceptional cases - even without any concessions in return. The USSR will be prepared to enter this stage, to step up both our political price and our military aid.

You seemed to be ruled by these considerations when you agreed to offer economic aid to Egypt to help it with the construction of the Aswan dam. If the Egyptian Government accepts this aid a situation will be created in which Egypt will inevitably become bogged down in a massive and ambitious construction and will need our support for a long period of time. I think it logical to extend this type of co-operation to other countries. And in particular never to forget the theory of cumulative rather than immediate political demands on which it is based.

3. In line with this I suggest that those countries to which economic aid is to be extended, should be divided into three groups, different methods and forms of economic co-operation being applied to each of these groups.

First of all, we should pick out the countries with anti-communist Governments friendly to us, which are already bound to the U.S. through stable long-term military agreements. In this case Governmental subsidies

Such errors as these, however, to the predominant extent that the forgeries are aimed at public opinion rather than officialdom, detract less from their effectiveness than one might expect. Once the forged documents have achieved their initial impact on the public mind, especially in underdeveloped

areas, denials and official exposures are likely to be met with skepticism, if indeed they come to public notice at all. Radio Moscow promptly mounted a major effort to publicize the Rockefeller letter and carried it during the following week in dozens of broadcasts in all languages, initially favoring audiences in underdeveloped countries but then broadening to include western Europe. It was assisted by other Bloc media and auxiliary press outlets outside the Bloc.

On 10 March another false document was surfaced in *Neues Deutschland* to sharpen up one aspect of the Rockefeller revelation, the grasping colonialism of American policy, as a weapon particularly effective against Near East targets. A purported memorandum from Secretary Dulles to the President written in the last half of December 1956 and urging vigorous U.S. action to step into the Near East power vacuum, it was paraphrased with quotes and described as proof that the Wall Street views of Rockefeller formed the basis for the U.S. Government policy manifest in the Eisenhower Doctrine since enunciated.

This occasioned another week-long burst of overt propaganda playing on both documents, mostly for the benefit of the Near East. Covert assets were also employed: in late March an East German trade delegation official met secretly with Arab League personnel and arranged to have the two forgeries translated into Arabic for hand-out to the governments of member states. In November, with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon, publicity for the documents was renewed, and by the end of that month more than a hundred instances of replay had been reported, some 80 percent of them world-wide Moscow broadcasts. Even in 1960 the Rockefeller letter continued to crop up—in February in a Hanoi news dispatch, in March in the Bagdad CP organ *Ittihad al-Shaab*, and in July in a broadcast from Peking to South Asia.

Patterns and Current Progress

It is notable that although the massive overt propaganda facilities of the USSR, seconded by the almost comparable media of Communist China, had the preponderant role in exploiting all nine of the black campaigns studied, neither of them did the original surfacing of any of the forgeries (unless you count the London embassy a propaganda facility in trans-



NEUES DEUTSCHLAND

ORGAN DES ZENTRALKOMITEES DER SOZIALISTISCHEN EINHEITSPARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS

Berlin, 10. März 1957

Berlin Sonntag, 10. März 1957

12. Jahrgang, Nr. 11, 1. und 2. Auflage 1957

„Neues Deutschland“ veröffentlicht Geheim- Memorandum von Dulles

**Feststellungen
des amerikanischen Außenministers Dulles**
über die schwere Niederlage des Imperialismus im Nahen Osten,
über das gestiegene Ansehen der Sowjetunion bei den
arabischen Völkern,

seine Vorschläge an Präsident Eisenhower:

Wie sich die USA die Herrschaft über die Erdölvorkommen
des Nahen Ostens sichern,
wie sie neue, mit Atomwaffen ausgerüstete militärische Stütz-
punkte im Nahen Osten errichten
und durch propagandistische Winkelzüge die Öffentlichkeit der
arabischen Länder irreführen sollen,
sind in einem geheimen, von Dulles dem USA-Präsidenten
unterbreiteten Memorandum enthalten.

Eine inhaltliche Wiedergabe dieses Geheimmemorandums, in
dem sich Dulles die Vorschläge des von uns veröffentlichten
Rockefellerbriefes zu eigen macht, veröffentlichen wir auf
Seite 3 unserer heutigen Ausgabe mit dem Titel „Der Feind
der arabischen Freiheit“.

mitting the four U.S. pilot letters or Khrushchev's complicity in opening the unstable-pilot campaign). Of the overt Bloc media the German were most frequently used for surfacing, but even they brought out only six of the 32 false documents.

There were doubtless other individual forgeries during this period that have not come to light, but our list of nine internationally distributed multiple-forgery series is probably fairly complete. It is therefore of interest that they form an almost regular pattern of geographical targeting for the two years in which they were initiated—in 1957 one each aimed at Europe, Asia, the Near East, and the world at large, with none specifically for the western hemisphere; in 1958 the same, but an extra one for the Near East. If this pattern reflects norms imposed on KGB planning sections, 1958 must have created in the Near East section some Heroes of Socialist

Forgery, and there should have been a shake-up of the Western Hemisphere staff. Perhaps this is what produced in 1960 the covertly circulated forged Dillon airgram exposed by the State Department on 2 September, referring to "the program set up [by the United States] to liquidate the Castro regime" but dated 5 February, when Under Secretary Dillon was out of town, and marred by formal errors and one of those ineradicable British spellings, "defence."

More seriously, the pattern of recent forgeries suggests that Sino-Soviet black psychological warfare operations, like overt propaganda attacks, may be not only sensitive to the opportunities provided by hot spots around the world, as one might expect, but also subject to administrative damping during efforts to relax East-West tensions. From March 1959 through May 1960 only two new forgeries of the type under discussion appeared, one in *Blitz* for the Far East and one in *Neues Deutschland* for Europe. But between the collapse at the Summit and the U.S. election of a successor to President Eisenhower, production was increased sevenfold, on a neat schedule of one new forgery per month.

One of these, happily countered by the State Department before publication, was photocopies mailed to Tokyo newspapers of a purported U.S. embassy memorandum showing that Japan-based U-2 planes were going to be hidden temporarily on Okinawa and then secretly returned to Japan. But the hottest spot of 1960 has of course been Africa. In April MTT's 1959 story of concentration camps and poison wells, credited to the Afro-Asian Permanent Secretariat in Cairo, was used in a speech by a UAR delegate to the Afro-Asian conference in Conakry. In June appeared a forged paper revealing British and American imperialist plots against the newly independent African countries. And in early September, with Lumumba still ascendant in the Congo, Leopoldville newspapers received copies of a frank "letter from Under Secretary Dillon to Ambassador Timberlake":

Limit your contacts with Lumumba's political opponents to a minimum, especially with Tshombe's people, although they should not be discontinued for a moment. We of course are certain that after what he received in Washington, Tshombe will not go back on us, at least of his own free will. God only knows what these blacks are likely to do. It would be difficult to find more mercenary creatures

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Psywar By Forgery SECRET

in the whole world. At present, we here do not envisage a more suitable candidate for the post of Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo. At present he seems to be the only suitable replacement for the high-handed postal clerk who stands on the pedestal as the "liberator of the Congo."

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Intelligence Articles V 1

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*Faulty intelligence and other
factors that brought a bold
campaign to Pyrrhic victory.*

GALAHAD: INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS

Charles N. Hunter

The six-month saga of Galahad's action in Burma has been sketched as a part of the larger history recorded in Romanus and Sunderland's *Stilwell's Command Problems*,¹ and more recently it has been told in vivid detail and with greater accuracy in Charlton Ogburn's *The Marauders*,² the unit's nickname invented and popularized by the press. The Army account is marred by omissions and errors, however, and skillful a narrator as Ogburn is, he was not in a position to view the campaign in its command and intelligence aspects nor to take fully into account the failures in planning, coordination, and intelligence that characterized CBI Theater operations under General Joe Stilwell's erratic and nepotistical direction.

Formed on the unorthodox image of Orde Wingate's Chindits, Galahad was used to surprise the enemy—General Tanaka's crack 18th Division, which had fought in Malaya and captured Singapore before participating in the conquest of Burma—in the rear by circling his flank through almost impassable mountain jungles. In the first half of 1944 it made three such flanking penetrations to facilitate the cautious advance of Stilwell's Chinese forces south and east toward Myitkyina—one to the enemy rear at Walawbum, one to Shaduzup and Inkangahtawng above Kamaing, and the last, most daringly, to Myitkyina. In all three it was successful in its immediate objectives; but all three, thanks in part to deficiencies in theater intelligence, were disappointing in the follow-up.

¹ Washington, D.C., 1956. One of the series *The U.S. Army in World War II* which form the official history produced by the Department of the Army. "Galahad," originally a code name for the project to send an unorthodox American force into Burma, in practice came to designate the force itself.

² New York: Harper, 1959.

At Walawbum Tanaka's supposedly trapped forces escaped their Chinese pursuers over trails that Colonel Joe Stilwell, Jr., his father's G2, had not suspected to exist. At Inkangah-tawng the roadblock, fumbled through lack of air photos and other reconnaissance, was withdrawn on the basis of dubious intelligence amid a confusion of poor communications and uncertain lines of command, and then vulnerable Kamaing was left unmolested in favor of a defensive action that cost exhausted Galahad severe casualties at Nhpum Ga. At Myit-kyina Galahad's designated objective, the airfield, was seized with sensationally neat precision, but what should have been the following quick occupation of the town was turned by lack of planning, international and interservice involvements, and the manipulation of intelligence into a grueling ten-week siege.

Provisions for Intelligence

Intelligence and reconnaissance platoons were organized in each of Galahad's three battalions, and these of course played a key role in the penetration missions; but no regimental intelligence staff had been planned and no personnel were provided for one either originally or by CBI Theater. We had no field manuals covering intelligence. The nearest thing to intelligence personnel assigned us was a detachment of Japanese linguists, Nisei, under the supervision of Lieutenant William A. Laffin, to interpret prisoner interrogations. These I had kept busy on shipboard publishing a daily paper and starting to record the history of Galahad, a record they continued to maintain until they became too few and overwhelmed with other duties. When, during training in India, a combat exercise against some of Wingate's columns demonstrated the need for an intelligence staff, Laffin, although he had very little military experience and none at all in intelligence, was made the S2.

This turned out to be a wise and fruitful appointment. Laffin was mature, physically active, and intelligent, and getting him oriented in combat intelligence was no great chore. All the Nisei, together with Jack Girsham of the Burma Rifles, who remained with us throughout, became excellent interrogators; but Laffin's linguistic skill was so highly developed that he could determine a Japanese prisoner's home prefecture without questioning him, simply by his accent. His apparent

clairvoyance would so astound the homesick and discouraged Japanese that they would break down very quickly and hold nothing back.

To brief ourselves on our projected area of operation we had had on shipboard the advantage of a library of some sixty books on Burma and Southeast Asia, arranged for by G2 in the Pentagon on General Weckerling's own initiative; but two efforts to get first-hand information on the immediate terrain before we jumped off from Ledo were aborted. General Merrill, who had finally been assigned to command Galahad under the designation 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), and I arranged to fly as supercargo on a photographic mission over the projected operations area, but the plane had to turn back after an hour or so in the air. And three officers Merrill had sent, one from each battalion, to reconnoiter the road under construction down into the Hukawng valley as far as Stilwell's forward headquarters at Shingbuiyang and to be briefed there were not permitted to return in time to do us any good: they reported back that on Stilwell's behalf General Boatner, his chief of staff, had dressed them down and questioned their courage for wanting to leave the forward area so soon. This incident gave Galahad the first impression of the headquarters to which it was assigned and a foretaste of what was in store for it.


Walawbum

The move out from Ledo, on 7 February, was made after dark for security reasons. The whole Galahad project was supposed to be highly secret. We had sailed under the not very convincing cover of medical replacements, and I had made an example of one young officer who had talked too much—to CIC men by bad luck—when we put in at Noumea to pick up our third battalion. When I had turned him over to MacArthur's G2 at Brisbane, General Willoughby had warned me that security in the CBI theater was poor to the point of being non-existent. He had been right: the night after we started our southeast march to the fighting zone Tokyo Rose announced that American combat troops were for the first time marching down the Ledo road.

Our first mission was to feel our way around the east flank of the front near Maingkwan, where Stilwell's Chinese had for some time been stalled by elements of Tanaka's 18th Division, and set up a roadblock at some unpredetermined point south of the enemy. For this kind of operation, and particularly for the selection of a good roadblock site, air photos are invaluable; but at this time, and continuously until well after the airstrip at Myitkyina was taken, photographic coverage was unsatisfactory. Air photos of an area of operations were likely to arrive after we had already passed it and no longer had any use for them. From what I learned later of Stilwell's method of planning, or rather his impatience with detailed planning, I imagine that the Air Corps probably received directives for photoreconnaissance missions too late to produce results on time. It gradually became obvious that we were following an artist's sketch rather than architects' blueprints in the campaign.

Laffin had secured all the information available about known Japanese positions, but whether we had got far enough east to clear the Japanese right flank had to be determined by patrols of the I and R platoons, which therefore suffered Galahad's first combat casualties as they ran into enemy patrols rounding the bends of trails. One scout was wounded and one killed during our first day in enemy-held territory. General Sun Li Jen's liaison officer with Galahad, a Colonel Lee, who had brought with him his orderly and little else except a cheerful and cooperative attitude, was incredulous about Galahad's dispersed methods of operation. To the day he left us at Myitkyina he continued to express amazement and concern over the distances at which the I and R platoons operated away from the battalions. They were in fact generally beyond the range of the portable FM SCR 300 and so had to carry a heavy 284 on muleback.

Ogburn describes well the eight-day march on this first mission, punctuated by river crossings and supply drops, the successful placing of a double block at Walawbum and three miles up the road at a river crossing, Galahad's baptism of shell fire as it held against the Japanese counterattacks, Roy Matsumoto's tapping of the Japanese telephone line and interception of reports and orders, including Tanaka's eventual



order to withdraw, and Galahad's relief on 7 March by the Chinese coming down from the north. He also refers to the loss of a bag of silver rupees in the withdrawal and says that Lt. Col. Osborne, his battalion commander, still chides him as responsible for it. He was not: I had this silver, the 5000-rupee headquarters portion of our 20,000 of secret intelligence funds, buried at Walawbum in order to lighten loads on our depleted complement of mules. There was little demand for silver in Burma, and still less for the thousands of Japanese yen and the trinkets some stateside expert had had included in our equipment. Food, medical attention, parachute cloth, and needles and thread were our most valuable currency.

The operation at Walawbum broke a long stalemate and effected a significant advance down the Kamaing road. In its failure to entrap the Japanese the Stilwells, father and son, played the key roles. It was a glaring deficiency in young Joe's theater intelligence not to have discovered that Tanaka's forces had constructed a route of withdrawal south and west of Walawbum. And the elder Joe did not know what his own forces were doing: on 8 March, twenty-four hours after Merrill had pulled Galahad out and broken communication with theater headquarters, Stilwell ordered a coordinated action by Galahad and the Chinese forces. When he learned that Galahad was gone he decided, says the official history, "that his orders to Merrill had not been clear enough." Why were communications not maintained and why weren't orders reduced to writing? There is an Army way of doing things, and there was a Stilwell way.

The uncertainty of theater intelligence was impressed on me personally a few days later, when I was flown to Stilwell's headquarters to get approval for our plan for the next mission. The headquarters staff criticized our proposed routes as ones on which we would have to carve drop zones out of the jungle to receive our supplies. When I said that Galahad's British experts, Jack Girsham and Evan Darlington—the latter a former area political officer who, knowing the country and the people intimately, kept us supplied with Kachin guides—thought there were ample open areas for drops, Stilwell commented caustically, "If the terrain is like that, how come I don't know about it?"

Detachment 101

This time Galahad was to split up from the start, Osborne's 1st battalion with the 113th Chinese regiment behind it marching on a tight circle over the Jambu Bum to cut the road around Shaduzup, and the other two battalions sweeping wide up the Tanai Hka to put in a block closer to Kamaing, a road-head of considerable importance. *Command Problems* tells how Merrill did not want to divide his force but was hampered in making his proposals to Stilwell by "extremely faulty coordination" amounting to a "hoarding of information": he had not been informed that a force of Kachins under OSS Detachment 101's Lieutenant Tilly, operating on the route to Shaduzup, was available to guide and screen the march. In Galahad we had the impression that the two Stilwells didn't set much store by 101.³ First battalion learned of Tilly's existence, as Ogburn narrates, in an almost accidental meeting half way to Shaduzup after unwittingly fighting a joint action with him against a Japanese patrol.

Merrill was told before we set out, however, that at Naubum on the Tanai Hka, where 2nd and 3rd battalions would pass, Detachment 101 had a field headquarters for Kachin guerrilla activities and had carved out of the jungle an air strip big enough for liaison planes, keeping it camouflaged except when planes were actually landing or taking off. Approaching Naubum after several days' march, we saw first an unofficial representative of the guerrillas, a strangely uniformed individual leaning against a tree. Without insignia to indicate his nationality or status, he was sporting an Australian wide-brimmed felt hat turned up, British style, on the left side. Stocky and good looking, with a black beard on his otherwise cleanly shaven face, he reminded me instantly of my Irish uncle Jack McNary. He was chewing on a twig and seemed to be trying to hide his intense interest behind a faint but impish grin. Such was my first glimpse of the Christian Brother missionary Father James Stuart, whom I later came to consider a trusted friend, a gentleman, and a true man of God.

³ For an account of Detachment 101's intelligence activities see W. R. Peers in *Intelligence Articles* IV 3, p. A1 ff.

The OSS unit was commanded by Captain Curl, a wiry old soldier with the finest beard I have ever seen on any human being. Deep auburn in color, it was carefully brushed back from a precision part in the exact center of his chin into two luxuriant flowing waves. It reminded me of an old painting of the prow of a clipper parting the waters of the Indian Ocean as it sailed into the burnt-orange sunset. Curl made us welcome to his headquarters, where he was protected by a circular screen of trail blocks and watchers forty miles in diameter that no Jap had yet lived to penetrate. He said he was prepared to march south with us with 300 Kachins.

Getting acquainted with these OSS people was a delightful experience. The next morning, silently and unannounced, a file of seven elephants, trunks holding tails ahead and one with a young calf at her side, was led in by Kachin mahouts and halted in front of General Merrill. Captain Curl was putting them at Galahad's disposal. We tried them out at our next supply drop in the demanding job of clearing the drop zone promptly. They and their mahouts proved quick-witted at learning the business and were regularly so used thereafter. As far as I can ascertain, Galahad is the only American combat force ever to have included elephants as a regular part of its combat train.

As we moved on we were now preceded by a scouting detachment of the OSS Kachins, who from this time on worked under Laffin's direct supervision. Curl's men had also thoughtfully built a foot bridge for us where the trail crossed the Tanai before rising with incredible steepness some 2000 feet to Janpan. Curl personally guided the Galahad battalions up this trail; although he was suffering from a bad knee, he insisted on marching with the column. And at Janpan, when I arrived with an advance guard some two hours ahead of Merrill, I was amazed to watch the Kachins, with the help of the village experts, build a rainproof shelter for him, complete with door and a fireplace for cooking, before the main column began to arrive.

None of the Janpan villagers had ever in his entire life seen so many human beings assembled in one place. As the column continued to pass through the village to its bivouac area on the far side, they became convinced, Father Jim Stuart told

me that night, that with this number of men engaged the war would surely soon be over.

Inkangahtawng

It was good to have Curl's knowledge of the country, because it was time to decide on the location of our projected roadblock and we had no air photos of the area. Along the march we kept expecting the requested photos of the terrain ahead of us, but when they were dropped they always covered only country we had already passed through. Now, moreover, on 20 March, we received a message giving us the additional mission of blocking the trails running north along the Tanai against any Japanese moving from the south to threaten the Chinese left flank below Walawbum. Half of Lt. Col. Beach's 3rd battalion was assigned to undertake this job with the help of the OSS Kachins and patrol the trails south of Auche, while I took the other half and the 2nd battalion, under Lt. Col. McGee, to establish a block somewhere on a five-mile stretch of the Kamaing road around Inkangahtawng. Merrill would stay at Janpan.

We had got as far as Auche and taken our last air drop when another of Stilwell's "Hurry up" messages—we had received one on the way to Walawbum that made us abandon at a drop site a good part of the supplies we had just received—caused the time for the roadblock to be set up some 36 hours. Now, in addition to having no air photos, we would have no time for reconnaissance, and would simply have to blunder across the Mogaung river through the Japanese positions and out onto the Kamaing road. I was not even sure the Mogaung was fordable, although the Kachins thought it was.

Blunder we did. On 24 March McGee, whom I had sent ahead while I saw to preparing an airstrip for evacuations, got across the Mogaung and found Inkangahtawng dead ahead and too well fortified for the reinforced patrols he sent to envelop it. He dug in 300 yards from the road and withstood repeated counterattacks and shell fire. I couldn't reach him by radio, but I wasn't worried because I expected to catch up with him and take over before he could get hit very hard. In the meantime, however, McGee received a message from Merrill—my own radio operators were having difficulty communicating with Janpan—to the effect that a captured map showed two

Japanese battalions moving to outflank our blocking force. Although it was not an action message, McGee decided to withdraw. When I took a liaison plane to look over the blocks I supposed by now established and perhaps to land on the road, I found his battalion marching back up the trail.

I could not object to Merrill's dealing directly with McGee because of the communications difficulties, but in my opinion this message should not have been sent. It transmitted unverified information from a source that could easily have been a plant. If I were being outflanked by a force close enough to endanger my mission and didn't know it, I should have been relieved and sent back to the infantry school for a refresher.

Back at Manpin, at the base of the hills and the point closest to Kamaing on our route, I finally got through to Janpan and we were instructed to move rapidly to Auche to block the trail north. Beach's patrols were fighting a delaying action against Japanese forces advancing north from Kamaing. We took a supply drop before leaving Manpin, and while it was being cleared an OSS Chinese agent appeared. Operating under a code name, he relayed information by radio to Lt. Col. Ray Peers, commander of Detachment 101. He said that a large Japanese force had left Kamaing on a trail to Auche only four or five hours ago, according to a reliable native informant, a purveyor of milk to the Japanese officers' mess in Kamaing.

Luckily the evening patrol of fighter planes came over as I was digesting and plotting this information, and I asked the flight leader to verify it. When he reported back that the tail of a column could be seen disappearing up the trail in question, I designated it a target and the fighters proceeded to work the Japs over. We knew they were successful, for they returned some time later to buzz Manpin, pull up in a steep climb, and end with the barrel-roll signifying *Mission accomplished*. Working with Galahad was a pleasure for the fighter pilots and a relief from supporting the Chinese. We pinpointed targets for close-in strafing and bombing and we checked and reported results of missions flown, whereas the Chinese designated whole areas as targets, never reported results, and were quite unreliable in reading maps.

It seemed to me, on the basis of all information available, that with this detachment of Japanese out of the way the important installation at Kamaing must now be wide open; and here I sat with a battalion and a half of troops just five or six miles away. I radioed Merrill for permission to move in on the place; it would be a bigger coup than our now abandoned Inkangahtawng project and would cut off the rear of the Japanese forces we had been ordered to intercept at Auche. To my disappointment I was told to withdraw; I still believe it was a golden opportunity that should have been exploited.

Nhpum Ga

What followed were Galahad's darkest days so far. McGee's battalion, moving back exhausted from Auche to Nhpum Ga on 28 March, was attacked and within two or three days cut off from 3rd battalion and the headquarters staff, which had taken up position in a valley to the north to protect the airstrip at Hsamshingyang. Merrill had a heart attack and was evacuated. As the situation became critical Father Stuart informed me that the Kachins might pull out at any time. Nevertheless, on 3 April, I ordered Kachins substituted for patrols wherever possible and all able men assembled for a determined drive to relieve McGee. As this drive made progress the Kachins perked up again and began to feel out the trails.

In the meantime Osborne's 1st battalion, after a brilliantly professional job of reconnaissance by its I and R platoon, had surprised the Japanese at Shaduzup on 28 March, set up a block, and held it against counterattacks until relieved by the Chinese with their pack artillery. Osborne's men were now ordered back over the long roundabout trails, the sum of both forces' earlier routes, to join us. They arrived on 7 April after a forced march on short rations. Exhausted as they were, and with dysentery and malaria widespread among them, 250 were found fit for immediate employment. With these and the help of air photos which had finally arrived, I was able to order a flank attack around the right side, protected by a diversionary move on the left, which cut the Japanese supply line.

By 9 April, Easter Sunday, the Japanese had had enough and pulled out. We were ordered not to pursue. McGee's men had performed a near miracle in holding out against what

we thought was an enemy battalion; after the war we learned that it was two mixed battalions of infantry reinforced by a company of artillery. This force, the main Japanese reserve in north Burma, was badly mauled, and its withdrawal ended any serious enemy threat to Stilwell's forces there.

As I walked into the defense perimeter that Sunday I paused to look at a motionless horse whose gray color I did not recognize. On close examination I was stunned to find that every inch of his body except his hooves was covered with inanimate gray flies, gorged with the flesh of the poor animal, too weak to flick his tail. Bloated animals, also covered with flies, lay with legs grotesquely extended in protest where they had fallen and died from shell fire, thirst, or starvation. An all too familiar nauseating odor lay over the area, heavy as a London fog.

McGee took me around the perimeter, reviewing the events of the past ten days. Here a soldier took a direct hit from a mortar and had to be buried in his foxhole; that scarred tree was used by a bazooka man to fragment his shells over the bunched-up Japanese; this was where Matsumoto crept forward and listened to the Japanese officers giving their attack orders; here a soldier shot his buddy in the morning mist; and there a lieutenant, unrecognized without his glasses, was shot by his own men. The Japanese, in their haste, had left several dead behind, including the bloated lower half of a body that looked for all the world like a pair of football pants stuffed with gear for an out-of-town game. Galahad had 52 dead, 302 wounded, and 77 evacuated sick, as against more than 400 Japanese killed; but it was badly weakened and needed a rest.

Arang

About the time we had got Nhpum Ga cleaned up Colonel Hank Kinnison, Stilwell's G3 at NCAC, visited us at Hsamshingyang and said that Stilwell was seriously thinking of organizing a task force to seize the airstrip at Myitkyina, head of navigation on the Irrawaddy, the northernmost railhead and the main Japanese base in north Burma. Although we considered this idea of Stilwell's a wild dream, involving as it would the crossing of the jumbled Kumon range in the rains preliminary to the coming monsoon, I thought the staff would

benefit from the exercise of preparing a study on its feasibility while the men and animals were getting back into condition. Laffin made a study of the terrain. Working from our maps, such as they were, and questioning the OSS Kachins and local villagers, he selected routes that might be negotiable over the mountains and south to Myitkyina. Father Stuart was an invaluable help, not only because of his own knowledge of the country but because he could evaluate for our purposes a Kachin estimate of the usability of a trail.

When, a few days later, I was asked to send a staff officer to Stilwell's headquarters, I gave him the staff study to take along as of possible use, incomplete as it was and scratched with pencil on all kinds of paper. Merrill, on his feet again and active at headquarters, incorporated it into plans he had been making for our next mission and presented it to Stilwell within a couple of hours. Galahad was ordered back to Naubum, where the Myitkyina Task Force would be formed.

Naubum, Curl's once recondite retreat, was alive with activity. Many new bashas had been built around the airstrip, now uncamouflaged with two liaison aircraft parked brazenly in the open. Merrill was there; he was to command the task force. His executive officer would be Colonel John E. McCammon, a Chinese-speaking officer newly brought from Stilwell's Kunming headquarters, for the task force would consist of Galahad and two Chinese regiments being flown in over the hump from China. I was to command a subordinate Task Force "H" comprising Osborne's 1st battalion and the 150th Chinese regiment, under Colonel Huang, plus a Chinese battery of 75-mm. pack howitzers. Kinnison would have a similar "K" force composed of Beach's 3rd battalion and the other Chinese regiment.

Jack Girsham and Laffin would be with H force. During the few days at Naubum Laffin made an intense study of the trails, leading or sending Kachins out to test routes that looked possible. The problem was not just to find a trail over the mountains, but to find a route that the animals with their heavy packs could take. He finally selected one and proposed that it be tried out all the way to Arang on the other side of the range.

The OSS people could talk by radio with Arang, where there was a secret setup similar to Captain Curl's at Naubum, and I asked them to have Arang dispatch a patrol to Naubum over the proposed route to check it. In a few days the four-man patrol reported in with the information that it was passable and with invaluable detail about it. Laffin was sent ahead with some Kachins and an engineer officer to improve it as far as they could.

On 27 April we set out, K force in the lead to cut off to the left from Ritpong for a feint at Nsopzup on the Myitkyina-Sumprabum road, H force to continue via Arang and attack the Myitkyina airfield with a target date of 12 May, and what was left of McGee's battalion, reinforced by 300 Kachins, to take a more direct route south of ours, providing security on the right flank as far as Arang. Past the improved first portion of the trail the going was brutal. Third battalion, in K force, lost twenty animals with their loads of ammunition and equipment; they would slip in the mud and roll down the mountainside. H force lost several. I once found a soldier struggling along with a pair of obviously heavy saddle bags in addition to his pack; they contained 1500 silver rupees, H force's intelligence funds. He was first incredulous and then dismayed when I ordered him to throw away the supposedly precious burden he had clambered down 200 feet to retrieve from his dead pack-horse.

We reached Arang, the OSS headquarters on the Kumon eastern slopes, behind schedule, having been delayed as far as Ritpong by the straggling tail of K force column. At Ritpong K force had met unexpected Japanese resistance and we had slipped on through without being observed by the enemy. Arang was a pleasant little spot, where we could take our last relatively safe air drop, evacuate those unfit to continue, and receive the latest intelligence and any changes in plan. I was never given any estimate of the Japanese strength to expect at Myitkyina, but I did receive here a large air photo of the town and one of its airfield, about two miles west of the town nearer the downstream settlement of Pamati.

Merrill flew in at Arang. Since I was going to impose radio silence from about the time H force left Seingneing, we agreed on a set of code words to keep him informed and to enable

me to order the necessary resupply of food and ammunition when we had taken the airstrip. Galahad carried on its collective human and animal back only enough ammunition for ten to twelve minutes of fire from all weapons, and immediate resupply would be imperative if there were any kind of fight. The codes were as follows:

Cafeteria lunch: H hour minus 48.

Strawberry sundae: H hour minus 24. Ready resupply transports.

In the ring: Attacking. Transports take off.

Merchant of Venice: Field secure; no repairs needed. Transports land.

If I judged that the field needed repair, engineers would land by glider. I repeatedly pressed Merrill for instructions on what to do after taking the airfield, whether to take the town and whether to cross the river, but he would only say, "Don't worry. I'll be the first man on the field and take over."

Merchant of Venice

We marched south from Arang behind a screen of 75 OSS-trained Kachins under the command of Lt. Bill Martin. Laffin stayed at the head of the column with Martin. In two days we reached Seingneing, which was reported to have been occupied by the Japanese at one time. Laffin, scouting it, found no signs of recent occupation, and we could therefore take a supply drop here. I tried to make use of this last opportunity to evacuate those too sick to go on: dysentery and a strange new fever which we eventually found to be mite typhus had become rampant. A few litter planes got in and out of the improvised airstrip until the wind shifted, but then after a near crash on the short take-off the pilots could no longer risk it. We had to leave two officers and 32 men there in charge of Major Tom Senff, who had a wrenched back and an infected throat. Somehow my request that they be taken care of was lost at headquarters, and they were left untended for five days until Senff in desperation limped the twenty miles to find us at Myitkyina.

There were two exasperating incidents with the Chinese at Seingneing. First, I found that they had got tired of carrying the rather heavy batteries of their radios and had thrown

them away some days before, and so couldn't be used in a dispersed operation. And now the commander of the pack howitzers wanted to leave all his ammunition behind because he had several lame horses and mules. It took about two hours to convince him that his battery without ammunition would be as useless as the radios without batteries.

Having radioed *Cafeteria lunch*, we left Seingneing in the afternoon on 15 May, planning a night march in order to cross the Mogaung-Myitkyina road half way to Myitkyina by early daylight. We were a small force—under 400 Americans, fewer than 800 Chinese rifles, and an untested battery of the lightest of light artillery—to be attacking an important enemy base, and everything depended on achieving surprise. The column could get across the road in three hours by daylight; at night it would take a great deal longer. Moreover, air observation and Kachin road watchers indicated that any large-scale use of the road occurred under cover of darkness. This schedule should give the men a chance to rest the following night before attacking on the morning of 17 May.

We were guided on this furtive march by one particular OSS Kachin whose knowledge of the country was a major factor in our successful approach; he had formerly been a forest ranger in the Pidaung National Forest through which we were moving. We also had at the head of the column three or four OSS agents of Anglo-Burmese extraction, not very aggressive but likable men. Like the sons of other mixed marriages throughout the Orient, the war had put them in the difficult position of having to choose between their opposing inherited loyalties and made them treasonable to the side they chose against. They had now irrevocably committed themselves to the Anglo-American war effort, and they were scared: as we neared the road crossing they would nervously step aside on the trail at every opportunity to relieve themselves. I wondered each time whether they would come back, but they always did. Courage is essentially self-control under frightening conditions, and these OSS agents had it.

Bill Laffin himself was in a similar or worse position. The son of an American retired sea captain and his Japanese wife, he had been repatriated on the Gripsholm after signing a pledge not to wage war against Japan. His parents remained in Japan under the watchful care of the Kempi Tai; it would

go ill with them and him if he were captured by his mother's people. I often wondered from what source he drew the calm courage that complemented his unfailing dignity and sense of decency. I admired him.

In the wee hours of that night, as we made our way through the intense darkness, I was radioed for permission to use a flashlight: our Kachin guide had been bitten by a snake, perhaps a hamadryad, and the doctor wanted to examine and treat him. The column halted, waiting for the verdict on our one indispensable man. His leg was swelling fast, Doc McLaughlin reported, and it would endanger his life to go on. I said he had to go on. "It will kill him," Doc answered. "We'll have to let him rest at least two hours." I told Doc he had to go on until he collapsed; too much depended on him. I sent my horse forward and told Laffin to disregard Doc's orders and put the Kachin on it and get going. McLaughlin, governed by selfless devotion to his profession and the precepts of the Hippocratic oath, could not bring himself to endanger a human life; but a commander must put the success of his mission above all other considerations.

It was not long now before our guide, in great pain but still in command of his faculties, said that the Mogaung-Myitkyina road lay ahead. Laffin and OSS Lieutenant Martin scrupulously refrained from setting foot on it; they wanted me to have the honor of being the first to cross this so important little ribbon of gravel. Sending security detachments a mile out on either side in the gray dawn, we crossed unobserved and without incident. When the whole column was across I had the radio unslung and transmitted *Strawberry sundae*—"H minus 24; ready supply transports."


The next crossing was the railroad, at a point some five miles from its terminus at Myitkyina. Here we expected no trouble, and had none. Herbie, one of our Nisei, climbed a telephone pole and tapped the line; there was nothing of importance on the wire. We did not cut it, not wanting to bring a repair crew down the tracks on us. Beyond the railroad lay the village of Namkwi, on the east bank of the Namkwi Hka. As a precautionary measure I had Martin and his Kachins round up the entire population, man, woman, and child, and bring them along as our guests for the night.

Elated at having reached our point of assault without being discovered, we bivouacked on the river south of Namkwi and spent a busy evening gathering information. Martin and his OSS agents engaged the villagers in long periods of questioning about the Japanese strength and habits, the condition of the airstrip, etc., until they were squeezed dry of what they knew. After dark Laffin sent a patrol to reconnoiter the airfield, and its leader got through and actually onto the runway and back without being seen, although Japanese were all about. As a result of these efforts I was in possession by midnight of excellent information on which to base an attack order, as follows:

The Japanese worked on the airfield at night, repairing any bomb damage incurred during the day. The repair crews were billeted on the far side of the strip toward the Pamati end. At Pamati there was a Japanese military police headquarters for the area. There was no wire around the airfield, and the revetments around the strip which I had noticed on my air photo and had been worried lest they be fortified were not. The 55-gal. oil drums the photo showed checkerboarding the field were still there. Cover was sparse, and observation points between us and the field were lacking. Laffin's patrol had plotted a compass course that could confidently be used as an axis of attack.

It was learned also that a train left Myitkyina for Mogaung at about eleven every morning, that in Myitkyina there had been 2000 Japanese some time ago, and that the Japanese had 25 geishas in the area. (This last item became one of absorbing professional interest to Herbie, who by the time the city fell on 3 August had an accurate list of the names of all of them.)

The attack, at 10:30 the next morning, 17 May, went like clockwork, like part of a peacetime maneuver. As the troops moved out we sent our message *In the ring*, the signal for our supply transports to take off. The Chinese swept across the field and dug in on the east, toward Myitkyina, against shell fire. Osborne took Pamati and, leaving a platoon there to hold it, proceeded upstream toward the Zigyun ferry south of Myitkyina, the ultimate objective I'd given him. OSS Lieutenant Martin and his Kachins first blew up the railroad bridge



over the Namkwi—the train escaped, coming through apparently ahead of schedule while the charges were still being placed—and then supervised the local villagers in the job of rolling the oil drums off the runway.

By mid-afternoon the field was operational. I radioed *Merchant of Venice* for transports to come in and land. We had difficulty getting an acknowledgement, so I asked the leader of a flight of P-40's that shortly flew over—with orders to support us, but we had no targets—to relay it in again.

Then the clockwork went crazy. The planes came in promptly, but they brought no ammunition, no food, no General Merrill, only sundry goods and personnel not ordered, not wanted, and not needed. First it was gratuitous engineers, landing in gliders with great hazard to Col. Huang's men at the edge of the field. Then came a 50-caliber antiaircraft battery that proved useless. Then a battalion of the 89th Chinese infantry regiment that had to be disposed someplace where they wouldn't shoot up the troops doing the fighting. What with taking care of all these arrivals I had no time for running the battle. The afternoon was a nightmare. *Command Problems* says it was General Stratemeyer of the Army Air Force who "intervened and upset the planned schedule." Why he was allowed to intervene and why Merrill or someone with authority from Task Force or Theater headquarters didn't arrive I still do not know.

Chinese Fiasco

The next morning, 18 May, Stilwell did fly in. He would have been welcome if he had brought food and ammunition, or even an idea of what we were to do next. But he brought only a dozen correspondents anxious to show how brave they were in visiting the combat zone. He did not say where Merrill was, and plans to follow up the success of our mission apparently had simply not been laid: when I told him that I was going to send the 150th Chinese against the town as soon as the supplies came in, he merely grunted, neither agreeing or disagreeing.

This day and the next, however, with ammunition low, I had to hold the Chinese in position east of the airfield. Osborne took the Zigyun ferry crossing but ran completely out of food and had to be withdrawn. On the 18th we lost Bill Laffin. I had asked him to take a liaison plane to find K force, whom we couldn't reach by radio, and deliver a message outlining our situation. He was in the air when a flight of Zeros, hiding behind a cloud formation that regularly hangs over the

Irrawaddy bend at Myitkyina, heard our fighter patrol radio that it was getting low on gas and was returning to base a few minutes early, before its relief arrived. The Zeros came in, and Laffin's plane either was shot down or crashed trying to get away. This was the only air attack we ever had. My orderly was killed, my own face was pock-marked by spent dum-dum fragments, and considerable damage was done to the fighter planes parked on the field. Stratemeyer could just as well have kept his ack-ack at home: it consumed a lot of food and ammunition, but no Zeros.

On the 19th still no supplies. Merrill flew in, but so unannounced and briefly that I saw him only in time to wave an astounded goodbye as he was taking off. After reporting to Stilwell that afternoon he had another heart attack that put him permanently out of the campaign. He had visited my headquarters, however, and been given our intelligence estimates that there had been between 400 and 500 Japanese in Myitkyina at the time of our attack on the field, that these had grown in a matter of hours to about 2000, and that now there were two and a half battalions, with more coming up from the south. With a supply of ammunition we could have kept going and got into the town on the 17th or 18th; now it would be more costly. Merrill reported these estimates to Stilwell, but curiously and perhaps with a purpose it was the 400-500 figure that stuck in young Stilwell's mind at his father's Shaduzup headquarters and in the mind of the intelligence officer at Myitkyina Task Force headquarters, at this time inexplicably still back at Naubum. More on this later.

The supplies finally arrived on the 20th. The 150th, ready to go, moved out against the town, beginning with an embarrassing fumble. I had unwisely given Colonel Huang an azimuth as axis of advance; he read his compass wrong, got off in the wrong direction, and had to come back and start all over. This time we lined his regiment up in a column of battalions, a simple attack formation not easily fouled up. The initial assault was successful beyond imagination, carrying to the railroad station in the heart of the city. But when overs from Japanese fire intended for the leading battalion began to hit those following in column, the latter stupidly opened fire on their own troops ahead of them; the British lend-lease uniforms the Chinese wore were indistinguish-

able except by their helmets from the Japanese. Then the entire regiment broke and ran, leaving close to three hundred dead or dying in the streets. It was every man for himself, and stragglers were even collected by McGee's force now arriving at Namkwi four miles away.

The Siege

On 21 May Merrill was formally replaced by Col. McCammon, his executive, who began to organize a new task force headquarters at the airfield. He would be commanding the 30th and 50th Chinese divisions, whose remaining elements were then arriving, as well as all of Galahad, which was now under my command; but he kept the two stars of his ad hoc Mexican promotion in his pocket. Osborne's battalion was kept at the airfield to guard it and the headquarters. The rest of Galahad—McGee at Namkwi and K force at last at Charpate—was assigned to provide security on the north and attack Myitkyina from there. Hardly a man of Galahad was by now free of dysentery or malaria or typhus, and the evacuation rate had become alarming.

McCammon was a reluctant debutant, and not well. He mounted one attack that failed. His reports to Stilwell were pessimistic. An atmosphere of apprehension, fear of an all-out Japanese attack to retake the field, began to prevail, not shared by Galahad. On 30 May Stilwell abruptly relieved McCammon and put Boatner, his own chief of staff, in command. I was given makeshift reinforcements in the form of two American engineer battalions from the Ledo road whom I was to introduce to combat operations. At this time Stilwell could probably have got the 36th British division to take Myitkyina, but having, in his own words, "burned up the Limeys" by his coup in seizing the airfield, he insisted on keeping it an American-Chinese show.

General Boatner almost immediately ordered an attack, but it got nowhere. Then in the early days of June the town was completely invested by the Chinese on the south and the Americans on the north. The original Galahad almost disappeared during this time. The doctors ordered first McGee and then Beach evacuated with the bulk of their battalions. Osborne, held inactive at the airfield against my wishes, was down to 18 officers and about 350 men. An unorganized batch

of the greenest of green replacements were formed into what we called 2nd battalion New Galahad and placed at Mankrin to block a small road running north along the river. On 4 June I had set up my headquarters at Radahpur, where the main road out from Myitkyina forks west to Mogaung and north to Sumprabum, and there it was to remain for the next two months. South of Radahpur, about half way to Myitkyina, the two engineer battalions, by now reliable combat forces in a limited defensive role, were in position on either side of the road. The siege began.

During June and July the question of the Japanese strength in Myitkyina became a sore subject between my headquarters on the one hand and task force and theater headquarters on the other. After Jack Girsham and our Nisei had interrogated some fifty prisoners and talked to hundreds of evacuees from the town, it was very clear that over 2000 of the enemy were still alive there. Yet the figure 400-500 had become so fixed at the headquarters on the airfield and in Shaduzup that they would not revise it even when more than that were known to have been killed in and around the beleaguered town. Our positive unit identifications and casualty counts were brushed aside.

It is my personal belief that this ostrich-like attitude was adopted in order to deceive the Chinese troops and shame them for their lack of aggressiveness. Young Stilwell could not have been so ignorant of the situation as the intelligence estimates he furnished us all through June and July indicated; if he was he should have been relieved. Neither the Chinese nor Galahad fell for this deliberate manipulation of intelligence, if that is what it was; it only gave us a complete lack of confidence in any intelligence information put out by our higher headquarters. Information received from above was carefully analyzed and then usually discarded.

Galahad's estimate of 2000 was still 'way short of the correct figure, as we learned after the war from Japanese officers, for a very simple reason. Every Japanese soldier we had hitherto killed or captured had been found to have his name and unit marked in India ink on the fly of his breeches. In June we began to find bodies without this marking, and so could not tell whether they had belonged to units already identified or to new ones. Our estimates, therefore, based on the known

Galahad

organizational strength of positively identified units, were incomplete, and we did not suspect that at one point in the battle there were some 4,500 enemy troops opposing us.

While thus underestimating Japanese strength for the benefit of the forces under his command, General Boatner was attempting to create a quite different impression in General Stilwell's mind. Here he dangled the prospect of losing even the airfield, saying in one report, "On the face of it it might appear that we have plenty here on the field for protection. Such is not the case; we in fact have only a prayer." Galahad would actually have welcomed an all-out banzai attack from the Japanese, having long since learned that these offered the best opportunity for rapid mass slaughter of the enemy. As it was, June under the monsoon dragged on as a month of frustration—sodden foxholes, one futile assault by a Chinese force, then advances measured in yards, everything in short supply, more casualties from combat, disease, and self-inflicted wounds among the green troops than we could handle, more green replacements. Still we never lost confidence that the job would eventually be accomplished.

I participated in one psychological warfare effort, a broadcast by loudspeaker beginning with Japanese folk-songs and then bringing me on to offer the Japanese soldiers a safe and convenient means of surrender. One of our Nisei translated, and surrender passes were dropped over the Japanese lines. The project flopped: the first Japs that tried to use the passes unfortunately approached Chinese positions and were shot.

On 25 June Mogaung fell to a joint British-Chinese attack, and Myitkyina became the last enemy rallying point in the area. The Japanese who had invested Fort Hertz in the north were also being withdrawn, ambushed and harried on their way south by the OSS Kachins. Galahad, astride all the roads north of Myitkyina, had to be constantly looking over its shoulder and hunting down Japanese trying to infiltrate into the city through the fields and down the river. Since the New Galahads were not good at patrolling and couldn't be relied upon to carry out independent missions, I had assembled the best of the Old Galahads, now scarce as hen's teeth, and organized a Headquarters Reconnaissance and Security Platoon. It did an effective job, using scouts from a mercenary force

of 30 or 40 local Gurkhas who took their pay sometimes in silver from the intelligence funds, more often in food for their families.

The Fall

Also on 25 June Stilwell relieved Boatner and put General Theodore Wessels from SEAC in command. Now for the first time we had at Myitkyina a commander with whom we could communicate. He visited every frontline unit, talked to the officers and men, and was receptive to suggestions. Although the first major effort he ordered, on 12 July, turned into disaster when supporting B-25's bombed our own positions and annihilated a platoon of New Galahad—in a small-scale replica of what happened at about the same time to General Bradley's troops trying to break out of the Normandy beachhead—morale began to improve and our daily attacks carried farther.

In mid-July Colonel Ford, the British commander of Ft. Hertz, came through with a party of British and a couple of OSS men; they told us that they had seen little evidence of Japanese. On the way back they did jump a large body that had got inside our own outposts; but this was the last large-scale Japanese attempt at infiltration, and we could now spend less time looking over our shoulder.

Air photos of the Japanese positions also now began to arrive in response to my long-repeated requests for frequent coverage. With these and the large photo I had been given at Arang, which was so much better than any map that I had studied it constantly, it became possible to select individual buildings and other points as targets for the artillery, the 4.2-inch mortars, and bombing. Galahad had the exclusive use of one fighter-bomber flown by Captain Allred, who had been with the group supporting us throughout the campaign and became in effect a member of the organization. Using his P-51 as heavy artillery, he could be trusted to drop 500-lb. bombs close to our own lines and to strafe within 50 yards of them. Our artillery too, built up to six howitzers, had trained itself to an extremely high peak of efficiency. At 2000 yards the gunners on a single piece could get seven rounds on the way before the first one hit the target.

One of the new air photos of the positions opposite Galahad, taken after a night of heavy rain, showed the roads leading from the town to the Japanese lines as dark in color for some distance and then lighter from there on. I studied it for hours trying to find the reason for this phenomenon, and then the solution hit me like an electric shock wave. The roads changed color at the point where the nightly traffic ceased on each; and therefore a concealed Japanese position must lie near each of these points. After further daylight air reconnaissance we began to destroy them systematically.

On another photo I noticed a patch of ground with many dark furrows across it, each of which terminated, along a very irregular boundary, in a faint blurred line on what seemed to be fine green lawn. After long pondering it struck me that the faint lines were rows of buried oil drums, with the dark furrows ones that had been dug up. I designated the former a target, and was shortly gratified to see large clouds of black smoke billowing from the area. A trained PI team would have discovered these things much sooner; it had been years since I had studied photo interpretation.

An additional battalion of New Galahad, under Lt. Col. Gestrung, had been in training at the airfield, and now, though still undertrained and very inexperienced, it constituted the maneuver force we had been needing for sixty days. Stilwell proposed using this force to cross a lake-like flooded padi on the left flank of the engineers' position, take an uncompleted airfield the Japanese had been building, and enter the north part of the town. The rest of the town would then be not worth holding. I agreed, provided that the attack were properly supported by concentrated artillery and mortar fire and that late air reconnaissance and photo coverage were accomplished in time to give all officers and key NCO's identical photos in lieu of maps.

These conditions, with the usual exception of the air photos, were met, the attack was well planned, and on 26 July Gestrung carried it out with success. His men established themselves firmly in the north section of the town. I held them there, telling headquarters that now it was time for the Chinese to move. Closing a ring is a delicate operation; I didn't want my men beyond the creek that forms a natural boundary between

the north and south parts of Myitkyina, for fear the Chinese would fire on them. The rest of Galahad I put to mopping up from the north, searching every inch of ground in its assigned area.

The Japanese commander, now facing certain defeat, committed suicide. On 3 August the Chinese made a ceremonial attack on the few Japanese left in the south part of the town, and it was announced that Myitkyina was in allied hands. The north Burma campaign, along with Galahad and my services in the CBI, was finished.

Numeral code and Wade-Giles romanization of Chinese characters as the basis of standardized name files for electronic processing.

MACHINES AND THE CHINESE NAME

The Biographic Register falls among the number of "specialized intelligence files," which, according to a recent article in these series, "can be indexed according to unambiguous features like names, nationalities, and locations" and which are therefore "the logical ones on which to try the first EDP applications"¹—i.e., electronic machine filing and retrieval. With this warning, it were well for all those who have to do with the reporting, recognition, and retrieval of Chinese names to prepare ourselves against the age of the computer so imminent upon us. For although a Chinese name may be more amenable to unambiguous filing than an estimate of the world situation, it frequently has ambiguities of its own, and the disconcerting effects of these can be mitigated only by the joint action of both reporters and processors.

The purpose of this paper is to explain to those who are not specialists in Chinese how the difficulties arise and to recommend courses of action in which both specialists and non-specialists will have a hand. Neither the problem nor the solution is at all new, but both become more urgent with the advent of the machine, which needs a set of precise rules to replace the intuitive know-how of the specialist manual processor.

Forms of Chinese Name

The Chinese has basically one family name (hsing) and one personal name (ming), written as a combination of ideographic characters. The great majority have a single hsing and a double ming, the latter hyphenated when romanized, as in CHANG Wen-yu. But sometimes the ming is single, as in Hu Ning; and here Ning, being a perfectly good surname, may be

¹ IV 4, p. 70.

mistaken for one. Sometimes only the surname is double (OU-YANG Wu), and more rarely both are hyphenated (OU-YANG Shan-tsun). Sometimes there is a supplementary Western name, placed last in indexing, as CHANG Wen-yu James.

These basic forms offer no unusual problems. The trouble begins when the Chinese are found romanizing their names according to the dialect they speak, according to some variant system, or arbitrarily, according to no system at all. For example: A useful list of Chinese names was obtained in the roster of a certain organization. They were signatures in ideograph. A translator correctly rendered one of them as CHANG Hsiung-mou, and just in case he gave also the Cantonese version, CHEUNG Hung-mou. But when CHANG himself romanized his signature for another organization's roster, he was found to use the spelling CHANG Hson-mou. Another of the ideograph signatures was correctly transliterated as LIN Chi-po, or Cantonese LAM Kai-poh; but LIN, registering later with an American society, signed his name as LAM Kai-bor. Women are likely to be even less predictable: tracing a young scientist named WEI Han-hsing we found that she had got married and sported an anomalous two surnames with a truncated given name—CHENG WEI Han-hsin.

Thus it is difficult, even when we start with a name in characters or in correct romanization, to anticipate what variant of it may be used in practice. The search for an individual named Lo, for example, necessarily involves a search of all those using the surnames, Lo, LOE, LOA, LOCKE, LOH, Loo, Lou, Low, LOWE, and Luo. It is still worse when we start with a solecistic romanization and try to get back to the original. Following are some of the names listed in the University of Michigan's 1958-59 *Directory of Students from Other Lands*, together with the original characters in standard Mandarin romanization, as best we can construct them:

<i>As Listed</i>	<i>Probable Correct Form</i>
DJUH Cornelia Yin-ying	Jou Yin-ying
DUH Ben Fu	Te Ben Fu
JAING Jerome Tsair	JENG ? ?
LIM Yen-san	LIN Yen-san
Kwok Eugenia Chi Ngo	Kuo Chih-wu
Yip, Sidney	YEH ? ?

These promiscuities are perpetrated by the individual Chinese themselves. An additional layer of random mutation is introduced by the variant systems through which Chinese names pass in other languages. Most frequent in this category is their appearance in an attempted transliteration from Cyrillic, as in the following examples:

<i>Cyrillic Transliteration</i>	<i>Correct Form</i>
VAN Yao-chen	WANG Yao-cheng
VAN Tzun-Tzyuan'	WANG Ts'ung-ch'uan
FYN Li-Ta	FENG Li-ta

In German an initial *CH* usually becomes *TSCH* (TSCHANG for CHANG) and *I* or *Y* becomes *J* (JEH for YEH and Ji for I or Yi). In French the initial *CH* may become *TCH* or *TZ* (TCHAO and TCHENG, but Tzou). And most recently the Communist Chinese on the mainland have been propagandizing a new and different romanization system of their own, Pin Yin, wherein, for example, CHANG becomes ZHANG, CH'EN becomes QIAN, and HSUEH is rendered XUE.²

Standardization for Machine Systems

The obvious authoritative standard for a Chinese name is the characters that represent it. The nearest approach in roman letters to this standard is what we have called above the "correct" romanization in Mandarin, that of the modified Wade-Giles system adopted by the U.S. Government.³ Forms can be converted to Wade-Giles from other *systematic* renderings—Cantonese, Cyrillic transliteration,⁴ Pin Yin—by the use of tables, which for purposes of prospective automation might even be incorporated into computer programs. But if we base our electronic storage and retrieval system entirely on the Wade-Giles romanization, we still build in ambiguities because many of the Wade-Giles forms are homonyms, each rep-

² For a full discussion of Pin Yin (or Pinyin, as it is rendered under its own system), see the article immediately following in this issue.

³ Set forth in *Key to Wade-Giles Romanization of Chinese Characters*, Army Map Service, 1944.

⁴ There is a *Russian-English Conversion Table for Chinese Syllables*, compiled by Robert B. Nielson, Library of Congress, and a table entitled in Russian *Chinese Names*, by Frank/Dornan, which shows variant Cyrillic renderings of many Chinese names and gives the English equivalents.

representing several different characters. Some of them, CHIEN, CHIAO, and HSIEN, for instance, each stand for any one of 20 to 30 different names.

There is fortunately at hand a ready-made system for designating the characters themselves, and one peculiarly well adapted to machine processing—the Standard Telegraph Code used for many years by the Chinese in radio and cable communications. In it each character is assigned a four-digit number that with few exceptions uniquely and unequivocally represents it. In intelligence this code has come to be used increasingly as a means of precise reference—by field officers in reporting, by analysts in telephone consultations, and in inter-agency memoranda. It seems clear that Biographic Register's romanized alphabetical files should be complemented, in so far as possible, with the STC numerals, especially in a system of electronic storage and retrieval.

There remains, however, the problem of getting the names cited originally whenever possible in characters or their Telegraph Code equivalents, and otherwise in standard Wade-Giles form—a big problem, because the sources are varied and far-flung, mostly not under our control. It is not too early now to attack this problem, along with that of other non-roman names of the Far and Near East, by providing the initiative and vigorous leadership for a committee with representation from Government, the academic world, the Asian associations, librarians, etc., which would have the contacts and influence to promote the necessary changes from current practices. Some of the steps that could be taken are embodied in the following recommendations.

Contracts for bibliographic and abstracting coverage should stipulate that Chinese names be presented in the standard Wade-Giles, when possible with characters or STC numerals, that project supervisors be qualified linguistically to implement this clause, and that transliteration from Cyrillic be done according to the conversion tables cited above.

Editors of international technical journals and reference books printed in English should be acquainted with the need to give Chinese names in the standard form, to require that Chinese authors and contributors furnish Wade-Giles versions of their names in addition to any arbitrary signature they

use, and to see that any indexed irregular name forms be cross-referenced to the Wade-Giles form.

University registrars and organizations awarding scholarship or travel grants should be asked to cooperate in requiring the Wade-Giles form of name, with characters, on applications for grants and university enrollment. Faculty rosters should give any Chinese names a similar treatment, as well as the rosters published by Chinese organizations from time to time covering Chinese students and faculty members in American universities. Western names used in combination with the Chinese, as in WANG Fu-jen Paul, should be appended. Married names of women students should of course be cross-referenced to their maiden names.

Chinese language courses given in government agencies should include some training in the name-handling aspect of the language.

International usage of the Wade-Giles form as an alternative to other national versions of Chinese names should be promoted by presenting the problem of variant forms through such international channels as the Library of Congress and national groups in France, Germany, Italy, Holland, and the USSR. It could be pointed out that a courtesy could be done that part of the English-speaking world interested in the Chinese people by printing the standard English version only once, in parentheses, with the signature or byline of an article or on the first mention of a name.

Status report on the Communist latinization of Chinese, with implications for intelligence practices.






























THE PROGRESS OF PINYIN

If the Communists have their way in China, the age-old characters of the Chinese language will finally join the Egyptian and Mayan hieroglyphics and the more recently buried Vietnamese ideographs in oblivion. Like Kemal Ataturk's a few decades ago, the Communists' effort to remold the nation includes a drive for drastic changes in a language ill suited to science and technology, to education of the masses, to the communications of a directed economy, to their international purposes. Much of the heritage that was dear to old China, obnoxious to the new, will also be buried with the old language: future generations of school children, taught from latinized textbooks, will not be able to read the undesirable ancient classics. The gentility of the cursive characters will be replaced by the classlessness of proletarian typefaces.

The language reform program of the Communists is a three-pronged drive. The first spearhead, aimed at the simplification of Chinese characters, has made the most progress. Some 2,000 characters are now accepted in the simplified form and used in textbooks and newspapers. Even family surnames are now shortened, although when General Hsiao Hua of the Chinese People's Liberation Army began using the short form of his surname in public dispatches instead of the ample there was much comment among scholars of the old school.

A second aspect of the language reform is the promotion of the Peking dialect as *putunghua*, the "common tongue" or national language. The Nationalists had introduced a *kuoyu* or "national speech" that selected from both northern and southern pronunciations, adopting for example the pronunciation *shui* used south of the Yangtse for the Peking (then Peiping) *ju*, "auspicious." Now it is again *ju* in the *putunghua* officially accepted for use in schools, broadcasting, etc.

Evolution of Chinese Writing

Shell and Bone Characters B.C. 1700-1400					
Ta-chün B.C. 776 -A.D. 250					
Hsiao-chün B.C. 250-A.D. 25					
Li-shu A.D. 25-220					
Kai-shu A.D. 380- present day					
Current Simplified Forms					
Meaning	servant	to fish	turtle	chicken	horse

(From Tao-tai Hsia's *China's Language Reforms*, Yale Institute of Far Eastern Languages, New Haven, 1956, p. 106.)

The third drive, the most revolutionary, the most significant for intelligence, and the one with which this paper is concerned, is that for *latinhua*, latinization, and is officially known as Hanyu Pinyin Fangan, Program for the Chinese Language in Phonetics. Pinyin, "phonetics," has come to denote the particular system of representing spoken Chinese in Latin letters—determined by the arbitrary values, including tonal qualities, given them—that is now being propagandized by the regime. Ostensibly the system is intended only to provide an aid for learning the standard (Peking) pronunciation of Chinese characters, a purpose which has so far governed most of its uses. The long-range aim, however, seems to envisage the Chinese coming to use only Pinyin and eventually dropping the characters. Wu Yu-chang, chairman of the Chinese Language Reform Committee, who as a refugee in the Soviet Union in the early days saw the Pinyin system being developed by philologists and who feels confident that China's millions will some day be using it in their daily work, specified as much in 1955:

Traditional Chinese writing is the product of feudalism. It has become a tool for the oppression of the proletariat and a stumbling block to mass education. It is not suited for the modern era. China must replace its outmoded character system with Pinyin.

Intelligence-wise, the impact of Pinyin is already being felt. Biographic registers and other filing systems organized by character sequence or according to the Wade-Giles alphabet must recognize and convert the new forms found in source materials. Plant names and trademarks are appearing in Pinyin. Pinyin signs have been put up on public buildings, streets, railway stations, and road posts. There are indications that as soon as place names can be standardized Pinyin maps may be issued. Government organs have already announced "draft" lists of Pinyin provincial and county names.¹

¹ A list published on June 15, 1958, by the Peking *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* (*Language Reform*) carried this explanation: "A total of 2,128 names of places on the county level and above are contained in this list; including those on Taiwan. The basis for this list is the publication *A Draft Gazetteer of the Administrative Division of the Chinese People's Republic* published by the Ministry of Interior in December 1955 and revised according to various State Council directives on administrative changes in China issued up to September 1957." The *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* (*Wenzi Gaige* in Pinyin) is the official organ of the Chinese Language Reform Committee of the State Council.

Development and Introduction of the System

The Latin alphabet used in Pinyin consists of the identical 26 letters used in English, except that the *v* is reserved merely for quotations from other languages and incidental special uses. Provision is made for an umlaut and other diacritical marks, but these are dropped in common usage. Several letters and diphthongs are pronounced quite differently than in English—*c* like “ts,” *q* like “ch,” *x* like “hs,” *z* like “tz,” *zh* like “dj.” The chart following gives some examples of the wide variations between Pinyin and the Wade-Giles romanization accepted as official by the U.S. Government. The influence of Cyrillic is evident in the random samples listed at the end.

Wade-Giles	Pinyin	English Phonetic Approximation
<i>Initials</i>		
cha	zha	jah
ch'a	cha	chah
chia	jia	jeeah
ch'ia	qia	cheeah
chih	zhi	jih
ch'ih	chi	cheeh
chin	jin	jean
ch'in	qin	chean
chou	zhou	joe
ch'ou	chou	cho
chu	zhu	joo
ch'u	chu	choo
chu <i>umlaut</i>	ju	jooh
ch'u <i>umlaut</i>	qu	chooh
hsi	xi	she
i	yi	yee
jan	ran	run
kai	gai	guy
k'ai	kai	kye
pang	bang	bahng
p'ang	pang	pahng
ta	da	dah
t'a	ta	tah
tsa	za	jah
ts'a	ca	chah
tzu	zi	jzu
tz'u	ci	tsuh

Wade-Giles	Pinyin	English Phonetic Approximation
<i>Finals</i>		
lien	lian	len
lung	long	loong
ch'lung	ch'iong	choong
hsieh	xie	sheh
mieh	mie	meh
Romanized Cyrillic	Pinyin	Wade-Giles
zhan	zhang	chang
zhen'	zhen	chen
tsan	zang	tsang
tszen	zeng	tseng
chen'	chen	ch'en
chzhan	zhang	ch'ang

The Russians, as a matter of fact, took an early initiative in latinizing Chinese² and participated in developing precursors of the Pinyin. In 1928 the Chinese Scientific Research Institute, then part of the Communist Academy in Moscow, proposed that a Latin alphabet, rather than the more difficult Cyrillic, be used for Chinese. In 1929 Chu Ch'iu-pai, a Chinese Communist leader studying in the Soviet Union, and the Russian philologist Kolokov devised a Latin-letter system for Chinese. In 1931 a conference in Vladivostok attended by Wu Yu-chang, Lin Po-ch'u, Hsiao San, Wang Hsiao-pao, and Soviet scholars E. H. Draizhova and B. Ya. Starogyd drafted a 28-letter latinhua alphabet.³

² Not that they pioneered the alphabetization. The possibilities were considered as early as the 16th and 17th centuries by philologists of other nations. The Manchu government gave some thought to an alphabet in 1894 when echoes of the Meiji Restoration in Japan reached the mainland. During the Literary Renaissance in China after World War I, Dr. Hu Shih and others introduced Pai-hua (colloquial Chinese) and a system of phonetics which enjoyed some popularity. In 1926 official sanction was given to the alphabetization of Chinese when the National Language Romanization Research Committee organized by Dr. Lin Yu-t'ang and others introduced the Gwoyeu Romatzyh system, which in 1932 was replaced by the Gwoin Charngyong Tsyhhuey system promulgated by the Nationalist government. Abroad, the English literary world has long accepted the Wade-Giles system, later modified to become the official U.S. standard, and the newer Yale University system. Missionaries working in Fukien, Taiwan, and Kwangtung have also introduced roman alphabets for previously unwritten local dialects.

³ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 21, 1959.

With the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 the language problem fell first to a semi-official Chinese Written Language Association and then in 1952 to an official Chinese Written Language Research Committee, which in 1954 was reorganized as the present Chinese Language Reform Committee under the State Council. National conferences held in Peking in October 1955 and February 1956 drafted the Pinyin program, and it was finally approved by the National People's Congress in February 1958.

The Congress prescribed that Pinyin "should initially be used experimentally in normal, middle, and elementary schools in in order to gain experience" and "should also be gradually introduced in the publishing field in order to perfect it through use."⁴ The Ministry of Education directed that instruction be started with the 1958 fall semester, and 50,000,000 people are said to have learned Pinyin that year.⁵ An experimental Pinyin newspaper, the *Hanyu Pinyinbao*, edited jointly by the Reform Committee and the Journalism Department of the People's University, began publication on October 12. Wan-jung Hsien in Shansi Province was designated an "experimental farm" to test the use of the new writing and by November 1959 had introduced Pinyin textbooks and was publishing its own Pinyin newspaper.⁶

In January 1959 a Peking meeting of librarians from institutions of higher learning and the Chinese Academy of Sciences called for adopting a uniform filing system based on

⁴ The Congress specified that the Pinyin should be applied also to the minority languages used in frontier provinces like Tsinghai and Sinkiang, both those hitherto lacking any written form and those of the Uighurs, Kazaks, Sibos, and Moslems that used the Arabic alphabet. Reporting on progress in this application, the *Jen-min Jih-pao* of February 10, 1960, wrote that "the plan for standardizing new terms approved by a recent meeting of philologists [in Sinkiang] provides for directly borrowing new terms from the Chinese language . . . Many terms found in Party directives, resolutions, and policy statements have now become common to all nationalities. . . . [This practice] will promote cultural exchange among the nationalities, socialist construction, and the unity of nationalities."

⁵ Peking, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 20, 1959.

⁶ Peking, NCNA, May 10, 1960.

Pinyin

Pinyin. The T'ai-yuan board of education has ordered experimental use of Pinyin as the basis for all files of student cards, library books, etc.⁷ Since January 1960 the anti-illiteracy campaign has shifted to promoting the use of Pinyin. In Shansi over 1,200,000 people joined Pinyin study groups, and there was a similar response in Kirin province. The program is now being pursued in 18 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions where *putunghua* is spoken. Visual aids and other devices for teaching Pinyin are sold in all New China Bookstores. In addition to wall charts and flash cards, these include a series of six graded textbooks, dictionaries, and phonograph records.⁸ The standard keyboards of typewriter and teletype machines, the Gregg Shorthand system, the Braille system for the blind, international semaphore signals, etc., have been adapted to Pinyin. Young Pioneers in many parts of China are said to write their letters exclusively in the new alphabet.⁹

“填韵母”答案

- 横列
- 1 文字 改革
- 3 面貌
- 6 幸福
- 8 会话
- 10 人民 公社

- 直行
- 1 完全
- 3 拼音
- 4 字母
- 5 学习
- 8 革命
- 10 姓
- 15 黄

W	E	N	Z	I			G	A	I	G	E			
A				I			E							
N				M	I	A	N	M	A	O				
Q				U										G
U	P						N	G						U
A	I			X	I	N	G	F	U					A
N	N			U				O						N
		Y	E			H	U	I	H	U	A			C
		I	X					U						H
R	E	N	M	I	N			G	O	N	G	S	H	E

CROSS-WORD LEARNING AID

In July 1960 the *Shansi Nung-min Pao* (Shansi Farmer) was converted to the use of Pinyin, changing its title to *Shanxi Pinyinbao*.¹⁰ In Peking, the press now supplements the traditional Chinese characters in its mastheads with Pinyin, the

⁷ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* Nos. 5 and 20, 1959.

⁸ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, April 2, 1960.

⁹ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 12, 1958.

¹⁰ *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, July 7, 1960.

well-known *People's Daily* appearing unfamiliarly as *Renmin Ribao*, the old *L'Impartial* as *Dagongbao*.¹¹ In a list of names appearing on page 3 of the August 25, 1960, issue of *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Pinyin was inserted after characters whose pronunciation might be in doubt: the characters for (Chang) I-yuan (1728-3354-3283) were followed by the Pinyin (*Zhang*) *Yiyuan*, that for Chi (8042), a rare Chinese surname, by *Qi*, that for Tai (0086/3141), a national minority in Yunnan Province, which is often mispronounced without vocalization, by the Pinyin *Dai*.

English-speaking foreigners wishing to learn Chinese through the medium of Pinyin are given assistance in a "Language Corner" of *China Reconstructs*, organ of the China Welfare Institute. Abroad, the Soviet Union, whose press immediately hailed the introduction of Pinyin,¹² makes it a required course for all students specializing in Chinese studies at Moscow University and uses it in Boarding School No. 11 and other schools teaching Chinese.¹³ In North Korea, the full text of the Chinese Pinyin program as proclaimed in 1958 was carried by *Korean Linguistics*, issued by the Korean Academy of Sciences. In March 1960 a Japanese goodwill mission under Zenmaro Toki, Chairman of the National Language Commission of Japan, visited China to study the language reform

¹¹ Other new names in the capital are *Congren Ribao* (Daily Worker), *Beijing Ribao* (Peking Daily News), and *Guangming Ribao* (Kuang-ming Daily News). In Shanghai there is *Xinwen Ribao* (Daily News) and *Jiefang Ribao* (Liberation Daily); in Canton, *Guangzhou Ribao* (Kuang-chou Daily News), *Yangcheng Wanbao* (Canton Evening News), and *Nanfang Ribao* (Southern Daily News). Further afield are *Qingdao Ribao* (Tsingtao Daily News), *Harbin Ribao* (Harbin Daily News), *Qinghai Ribao* (Tsinghai Daily News), *Xizang Ribao* (Tibet Daily News), *Neimenggu Ribao* (Inner Mongolia Daily News), and *Yili Ribao* (Ili Daily News of Sinkiang).

¹² In 1958 articles on the Pinyin system were carried by *Izvestia*, March 23rd; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 24th; *Sovietskaya Moldavia*, June 12th; *Moskva Pravda*, March 13th; *Problemy Vostokovedeniya*, No. 2; and *Sovremennyy Vostok*, No. 8.

¹³ Russian words are also transliterated into Pinyin for the convenience of the Chinese: *Kenimuntngong* for Kremlin Palace, *Nijita Henuxiaofu* for Nikita Khrushchev, *Liening* for Lenin, *Kitayi* for China, *Kamuunizimu* for Communism, *situjiante* for student, *wuqiqli* for teacher, *maliki* for child. (*Wen-tzu Kai-ko* Nos. 12 and 22, 1959.)

Zuowei Zhongguo wenzi gaige gongzuo de lao gongzuoren yuan,
kandaole muqian Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shi nian lai de wenzi
gaige gongzuo de weida chengjiu: hanzi jianhua fang'an de shun-
li tuixing, jue daduoshu zhong-xiaoxue he shifan xuexiao de yuwen
ke dou yi shiyong putonghua jinxin jiaoxue quan-guo ye you 5000
wan xiaoxuesheng kaishi xuexi pinyin zimu — zhen shi de women
huanxin guwu! Zhexie chengjiu shi gen Dang de lingdao he guan-
hui shi fenbukar de.

"Wenzi Gaige" zazhi shang suo fabiao de youguan putonghua
pingbihui de chengji, tebie shi women gaoxing.

Quan-guo Renmin Daibiao Dahui pizhun de Hanyu pinyin
fang'an dui women jiaoxue gongzuo, tebie shi zai xuesheng de fa-
yin fangmian, shi yige qiangyouli de gongju. Bifang shuo: Mosike
Daxue Dongfang Yuyan Xueyuan bianxie de Hanyu jiaokeshu li
jiu guangfan shiyongzhe zhexie pinyin zimu.

Women xiangxin Zhongguo Wenzi Gaige Weiyuanhui zai Dang
de lingdao xia zai tuiguang putonghua, xiaomie wenmang, jinyibu
tigao renmin de wenhua shuiping, ba tamen jiaoyucheng shehui-
zhuyi de jiji jianshezhe zhexie zhongda renwu jiang dadao geng
weidad chengjiu.

Dang Weidad Shiyue Shehuizhuyi Geming sishi er zhou zhi
xiang Zhongguo Wenzi Gaige de lao gongzuoren yuan he xin gan
bu zhi reled tongzhi jingli!

Shi Pingqing

Long Guowu (Danzhuo E.H.)

Zhou Songyuan

Si Jide (Chapoye B.J.)

1959 nian 10 yue 28 ri.

PINYIN FELICITATIONS FROM A SOVIET SCHOLAR ON THE DECENNIAL OF THE
REPUBLIC

program.¹⁴ In India and Pakistan, however, Moslems are reported angry at the Pinyin plot to wipe out the cultural heritage of the Moslems in Sinkiang.¹⁵

Pinyin in Science and Technology

The Chinese Academy of Sciences has created a special committee to study the application of Pinyin to the field of Chinese science. Junior researchers organized Pinyin classes in the science center at Chung-kuan Ts'un near Peking, beginning in June 1958 with an enrollment of over 600.¹⁶ It is expected that Pinyin will facilitate the machine translation of scientific articles. Pinyin words have been proposed that often approximate foreign words in use in the different sciences.¹⁷ Scientific and technical periodicals carry such Pinyin titles as *Kexue Tongbao* (Science Bulletin), and *Kexue Xinwen* (Science News).¹⁸ Although *Scientia Sinica* still uses its old Latin title, it lists the names of its editorial committee in Pinyin.¹⁹

In November 1959 the Geographical Transliteration Committee of the State Bureau of Surveying and Cartography announced draft regulations for the transliteration of minority

¹⁴ Tokyo, *Akahata*, March 23, 1960.

¹⁵ *New York Times*, February 28, 1960.

¹⁶ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko*, August 30, 1958.

¹⁷ In chemistry, *zirkon* for zirconium, *krogenin* for cryogenium, *karat* for carat, *karbakol* for carbacholum, *krom* for chromium, *kasin* for quassin, *kinamin* for quinamine, etc. In medicine, *naomoyan* for meningitis, *guanjie huanong* for swelling of the joints, *jixing* for acute, *manzing* for contagious, etc. Some space-age terms are *xingji feixing* (interplanetary travel), *yuzhou huofian* (space rocket), *yuanshineng feiji* (atomic airplane), *qianshui kechuan* (submarine passenger ship), *jiatong* (communications).

¹⁸ Others are *Diqiu Wuli Xuebao* (*Acta Geophysica Sinica*), *Qixianxue Yibao* (Meteorological Translation Journal), *Dizhi Yu Kantan* (Geology and Prospecting), *Wuli Yibao* (Physics Translation Journal), *Dian Shijie* (Electricity World). These Pinyin titles are now used in Moscow's Referativnyy Zhurnal (Journal of Abstracts). Referativnyy Zhurnal - Khimiya, No. 16 for 1960, for example, carried #65998 *Zaozhi Gongye* and #66017 *Huaxue Tongbao*.

¹⁹ Some of these men are Ma Da You (Maa Dah-you), Qian Xue Sen (H. S. Tsien), Ye Du Pei (Chu Thay Yap), and Zhang Xi Jun (H. C. Chang). The unsystematic old names in parentheses point up the potential value of Pinyin in providing a standard system of romanization for the storage and retrieval of biographic data.

nationality place names into Pinyin.²⁰ Pinyin spellings for the provinces and regions of China have been standardized according to the chart on page A46. Moreover, committees are at work standardizing Pinyin spellings of geographical names for the entire world.²¹ These groups face the problem of

²⁰ In brief summary as follows (from the Peking *Ti-li Chih-shih*, "Geographical Knowledge," No. 11, 1959):

1. All Han place names should be transliterated according to the Hanyu Program for Pinyin. For example, instead of the Chuang pronunciation *Guangsat*, the Peking pronunciation *Guangxi* should be used for the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region.

2. If the pronunciation of a place name is not the same in Han and a minority language, the Pinyin transliteration should generally follow the Han pronunciation. But the pronunciation of the minority nationality may be accepted in special cases. For example, use *Urumqi* instead of *Wu-lu-mu-ch'i* and *Xishuangbanna* instead of *Sipsuangbanna*.

3. Use Han place names such as *Bailingmiao*, but add the native name, *Bat Halga*, below.

4. Where more than one minority language is prevalent, use the officially accepted language. For example, in Sinkiang use the Uighur *Tashkurgan* instead of the Tadjik *Warshide*.

5. Use the dominant minority pronunciation instead of the local minority pronunciation. For example, in the Xishuangbanna Dai nationality area in Yunnan province, a river is locally called *Namkinli*, but in the standard Dai Yunjinghong language it is the *Namkindi*. The latter should be adopted. For a certain town in Inner Mongolia the name *Huh Hot* should be used instead of the local pronunciations *Hoh Hot*, *Goh Got*, and *Hohe Hota*.

²¹ Some of the draft transliterations in *Yameilija* (the Americas) are *Baxi* for Brazil, *Jianada* for Canada, *Guba* for Cuba, *Moxige* for Mexico, *Banama* for Panama, and *Bilu* for Peru. In *Afeilija* (Africa): *Kamailong* for Cameroons, *Jiana* for Ghana, *Qieniya* for Kenya, *Gangguo* for Congo, *Madaftastija* for Madagascar, *Molugge* for Morocco, *Atji* for Egypt, *Duoge* for Togo, *Sanggeiba* for Zanzibar, and *Aerjiliya* for Algeria. In *Yaxiya* (Asia): *Jianpusai* for Cambodia, *Xilan* for Ceylon, *Chaoxian* for Korea, *Feilubin* for the Philippines, *Yindunizhiya* for Indonesia, *Riben* for Japan, *Taiguo* for Thailand, and *Yuenan* for Vietnam. In *Ouluoba* (Europe): *Bilishi* for Belgium, *Deyizhi* for Germany, *Xila* for Greece, *Falanxi* for France, *Yidali* for Italy, *Nansilafu* for Yugoslavia, *Heland* for the Netherlands, *Aodili* for Austria, *Ruidian* for Sweden, and the east European *Baojialiya* for Bulgaria, *Jiekesiluofako* for Czechoslovakia, *Xiongyali* for Hungary, *Polan* for Poland, *Luomaniya* for Rumania, and *Aerbaniya* for Albania. Some geographical designations in *Sulian* (the Soviet Union) are *Mosko* for Moskva, *Gruzia* for Grusinskaya, *Hasak* for Kazakhskaya, *Baioros* for Belorusskaya, and *Oros* for Rossiyskaya.

WADE-GILES	PINYIN	WADE-GILES	PINYIN
Anhwei	Anhui	Kwangsi	Guangxi
Chekiang	Zhejiang	Kwangtung	Guangdong
Fukien	Fujian	Liaoning	Liaoning
Heilungkiang ..	Heilongjiang	Ninghsia	Ningxia
Honan	Henan	Shansi	Shanxi
Hopei	Hebei	Shensi	Shānxi
Hunan	Hunan	Shantung	Shandong
Hupei	Hubei	Sinkiang	Xinjiang
Nei-meng-ku ..	Neimenggu	Szechwan	Sichuan
Kansu	Gansu	Taiwan	Taiwan
Kirin	Jilin	Tibet	Xizang
Kiangsi	Jiangxi	Tsinghai	Qinghai
Kiangsu	Jiangsu	Yunnan	Yunnan
Kweichow	Guizhou		

whether to pinyinize geographical designations according to the local pronunciation or according to international usage, whether Paris for example is properly Pah-ri' or Pair'-iss. One writer contended that Dublin should be listed as *Balia-keli*, Pinyin for the Gaelic Baile Atha Cliath.²²

Pinyin in Communications

The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs promptly issued an order for the adoption of the newly promulgated system in the postal and telegraphic service. The text of the order with an explanation of the regulations governing the use of Pinyin is given in the September 30, 1958, issue of *Wen-tzu Kai-ko*.²³

²² *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 4, 1959.

²³ In summary:

1. Pursuant to the decision of the fifth session of the First National People's Congress made on February 11, 1958, telegraph messages may be transmitted in Pinyin.
2. The 26 letters of the Pinyin alphabet will be used. A *y* may be inserted before a *u* to indicate an umlaut.
3. Pinyin may be used for all categories of domestic messages.
4. Pinyin messages in secret code may be transmitted only by military and government organizations and organizations granted permission by the government.
5. Only messages written in approved Pinyin and clear text will be accepted for telegraphic transmission.
6. Designations of telegraph offices and message rates will be those now in current use.
7. Pinyin telegrams may be addressed to telegraph registration numbers, *youxiang* (post office boxes), or *dianhua haoma* (telephone num-

Pinyin traffic was initiated on a trial basis on October 1, 1958, National Anniversary Day, to and from Peking, Shanghai, and Chungking. The Shanghai Post and Telecommunication Bureau implemented the order of the Ministry by issuing a notice announcing acceptance of Pinyin messages as of October 1, 1958, at all post and telecommunication bureaus.

Wen-tzu Kai-ko (No. 8) of August 1958 carried a model Pinyin message for bank transfers, by which for example the Yuan County Merchandising Company, with account number 2401 at the Provincial Bank, could effect a telegraphic transfer of 10,000 yuan to the provincial authorities. Under the old method the telegram would have read, "(2401) (10,000) (0337-4905-0361-0674-0448-3387) (0064-1874-1421)," with 24 message units and requiring four processing steps. In Pinyin it is simply "(2401) (10,000) Y. X. Gonsi lirun. Jing Qiaoxao," with only 13 units in clear text requiring no processing. Bank messages could be further simplified by abbreviating the Pinyin words for currency units—*w* for wan (10,000), *q* for qian (thousand), *b* for bai (hundred), *y* for yuan (dollar), *j* for jiao (dime), and *f* for fen (cent).

The national railways are making wide use of Pinyin. The main railway station in the capital has the sign *Beijing Zhan* (Peking Station) across its front entrance. Inside is a *Junren Houcheshi* (Military Personnel Waiting Room). The post office in Peking is marked *Beijingshi Youju*. On October 1, 1959, the Ministry of Railways ordered the serial markings on all rolling stock changed to Pinyin. Open freight cars now

bers). To expedite delivery, the names and addresses of senders and recipients should be backstopped in characters.

8. Pinyin messages may be transmitted in single or connected words. Conversion into characters will be done on request.

9. Five letters or fewer constitute a Pinyin unit and the fee is three cents per unit.

10. Pinyin messages will not be accepted for international traffic; including Hong Kong and Macao.

A supplement to the regulations points out that the official Pinyin spelling of Chinese characters is given in a "Chart of Common Pinyin" issued by the Language Reform Publishing House in May 1958. The supplement also declares that the transmission of domestic messages in secret code is governed by Telegraph Regulation No. 39 and that messages in Pinyin must carry the notation "HY" (Hanyu) to indicate that the message is not in a foreign or minority nationality language. (*Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 11, 1958.)

use the designator *C* in place of the old phonetic "x," closed cars *P*, and coaches *RZ*. Locomotives are designated *DK*, *ET*, and *JF* (Jiefang).²⁴

Discussing the use of Pinyin in railway dispatch work, the staff of the Shanghai Railway Bureau made suggestions for short forms to use for railway traffic. Thus *n* could be used for nien (year), *y* for yue (month), *r* for ri (day), *5c* for wuci (fifth train), *fr* for fahuoren (shipper), *sr* for shouhuoren (consignee), *t* for ton, *d* for dan (picul), etc. It was also suggested that the last letter of a doubtful word be doubled; for example, since "bu" in the message "40t shengtie bufa" could mean either 40 tons of wrought iron *reshipped* or *not shipped*, the latter meaning could be indicated by writing "40t shengtie buufa."²⁵

On July 1, 1958, railway telegraph offices in the Tsingtao, Weihsien, and Chefoo stations began using Pinyin. In the Tsinan railway bureau over 200 cadres are said to be studying Pinyin part or full time, and it is claimed that eighty percent of the Nanking railway office staff are learning to use Pinyin in their operations.

Communication publications bear titles in Pinyin along with the traditional characters. A common one in every city is the *Dianhua Haobu* (telephone book). Some communications journals are *Luxingjia* (Traveller), *Tiedao Zhoukan* (Railway Weekly), and *Wuxiandian* (Wireless). The latter carries Pinyin sectional headings—*Aihaozhe Xiaozhizuo* (Innovations of the Hobbyists), *Dajiatan* (Everybody's Comments), *Shijie Zhi Chuang* (Window of the World), *Weishemma* (Why?), *Kankan Xiangxiang* (Look and Think), *Wuxiandian Wenda* (Questions and Answers on Radio), and *Duzhe—Zhuozhe—Bianzhe* (Reader—Writer—Editor).²⁶

Pinyin in Military Usage

On June 10, 1960, the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army directed the armed services to implement an April 22nd decree of the Party Central Committee that Pinyin be universally adopted in training; the armed forces must be unified, it said, and this can be accom-

²⁴ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 22, 1959.

²⁵ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 2, 1959.

²⁶ Peking, *Wu-hsien-tien* (Wireless), September 19, 1959.

plished only if a common language is used. All instructors, educational and dramatic personnel, interpreters, and motion picture workers were ordered to become conversant with the new system.²⁷


Even earlier, however, at a Second Cultural Work Conference of the armed forces held in Peking in November 1959, Deputy Director Liu Han of the propaganda section had reported considerable progress in the use of Pinyin in the armed forces: the Shen-yang Military District had early in 1958 ordered all its subordinate military units and training institutions to use Pinyin; the Navy had adopted it in July for visual communications like semaphore and flash signals; most military schools were using it. Troops from Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Chekiang, and Kiangsu, who usually have strong local accents, were beginning to learn correct Chinese through the phonetic writing.²⁸

In 1960 a concerted effort was being made to teach recruits Pinyin, thereby simultaneously improving their vocabulary and pronunciation. It is said to require usually some 30 to 40 hours of instruction. Book I of an anti-illiteracy textbook series being published by the Army's General Political Department is written in Pinyin, and other military publications transliterate their titles and difficult words in the text.²⁹ Illiterate recruits for communication battalions from Kwangtung province and the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region are said to have learned Pinyin in three or four months with the help of teaching aids like "Pinyin poker" and "military termi-

²⁷ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 11, 1960.

²⁸ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 23, 1959.

²⁹ The Pinyin titles of some important military publications are *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation Army News), *Jiefangjun Huabao* (Liberation Army Pictorial News), *Jiefangjun Zhanshi* (Liberation Army Soldier), *Jiefangjun Wenyi* (Liberation Army Literature and Art), and *Hangkong Zhishi* (Aeronautical Knowledge). A few military terms are *junfu* (uniform), *junguan* (officer), *junhao* (insignia), *junhuo* (ammunition), and *junji* (discipline). A short item entitled "Jiefangjun Baoweizhe Women" (The People's Liberation Army is Defending Us) reads: *Jiefangjun shushu shouli nazhe qiang, bupa fengchu yuda; bupa hurrede taiyang. Tamen ririyeye baowei zuguo, gonggu, guafang.* (The People's Liberation Army, rifle in hand, is not afraid of the wind, rain or fiery sun. Day and night, it defends the homeland and strengthens national defense). (From *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* Nos. 19 and 23, 1959.)



白鷺牌啤酒
BAI LU SHI BEI JIU



nology contests," and training in radio operation could therefore be reduced from a year to six months and still yield a five-fold improvement in transmissions.³⁰ At a Third National Demonstration Conference on teaching *putunghua* held in Peking during August 1960, several Army units were cited for their excellence in Pinyin semaphore signalling.

Pinyin in Commerce and Literature

Advertisements in the mainland press now carry such Pinyin phrases as *Meidu Dianchi Chang Zhi*, "Beautiful Capital Battery Works." In August 1959 Shanghai merchants were ordered to use Pinyin in their signs. A box of shoe polish has on its cover *Matou xieyou Di 2 Huaxueshe* (Horse Head shoe polish made by No. 2 Chemical Works). Other trademarks are *Bailusi Pijiu* (White Crane Beer) and *Hanqiao Pai* (Han River Bridge Shoes). China's latest luxury sedan (with a scented mahogany dashboard and silk floor rugs) is called *Hongqi* (Red Flag). The picul is now *dan* and the catty *jin* (.5 kilogram).

Some familiar names for theaters and parks in Peking are now written in advertisements and signs as *Xin Zhongguo* (New China), *Dahua* (Great China), *Zhongshan Gungyuan* (Chung-shan Park), *Beihai* (Imperial Palace Lake), *Shoudu* (Capital), *Erhtong* (Children's). China's largest domestic book distributor, the New China Bookstore, is rendered *Xinhua Shudian*, its international counterpart *Guozi Shudian*.³¹ English-language news dispatches are beginning to use Pinyin titles without translating them, for example that of *Red Flag*, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which is cited simply as *Hongqi* in the transmissions of the New China News Agency.

Implications

It can thus be seen that the replacement of the old writing with the new phonetic alphabet, although it is not being accomplished overnight, is making substantial progress under the steady pushing of the regime, and that after less than three years we in intelligence are beginning to feel its effects. It would be premature to say that we should be giving active

³⁰ *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, May 26, 1960.

³¹ *Peking Review*, June 16, 1959.

consideration to the adoption of Pinyin ourselves in Chinese gazeteers, maps, biographic registers, alphabetical files, language training, and standard nomenclature; aside from the still experimental status of some phases of the Communist program and our uncertainty about the rapidity of its future progress, the new system would be a hindrance in processing material concerning or obtained through the Chinese on Taiwan and elsewhere in the anti-Communist diaspora. But we should at least be keeping up with the Communists in our familiarity with the Pinyin forms, and as we set up new systems we should design them with an eye to convertibility to Pinyin. Otherwise we may find ourselves stuck, in a decade or two, with passing the bulk of our material through a superfluous routine of conversions into and out of the then antiquated and artificial Wade-Giles. We have succeeded in remaining for more than eleven years the frightened ostrich with respect to a single Communist rendering, Peking, but we should not try it for a whole language.

Sketch of a successful British penetration at high level into the American Revolutionary effort.

**EDWARD BANCROFT (@ Edwd. Edwards),
ESTIMABLE SPY**

The American Revolution, as John Bakeless illustrates with copious detail in his recent book,¹ teemed with spies and undercover agents, military and political, on both sides. What often seems surprising, in the hindsight of the current age of highly organized espionage, is that rather inexpertly camouflaged penetrations went undetected by those on the other side astute enough to employ clandestine means themselves, who therefore should have known what to expect of the enemy. Certainly a man with Benjamin Franklin's reputation for astuteness should not have been taken in and milked for years by a British agent making his maiden venture into espionage. Yet Edward Bancroft, whom Franklin appointed, worked with, and defended as private secretary to himself and Silas Deane, American commissioners in Paris, did just that, with untold damage to the American cause. Praised, accused, and vindicated, he maintained his cover almost in perpetuity. When his agent role was unmasked he had been dead for 68 years.

The story of this man of many talents has never been assembled and published in one piece. Sufficient material is extant, however, scattered in scholarly papers on the history of the times, to afford glimpses of his life and the outlines of his potent espionage activity against the Americans in Paris, made possible by his native ability and abetted by the failure of Benjamin Franklin and others to take the most elementary counterintelligence precautions.

Recruitment of a Polymath

Bancroft was born in Westfield, Massachusetts, on January 9, 1744. Little is known of his childhood and youth. Although it has been said that he had no formal education,

¹ *Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes*, reviewed in Intelligence Articles IV 1, p. 101.

there is some evidence that he was once a pupil of his future employer Silas Deane, formerly a schoolmaster.² This circumstance, if true, may have contributed to the close relationship which later developed between the two men. Bancroft did not remain long in his native country, for before about 1766, when he took up residence in England,³ he had served as a sailor and had stayed long enough in Dutch Guiana to gain considerable knowledge of the natives' habits, customs, and religion: in 1769 he wrote a treatise on this subject that gained him scholarly acclaim.

In England he studied medicine and was ultimately elected a member of the College of Physicians. His interests were by no means confined to medicine, however. He was a contributor on American subjects to the *Monthly Review*, and he became an editor of this periodical. In 1769 he published his *Remarks on the Review of the Controversy between Great Britain and her Colonies*, which helped considerably to establish his reputation as an authority on that vexatious problem. It was through his writings that he came to know prominent men like Doctor Priestley and Benjamin Franklin. His attainments in scientific work won him membership in the Royal Society, and in the technological field he became something of an inventor in the processing of textiles.

These slim facts, about all that is known of his life outside his activities during the revolutionary period, are sufficient to establish that he was an unusually versatile and accomplished man. Because of his work as doctor, scientist, anthropologist, and political historian, he came to the attention of important men of the times and was welcomed into the most exclusive circles of the enlightened, cynical society of 18th-century Europe. About his personal life we know even less than about his several professional careers; and we can only guess what motivated him to add espionage to his list of professional accomplishments. It seems probable that money was a factor: he gambled on the stock exchange, and some of his writings indicate a strong concern and an occasional anxiety for the sources of his income.

² "Edward Bancroft," in *Dictionary of American Biography*, Johnson, et al., editors, Vol. 1, pp. 563-564.

³ See his "Memorial to the Marquis of Carmarthen," in *American Historical Review*, XXIX, pp. 493-495 (from Stevens Facsimiles).

Edward Bancroft

The immediate reason for his turning British spy was apparently his friendship with Paul Wentworth. This man, a member of a famous New Hampshire family, had spent many years in England, and when the Revolution came he cast his lot with the mother country. His connections were such—he was related to the Marquess of Rockingham—that he rose high in court circles and was offered an important job in the British Secret Service. He bargained well, agreeing to work against American interests only on the assurance of getting in addition to his salary a seat in Commons and a baronetcy, these to be tendered at the end of hostilities. Bancroft himself says⁴ that it was Wentworth who first approached him on the matter of giving information to the British concerning American negotiations in Paris, and his statement has been accepted by historians.⁵ There is documentary support for it in the fact that his contractual agreement with the British Secret Service was prepared in Wentworth's handwriting.⁶

This agreement, not made until some six months after Bancroft had begun reporting to the British in July 1776, committed His Majesty's Government to pay him a sum of money outright and several hundred pounds per year thereafter in return for specified information to be supplied to Wentworth and to Lord Stormont, King George's Ambassador in Paris. How extensive the British requirements were for coverage of the American-French target and how importantly Bancroft figured in their expectations can be seen in the following excerpt:

Information to be supplied to Wentworth:

The progress of the Treaty with France, and of the assistance expected, or commerce carried on or in any of the ports of that Kingdom.

The same with Spain, and of every other Court in Europe.

The agents in the foreign islands in America, and the means of carrying on the Commerce with the Northern Colonys.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See Burton J. Hendrick, *The Lees of Virginia*, pp. 280-281, and Carl Van Doren, *Benjamin Franklin*, p. 580.

⁶ Hendrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-283.

Edward Bancroft

The means of obtaining credit—effects and money; and the channells and agents used to apply them; the secret moves about the Courts of France and Spain, and the Congress agents, and tracing the lines from one to the other.

Franklin's and Deane's correspondence with the Congress, and their agents; and the secret, as well as the ostensible letters from the Congress to them. Copys of any transactions, committed to papers, and an exact account of all intercourse and the subject matter treated of, between the Courts of Versailles and Madrid, and the agents from Congress.

Subjects to be communicated to Lord Stormont:

Names of the two Carolina ships, masters both English and French, description of the ships, and cargoes; the time of sailing, and the port bound to.

The same circumstances respecting all equipments in any port in Europe together with the names of the agents employed.

The intelligence that may arrive from America, the captures made by their privateers, and the instructions they receive from the deputys.

How the captures are disposed of.⁷

The Penetration

The fulfillment of such demanding requirements would have been beyond even Bancroft's abilities if he had not had the remarkable access to information already demonstrated in his first reports to the British. His principal source was Silas Deane, whom the nascent States of America, in one of their first diplomatic ventures, had sent to France in 1776 to try to secure French aid. Americans had long been abroad seeking commercial and financial arrangements, and the several colonies had been sending their representatives to London for many years; but these men were not practiced in the protocol prescribed for the envoys of free governments, and there was no reservoir of American personnel trained to cope with the intricacies of European, and in particular French, court procedure. Silas Deane, in many respects well qualified for his role as commissioner to France, would find his Connecticut Yankee background of ill stead against the wiles of French politics. He needed the guidance of a man of the world, and Edward Bancroft was eminently suited to provide that guidance.

Benjamin Franklin was responsible for the writing of Deane's instructions. Presumably aware of Deane's diplo-

⁷ Samuel Flagg Bemis, "British Secret Service and the French-American Alliance," in *American Historical Review*, XXIX, pp. 477-478.

matic deficiencies, recalling his friendship with the scholar and scientist Dr. Bancroft, then living in England, and mindful of the Doctor's defense of American rights published in 1769, he included specific directions that Deane write Bancroft in London and ask him to come to Paris.⁸ This Deane did when he arrived in Bordeaux on June 6, and after a month's delay while Bancroft recovered from an illness, the two men met in the French capital.

Bancroft spent most of July in Paris with the American commissioner. Deane freely confided to him all the plans of the Congress and its hopes for French assistance, and even took him along to his meetings with French Foreign Minister Vergennes. The course of these negotiations was minutely recorded by Deane in the evenings for the confidential information of the Congress. But Bancroft occupied his evenings in exactly the same way: with just as much careful detail, with just as much secrecy, and with far greater literary art, he put to paper the same facts. These were the reports that later found their way to Lord Suffolk, head of the British Secret Service.⁹

In the early weeks of the Deane-Bancroft relationship, the association was loose and informal, and Bancroft made no move to take up permanent residence in Paris. During the summer and fall he made several trips back and forth from London. When Benjamin Franklin arrived to reinforce Deane's effort, Bancroft played the role of warm friend and assistant to both of them. A third commissioner, however, who arrived with Franklin, the Virginian Arthur Lee, he evidently spent little time trying to cultivate, perhaps because that rather irritable gentleman was not often taken into the confidence of his fellow commissioners and because he kept separate quarters at Chaillot, some distance from Passy, the center of American activity.

By early 1777 Bancroft's services had become so indispensable in the eyes of the commissioners that he was offered the position of secretary to Deane and Franklin and residence with them at their headquarters at Passy. So at about the

⁸ "Letter of Instruction," in *Deane Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 123-126.

⁹ "Narrative of Edward Bancroft," in *Deane Papers*, dated August 14, 1776 (from Stevens Facsimiles, #890), Vol. I, pp. 177-184.

same time he was formally commissioned as a British spy, he was asked by his target sources to work for them, to live in the same house with them, and to accept a salary from their government. So highly was he regarded that Deane wrote to the Congress:

Dr. Bancroft having been involved in the suspicion of being privy to the firing of stores at Portsmouth an incident in his life which is not altogether clear, and finding himself growing obnoxious to the administration and their partisans, left England early in the year 1777, and came to Paris, where he most assiduously devoted his time and abilities to the service of his country, and assisted the Commissioners in writing for them, and by keeping up a correspondence with his friends in London, from whom good and useful information was obtained.

And again:

Though I have several times mentioned Dr. Bancroft and his services, I cannot in justice to these States, to him, and to my own feelings, omit saying that he was early sent for, by order of Congress, from London; that he sacrificed all his prospects there, and during the whole time of our negotiations in France, devoted himself to the Service of country; that he acquired the esteem and confidence of persons of rank and character in France, as well with the political and commercial, as with the literary characters in that kingdom.¹⁰

Modus Operandi

Whenever possible Bancroft made copies of all instructions received by the commissioners from the government in Philadelphia, as well as communications exchanged between them and Vergennes, and forwarded them to Wentworth or Sturmont, according to his instructions, for transmission to Lord Suffolk. But when there was no opportunity to copy the documents on the spot he simply removed them from the house at Passy and took them or sent them to the British Embassy for duplication. Then he would return them to the commission files the next time he got a chance.

How he managed to keep his communications secure is not altogether clear. He did find good pretexts for frequent excursions to England, but the information could not always wait for such trips. In Paris he had the task of outwitting the numerous spies and counterspies that dogged the steps

¹⁰ "Silas Deane's Narrative, Read Before Congress," in *Deane Papers*, Vol. III, pp. 144-204 (pp. 180 and 201).

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of every official there. Vergennes employed a veritable army of agents whose sole duty was to keep watch on the activities of every American in Paris, including Franklin, Deane, and Lee; in the complicated web of intrigue which surrounded American-French negotiations, no one was trusted. It must have required great forethought and alertness to avoid both chance apprehension by the Americans and the deliberate surveillance of the French.

We do know something of the mechanics of his communications system. He was instructed to relay most of his information in dispatches addressed to certain individuals, and "anyone who might accidentally discover these dispatches would think that he had stumbled upon an illicit love affair; they were to be written 'in gallantry,' upon white sheets of paper, with liberal spaces between."¹¹ The real message, of course, was written in the intervening spaces in a "white ink" for which only Lord Stormont possessed the developer.

Bancroft got his letters to the British Embassy through a dead drop. A member of the Embassy staff went every Tuesday evening after half past nine to the south terrace of the Tuileries, where there was a certain tree with a hole at its root. In this hole was a bottle which would contain any information from Bancroft for Stormont. The bottle was sealed and tied at the neck with ordinary twine about a half yard in length, the other end of which was fastened to a peg of wood. The peg was split at the top to hold a small white card that would make the spot visible in the dark.¹²

The regular visits to the same spot on the same night of every week, the white card in the peg, and the sealed bottle hanging on a piece of twine should inevitably, one might think, have betrayed Bancroft's activities to the French. But the measure of excellence is success; and this method proved effective and safe for several years. Even more glaring, though better explainable, is the fact that the American commissioners, even after it became clear that many of their principal secrets were known to the British, never subjected their secretary to the simple security checks that would have revealed or prevented his depredations.

¹¹ Hendrick, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

¹² *Ibid.*

One of Bancroft's most effective ruses was to dwell at length on the danger in which he found himself in England, both in the last months of 1776 when he still maintained a residence there and thereafter on his trips to London, ostensibly to gather information for the Americans. (As arranged by Whitehall, where he was most frequently to be found while in the city, he did carry back to Franklin and Deane some news of British war plans which appeared to be valuable but in reality could do no harm to the Imperial cause.) The intimations of danger begin on a note of bravado:

This has been a day of Fasting & Prayer for the Subjugation of America. I have however in defiance of the Royal Proclamation been dining at Mr. Walpoles with some well disposed Friends & making merry.¹³

But they soon become explicit and serious, if still brave:

70 [Grand], 177 [Priestley], 31 and other friends of mine have expressed for some days, and especially since the Bill to suspend Habeas Corpus, great fears for my safety; and this morning 70 advised me very stongly to think of going soon to 68. I am not subject to unreasonable fears, and I do not think there is yet sufficient reason to profit by this advice, although I must confess that I think that before long the position of every faithful American will be dangerous here, and mine is even now extremely disagreeable. People of position in this country begin to think that it is unreasonable and even dangerous to keep up any intamacy with us, and my best friends, although they Continue to show me hospitality, evidently desire to do it as secretly as possible, and one hears in public from those who are enemies of America nothing but insults and most insolent invectives against the colonists and their friends.¹⁴

Not content with this verbal camouflage, Bancroft and his superiors in the Secret Service followed it up with a live demonstration, arranging that during one of his visits across the channel he should be arrested and imprisoned on charges of aiding the Americans. It was a convincing act, in spite of his having to be released shortly to get on with his work for

¹³ Bancroft to Deane (London, December 13, 1776), in "The Deane Papers, Correspondence Between Silas Deane, His Brothers and Their Business and Political Associates 1771-1795" in *Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 56-58.

¹⁴ Bancroft to Deane (London, February 7, 1777) (reprinted from Stevens Facsimiles, #635) in *Deane Papers*, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 482-486.

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the Service, and the lesson did not fail to take on the Americans in France. In despair, Deane wrote to Robert Morris:

... Doctor Bancroft is arrested in London for corresponding with and assisting us—This worthy man is confined in the Bastille of England, for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus has enabled the wicked tyrant and his slaves to make a Bastille of every prison in England.

I feel more for Doctor Bancroft than I can express; he deserves much from us; consequently will be pursued with the utmost rigour by them, though nothing capital, not even the correspondence can be proved. I wish we may be able to assist him.¹⁵

The welcome that awaited Bancroft on his return to Paris from his "harrowing experience" can be imagined. To a man who was willing to risk so much, receiving in return relatively little from his native country, Franklin and Deane were anxious to make any amends in their power. While they were limited in financial capabilities, they could repay Bancroft in loyal friendship, and here they did not stint. This was precisely the reward he needed.

Real Dangers

Bancroft's very efficiency in providing the British with authentic data on the American-French negotiations and with countless reports on the sailings and cargoes of French ships bound for America threatened his undoing as the information was exploited. Lord Stormont used it as the basis for heated demands that France cease violating its official neutrality by helping the revolutionaries, and the implications of the solid factual support adduced to back up the British protests were not lost on Vergennes, Louis XVI, and others in Paris. Almost everyone of any note in the circle of negotiators became suspect. Even the true source, Bancroft, did not entirely escape suspicion; but his well-nourished friendships, along with his own agility and luck, served him well.

Anxious to protect himself from too close scrutiny, Bancroft did not hesitate, presumably with British blessing, to expose others whom he claimed were British spies or who actually were minor ones. He was the key agent in Paris, and if his safety dictated the sacrifice of smaller fry he could not

¹⁵ Deane to Robert Morris (Paris, March 16, 1777), *ibid.* Vol. II, pp. 24-25.

scruple. In a nicely worded letter he warns Deane, with a forthrightness that begets confidence in his own loyalty, of a reputed spy and traitor:

Since writing the preceding, I have been with a friend whose veracity I can rely on; and who tells me some particulars it becomes you to know, viz., That Dr. Williamson, of Pennsylvania, who came over hither with Mr. Ewing, and who (though ostensibly a zealous American) is secretly a Spy in the service of Government, and has been in Holland some time, collecting intelligence, is now arrived in Paris for the same purpose . . .¹⁰

With equal forthrightness, in the same letter, he assesses his own services:

All that can be done without money, I am constantly doing, and indeed from my connections I am able to do much more without it, than most persons with an allowance for Secret Services, as liberal as the Powers of Europe generally make to their Ministers.¹¹

Of the several persons who at times had reason to be suspicious of Bancroft, Arthur Lee was the most persistent in his accusations. Even as early as the fall of 1776, the commissioner from Virginia presented to his colleagues what seemed to be incontrovertible proof that Bancroft spent a large part of his time on his London trips, not with the friends of America, but with the Privy Council.¹² But Franklin turned a deaf ear to Lee, however convincing his proof of Bancroft's duplicity. For this Bancroft could thank not only his own persuasive personality, but an incident in the history of the relationship between the old Pennsylvanian and the Virginian.

During the 1760's one of the greatest land development schemes ever conceived for America was proposed for most of the land in the Ohio valley and surrounding territories. A number of competing groups sought some form of franchise for this task from the British Government, and the two foremost factions were one led by Franklin, the Walpoles, and other friends and one comprising the Lee family and other prominent southerners. The Vandalia project, as it was called, aroused a bitter enmity among all would-be partici-

¹⁰ Bancroft to Deane (September 13, 1776), *ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 237-243.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

¹² Hendrick, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

pants in the tremendous boondoggle, and not the least was that created between Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee. Apparently Franklin was not so magnanimous that he could forget his personal feelings to judge objectively Lee's accusations, which as it turned out were more right than he could prove.¹⁹

Moreover, Foreign Minister Vergennes blunted the effect of Lee's suspicions by pointing the finger elsewhere, at William Carmichael, another secretary to the American mission. Bancroft endorsed Vergennes' proposal that Carmichael be returned to America, although he knew that this action could not secure his own position: the information leaks would still be noted. To protect himself further he gave circulation to the story that the spy was in reality none other than the Revolution's great benefactor, Caron de Beaumarchais. Probably not many fell for that, but at least it served the purpose of deflecting the spotlight from himself for a while.²⁰

Arthur Lee, who had realized immediately that the attempt to discredit Beaumarchais was merely part of a smoke screen, was able to establish for a fact in June of 1778 that Bancroft was in direct communication with the government in London.²¹ He lost no time in letting Franklin know about the situation. If ever Bancroft had cause to worry, it was now. But again his luck held; Franklin refused point blank to believe the evidence. Nothing Lee could do would convince the old man that his close friend was really a spy and the enemy of America.

We think of Franklin as one of the shrewdest diplomats this country has ever produced and a man who never got the bad end of a bargain; but of all the dupes of history surely none can best his record in the Bancroft case. He allowed personal relationships to color his judgment, and his country suffered the consequences. For although the cause of Empire was lost, it was not for any lack of intelligence from Paris, and the cause of freedom was certainly hurt by Bancroft's activities.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*; see chapter XI.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

De Mortuis

Proof of Bancroft's role during the Revolution did not appear until 1889. In that year the secret papers of Lord Auckland, assistant to Lord Suffolk of the British Secret Service,²² were made public. One of the documents in the collection was a detailed statement to Lord Carmarthen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in 1784, in which Bancroft presses his claim for reinstatement of his pension for services rendered. Since it is the only account we have in his own words of his betrayal of the country of his birth, it deserves to be entered in the record.

EDWARD BANCROFT'S MEMORIAL TO THE MARQUIS OF CARMARTHEN

In the month of June 1776, Mr. Silas Deane arrived in France, and pursuant to an instruction given him by the Secret Committee of Congress, wrote me in London, requesting an interview in Paris, where I accordingly went, early in July and was made acquainted with the purposes of his Mission, and with every thing which passed between him, and the French Ministry.

After staying two or three weeks there, I returned to England, convinced, that the Government of France would endeavour to Promote an Absolute Separation, of the then United Colonies, from Great Britain; unless a speedy termination of the Revolt, by reconciliation, or Conquest, should frustrate this project. I had then resided near ten years, and expected to reside the rest of my Life, in England; and all my views, interests and inclinations were adverse to the independency of the Colonies, though I had advocated some of their Claims, from a persuasion, of their being founded in Justice. I therefore wished, that the Government of this Country, might be informed, of the Danger of French Interference, though I could not resolve to become the informant.

But Mr. Paul Wentworth, having gained some general knowledge of my Journey to France, and of my intercourse with Mr. Deane, and having induced me to believe, that the British Ministry were likewise informed on this Subject, I at length Consented to meet the then Secretaries of State, Lords Weymouth and Suffolk, and give them all the information in my power; which I did, with the most disinterested views; for I not only, did not ask, but expressly rejected, every Idea of, any reward. The Declaration of Independancy, was not then known in Europe, and I hoped, that Government, thus informed of the Danger, would prevent it, by some accomodation with the Colonies, or by other means.

²² Lord Auckland was William Eden, a forefather of Sir Anthony. He had been Paul Wentworth's immediate superior during the Revolution.

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It had been my original intention to stop after this first Communication; but having given the first notice of a beginning intercourse, between France and the United Colonies, I was urged on, to watch and disclose the progress of it; for which purpose, I made several Journeys to Paris, and maintained a regular Correspondence with Mr. Deane, through the Couriers of the French Government. And in this way, I became *entangled* and obliged to proceed in a kind of Business, as repugnant to my feelings, as it had been to my original intentions.

Being thus devoted to the Service of Government, I consented like others, to accept such Emoluments, as my situation indeed required. And in Feb'y 1777, Lord Suffolk, to whom by Ld Weymouths Consent, my Communications were then made, formally promised me, in the King's Name, a Pension for Life of £200 pr an. to Commence from the Christmas preceeding. This was for Services *then rendered*; and as an inducement for me to go over and reside in France, and continue my services there, until the Revolt should terminate, or an Open rupture with that nation ensue, his Lordship farther promised, that when either of these Events should happen, my permanent pension of £200 pr an. should be increased to £500 *at least*.

Confiding in this promise, I went to Paris, and during the first year, resided in the same House with Dr. Franklin, Mr. Deane etc., and regularly informed this Government of every transaction of the American Commissioners; of every Step and Vessel taken to supply the revolted Colonies, with Artillery, Arms etc.; of every part of their intercourse with the French and other European Courts; of the Powers and instructions given by Congress to the Commissioners, and of their correspondence with the Secret Committees etc. and when the Government of France at length determined *openly* to support the Revolted Colonies, I gave notice of this determination, and of the progress made in forming the two Treaties of Alliance and Commerce, and when these were signed, on the Evening of the 6th of Feb'y, I at my own Expense, by a special Messenger, and with unexampled dispatch, conveyed this intelligence to this City, and to the King's Ministers, within 42 hours, from the instant of their Signature, a piece of information, for which many individuals here, would, for purposes of Speculation, have given me more than all that I have received from Government. Afterwards, when that decisive measure, of sending Count D'Estaing with the fleet from Toulon, to Commence Hostilities at the Delaware and New York, was adopted, I sent intelligence of the direct object and Plan of the Expedition.

I had originally explained to Lord Suffolk my Determination to quit this business, whenever an Open War with France, should destroy, what had been my principal inducement to meddle with it; I mean, the hope of preventing a Separation of the revolted Colonies; And as this war now appeared unavoidable, I requested that the King's Ministers would, as soon as practicable, provide

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other Sources of information, and permit me to withdraw myself. This request however was never granted. But to fulfill the promise made by my Lord Suffolk my permanent Pension was increased to 500£ per an. and regularly entered, in Book Letter A. payable to Mr. P. Wentworth for the use of Edwd. Edwards; the name, by which, for greater Secrecy, it had been long before agreed to distinguish me.

In June 1780, the King's Ministers, reflecting that this Pension had been given as the reward of *Antecedent* Services, and that it would be unreasonable, to require a longer Continuance of them, without a farther recompense, agreed to allow me an additional yearly sum of £500, *so long as I should reside in France*; and they encouraged me to expect that this last Sum, or at least a Considerable part of it, would be ultimately added to my permanent pension, in case Government should be satisfied with my future services. I accordingly received from his Majesties Treasury the Stipulated annual allowance of £1000 until the month of April 1782; when the Change of Ministers, with Mr. Burkes Bill, created some difficulty on this Subject. But the matter being Explained to my Lord Shelburne, he took care, before his resignation, to secure and pay me through the then Secretary of State, for foreign Affairs, (my Lord Grantham), a full years Sallary, though the last quarter was not then due.

In June 1783, I came to London, and informed Lord North (to whom my latter information had by particular direction been addressed) of my intention of going to America, where I offered my Services, in promoting measures and dispositions, favourable to the interests of this Country, as well as in giving information of the State of things there, and of the views and proceedings of Congress etc. I likewise reminded him, of the encouragement which I had received to expect that the second 500£ pr. an. or at least a part of it would be made permanent like the first, adding that if my services in America, were accepted, it would as I presumed, in any case, be thought reasonable, to Continue to me, at least while there, the same allowance as had been made me in France. With this Proposition, his lordship appeared to be satisfied, but at a subsequent interview, he referred me to Mr. Fox for a decision respecting it, as well as for the payment of a quarter Sallary, then due, alledging, that Mr. Burke's Bill, had made it absolutely necessary to provide for me, through that Department.

I accordingly saw and conversed with Mr. Fox respecting my situation and propositions, which he promised to consider of; but as I had not foreseen any difficulty, or delay, and had already agreed, and Paid for, my Passage to Philadelphia, I was obliged to follow the Ship to the Downs, on the 12th of August 1783, before any decision was made, and indeed, whilst Mr. Fox was out of Town. I however informed him, by Letter, on the evening of my departure, that he might expect the Continuation of my

Services to Government whilst in America, and requested that the quarters Salary, then due, might be paid to Mrs. Bancroft. She accordingly soon after received £250 for that Quarter; since which nothing has been paid for my account.

On my part, I have endeavoured, as far as practicable, whilst absent, in America, to render myself useful to the British nation and Government. Great Events indeed did not occur for Communication, and the ill temper produced in America by the Proclamation, respecting the intercourse from thence to the West Indies, did not allow me to do all I had hoped, in promoting sentiments and dispositions favourable to this Country; though I endeavoured it, and I think with some little success, in particular Channels and Connections; and I have endeavoured, occasionally, to vindicate the late measures of this Government, in Newspapers, particularly under the Signature of Cincinnatus, against the Publications of Common Sense.

One years Salary was due to me at midsummer last, which I request the payment of: what it shall be, must depend on the King's pleasure, and that of his Ministers: I make no Claim beyond the permanent pension of £500 pr an. for which, the Faith of Government has been often pledged; and for which, I have sacrificed near eight years of my Life, and my pursuits in it; always avoiding any Kind of appointment, or emolument from, as well as any sort of Engagement to, any Government in the United States; in the full determination, of remaining to the end of my Life, a faithful Subject to my natural and most Gracious Sovereign.

In Dr. Bancroft's Sept. 17, 1784.

ST. JAMES'S 16th Sept'r 1784.²³

It is curious that the outcome of Bancroft's effort to claim what he thought was due him is not known. Of the latter half of his life we know only that he lived comfortably and respectably in England, where he published several scientific and scholarly works. He died in Margate in 1821, to the last, as he was determined, a loyal subject of the King.

²³ Bancroft Memorial, *op. cit.*

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

WORLD WAR II

DIE SCHWEIZ IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. Edited by *H. R. Kurz*. (Thun: Ott Verlag. 1959. Pp. 400. Sw. fr. 44.50.)

This handsome memorial volume dedicated to the Swiss defense effort during World War II is made up of three dozen essays authored for the most part by the wartime heads of the various defense agencies and branches of the military service. To those who are accustomed to viewing the war from the standpoint of one or another of the belligerents, the story of the protective measures taken by an apprehensive bystander offers a new perspective.

Swiss military activities were by no means confined to mere preparation against eventualities, especially in the air: the fighter planes responded during the five years to 7,379 violations of their aerial borders. Initially these were almost all German, and when some of the German planes were shot down the Nazis undertook deliberate reprisal actions in which they came off second best. In 1942 and 1943 the violators were chiefly British bombers on night raids, and there was little trouble with them. It was left for the bigger and better American daylight raids in 1944 to make the bigger and worse mistakes, most notably that on April Fools' Day when they dropped some 400 high explosive and incendiary bombs on Schaffhausen, causing many casualties and damage estimated at ten million dollars.

Three of the essays are on intelligence subjects. The wartime Chief of Army Intelligence illustrates his doctrinal discussion of the principles of military intelligence with the example of his organization's reconstruction of German intentions in the spring of 1940. A source he had in the German High Command—who had revealed three weeks in advance that the Germans would occupy Denmark and Norway—reported in April that an attack on France through Holland and Belgium could be expected any time after 8 May. There would be troop movements also in southern Germany, he said, but these would pose no threat to Switzerland, being designed only to tie down French forces on the upper Rhine. All Swiss agent nets in southern Germany were concentrated on

providing confirmation of this interpretation, and they were able to keep their government reassured, in spite of a welter of ominous rumors, during the shocking events of May. Moreover, as the German forces were being assembled in their jump-off positions, the Swiss were able, according to this account, to foresee through order-of-battle information and an analysis of the strategic situation that the main thrust would come through Luxembourg and the Belgian Ardennes, whereupon Guderian's panzer army would probably drive to encircle the Allied forces in northern France, as in fact it did.

In the counterintelligence field there are articles on the counterespionage and countersubversion efforts of the Army and of the Federal Police. It is noted that in this war, in contradistinction to World War I, Switzerland was marked for eventual take-over by the Germans, subversion through Nazi and Nazi-front organizations was a real threat, and Swiss defenses were the target of massive espionage operations. One has the impression from these essays that although subversion was fairly well held in check, the counterintelligence forces, in spite of thousands of arrests, came nowhere near coping with the German spies, and that the Germans learned whatever they wanted to know. There is brief mention of the belligerents' intelligence activities against each other in Switzerland and by way of example a summary account of the Rote Kapelle and the Rado net.

Not strictly intelligence, but of intelligence interest, is an essay on the secret negotiations which led to the surrender of the German forces in Italy at the beginning of May 1945. It is contributed by Max Waibel, who with his compatriot Max Husmann and the Italian baron Luigi Parrilli first took the initiative in bringing representatives of the belligerents together and then when it seemed the negotiations had broken down persisted in renewing them for their successful conclusion. From its beginnings on 21 February, when Parrilli after several weeks' waiting for a visa came to Switzerland to enlist his friend Husmann as mediator, the effort had gradually progressed by 19 March from negotiation through the intermediaries between Allen Dulles on the one hand and representatives of SS General Wolff on the other, with respective conditions for surrender a world apart, to a face-to-face meeting between General Wolff and Allied generals which

made satisfying progress. Then Himmler got wind of what was going on, and he and Hitler and also Stalin took various obstructive measures. Finally on 22 April the Allies broke off the negotiations.

The next day, however, General Wolff showed up with Marshal Graziani and a delegation having full powers to surrender all the German forces in Italy, expecting to proceed to Allied headquarters to sign the capitulation. Waibel put the delegation up as his house guests in Lucerne while Allied agreement to receive it was sought. This was not immediately forthcoming; but on 29 April, at last, the capitulation was accepted by Field Marshal Alexander at Caserta. Waibel regrets only the delays caused first in March by Himmler's action and then on 22 April by the order from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to break off the talks: "On 23 April, when the German plenipotentiaries entered Switzerland, the Allies were still south of the Po. It would have spared much blood and destruction if the Allied attack across the Po hadn't had to be carried out."

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH. By *William L. Shirer*. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1960. Pp. 1245. \$10.)

In this product of many years of labor Mr. Shirer sweeps the unwearied reader compellingly through his thousand and more pages of the history of Nazi Germany. He weaves into an epic unity the personalities, ideas, events, intrigues, and political and military campaigns that engendered, characterized, and finally terminated what he calls a twelve-year Age of Darkness. It is a Wagnerian theme, and he has done it justice.

Fastidious historians may complain that the author's loathing of the whole phenomenon of National Socialism unduly colors his work. It is true that this repugnance and his sense of outrage at all those who failed to stop Hitler, coupled perhaps with journalistic habits of expression, result in some caricaturing. Hitler at the height of his power is too often called "the former Austrian corporal," Goering almost invariably "the fat Reich Marshal"; it is always the "befuddled" Rosenberg, "toady" Keitel, the "spineless" Brauchitsch, etc. Schellenberg and several of the lesser Nazis are successively

introduced as "intellectual gangsters." There are frequent sarcastic jibes at the gullibility of Western politicians, at the arrogance and hypocrisy of the Nazis, and above all at the German generals' capitulation to Hitler. The monstrosity of Nazism were plain enough without such editorial captions.

But these are superficialities. Beneath them the history is laid out with scholarly objectivity. Based directly on the millions of captured official German documents and private papers, most of them unpublished, and postwar interrogations and testimony of the principals, it takes into account also all the many memoirs and the fewer scholarly works on the Third Reich that have appeared since its fall. The value of Mr. Shirer's work nevertheless lies less in the presentation of new evidence—although some new facts are adduced—than in its synthesis of all the complex threads of political action, diplomatic negotiation, dissident plotting, war strategy, and occupation policy into an animated tapestry of record.

The intelligence specialist will similarly find his interest in *The Rise and Fall* in this synoptic view. There is nothing about resistance activity in the occupied areas, little on Allied or even on German intelligence. The German resistance is well sketched, but only sketched. Yet Mr. Shirer conveys a clearer idea of the sporadic, fragmented, irresolute, and blundering German opposition than one can reach through any of the individual memoirs or in recent scholarly works like Gerhard Ritter's.¹ And intelligence proper, one concludes, on almost all of the major political and military surprises, would have been ample if only it had been believed. It is again and again noted that details of the prewar diplomatic negotiations, secret and behind scenes, were known to those being schemed against, often apparently through communications interception. There were massive forewarnings of the attacks on Poland, on Denmark and Norway, on the Low Countries and France, on the USSR, in North Africa, on the Normandy beaches, and some even of that in the Bulge. One comes away with the impression that only the USSR kept its military secrets fairly well; and here also much knowledge that was obtained of Soviet strength was useless because Hitler refused to believe it.

¹ *The German Resistance*, reviewed in Intelligence Articles IV 2, p. A48.

THE ECONOMIC WAR

SOVIET ECONOMIC WARFARE. By *Robert Loring Allen*.
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1960. Pp. 293.
\$5.)

In a subject area which has thus far given rise to so few serious published works, Robert Loring Allen's *Soviet Economic Warfare* must be welcomed as a noteworthy pioneer effort. It is a pity, however, that the work falls short of fulfilling its stated promise "to record the salient features of Communist foreign economic relations in a systematic and coherent fashion" at a time when a clearer understanding of the Soviet economic challenge has perhaps never been more imperative. It is all the more regrettable when such a work represents the culmination of a three-year research project in which more than 20 scholars participated, writing nearly threescore research papers, monographs, and books on Soviet foreign economic policy.

As a compendium of useful statistics and detailed anecdotes of Soviet foreign trade organization and practice, *Soviet Economic Warfare* undoubtedly makes some contribution to public awareness of the facts and figures of the Soviet economic offensive in underdeveloped countries outside the Bloc. But in his concentration on the *what* of the Soviet trade drive, the author has tended to neglect the vastly more important *why* and *how* of such a policy. While one can agree with him that the Soviet Union, through its economic and political support to underdeveloped countries, seeks firmly to secure their "national liberation" and ultimately their absorption into the Soviet orbit, the key question for the Communists (and for the West) is how economic assistance alone can hope to exert a decisive influence on the social order of underdeveloped countries where political power remains in the hands of the anti-Communist national bourgeoisie, where the means of production are largely privately owned, and where free enterprise remains the predominant influence on economic development. On this question Dr. Allen is disappointingly silent.

The Soviet Union's recent reversal of the classical concept of trade following the flag must be regarded as but one com-

ponent of a highly integrated political, diplomatic, and psychological campaign which, in the semantically deceptive guise of "coexistence," wages an unceasing struggle to extend Soviet power and influence throughout the non-Communist world. To treat Soviet foreign economic policy in isolation, apart from the larger political objectives of the USSR, or indeed to treat Soviet policy in underdeveloped areas without reference to Soviet objectives in the industrial West, as this work does, is to make impossible any really effective understanding of the challenge posed by Soviet "economic warfare."

Dr. Allen's strong anti-Soviet emotions (he rather needlessly hastens to assure us at the outset that his "personal sympathies are opposed to Soviet economic and political concepts and practices") often seem to becloud his more objective judgement and result in a host of debatable assertions not easily reconciled with the facts or even with each other. The Soviet approach to international trade, for example, is described by the author both as one of "remaining aloof from the world economy" (p. 61) and as "having emerged from its economic isolationism" (p. 241). The Soviet system of state trading is assessed as contributing to a "relatively inflexible, bureaucracy-ridden system which often finds itself incapable of adjusting to the continual vicissitudes inherent to international trade" (p. 73) and also as providing the USSR with "greater bargaining power, more sensitivity to the state of affairs, greater flexibility in meeting particular situations" (p. 44). A presumed shift in internal cost structure in the USSR is adduced as motivating a "recognition . . . of the cost-reducing opportunities that appear in international trade" (p. 46), but elsewhere we find "there is little evidence to suggest . . . that the Soviet Union exports for traditional, comparative cost purposes" (p. 71).

Finally, in the author's overzealous efforts to prove his proposition that Soviet foreign economic policy is "engaged in undermining the efforts of underdeveloped countries to establish equitable economic, political and social systems," he dwells on the incidental and transient, generalizes from specific and often unrelated instances, confuses tactics with strategy, and too often subordinates the scholar to the propagandist. The result is a needless reiteration of the Bloc's

obviously evil intentions in underdeveloped countries, to the virtual denial of any legitimate commercial interests in the area. For the specialist in the field, *Soviet Economic Warfare* is a work of limited horizon and debatable conclusions better suited to the overseas libraries of the USIA than to an intelligence collection. For a keener insight into the motives and implications of the Soviet economic offensive in underdeveloped countries, the calmer and more closely reasoned analysis of Joseph Berliner's *Soviet Economic Aid* (New York, 1958) is to be preferred.

MISCELLANY

THE POLICY MACHINE: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy. By *Robert Ellsworth Elder*. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1960. Pp. 238. \$4.50.)

Our principal interest in this book lies in its 25-page chapter on the intelligence arm of the Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The author has been well briefed on INR's general organization and some of its functions, but he gives rather more space to its current intelligence activity and rather less to its research work than this reviewer would have done. On its role in the community, especially its very important role in arriving at National Intelligence Estimates, he lets on that official secrecy makes "published facts for tracing the procedures used in developing [these documents] . . . scarce as hen's teeth." There is published, of course, one solid gold, outsized hen's tooth on this very subject—the Ransom book¹—which Mr. Elder, oddly enough, acknowledges in a footnote but otherwise neglects.

In a few good sentences he copes with the major problem of the intrusion of policy into intelligence and vice versa. He does not, however, bear down on it, nor does he really get at how it is complicated by the flow into INR of operating Foreign Service Officers with no prior intelligence experience.

The book as a whole is disappointing: the real problems of policy formulation get lost in the mechanistic approach that the title suggests.

THE OVERSEAS AMERICANS. By *Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clarke Adams*. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1960. Pp. 305. \$5.95.)

This is the latest of a tremendous amount of useful writing on the subject of overseas duty by members of the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, probably the most prominent of the institutions arrayed in increasing numbers against the problem of Americans' performance abroad. The burgeoning concentration on this problem, one feels, tends to

¹H. H. Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, reviewed in *Intelligence Articles* II 4.

overemphasize the difficulties of adaptation to a foreign culture. In the anxiety to prepare for "culture shock" it may be forgotten that many of the shocks are pleasant surprises; wives and children are likely to be treated as additional vulnerabilities rather than a help in cushioning shocks and enhancing pleasant surprises; the plunge into a foreign culture is presented as too generically different from what happens when New Englanders visit the American Southwest or Southerners come to Yankee land; it is too little considered that many Americans have at least a vestigial feeling for the foreign culture from which they came, and many others live in or near communities in which elements of such cultures persist. Nevertheless the problem is a real one, and it is analyzed here intelligently, in depth, with particularity, and without jargonized scientification.

The authors' analysis, based mainly on interviews with Americans working in a representative sample of countries outside Western Europe and with the local foreign nationals affected, lays the groundwork for their constructive discussion of what can be done to improve American performance overseas. With respect to the selection of personnel for overseas duty, "still more an art than a science," they make a real contribution to the groping for criteria, requiring among other qualifications some evidence of "environmental mobility." They evaluate with good perspective the virtues and limitations of both language training and quickie orientation programs. They make revolutionary long-range proposals for U.S. education, calling for language studies early in the public schooling, college courses in particular areas and in cross-cultural problems, a "live option" of taking part of the college work abroad, and graduate studies that prepare not only for a profession but for following a profession overseas.

To effect these changes, finally, that would build overseas-manship into our educational system rather than graft it on behind, they propose that a National Foundation for Overseas Operations, after the pattern of the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health, be established in the Executive Branch with the responsibility for coordinating research, dramatizing the nation-wide attack on the problem, and giving financial assistance to deserving efforts.

THE SEA WAS KIND. By *Albert Klestadt*. (New York: David McKay. 1960. \$4.50.)

A number of books have been written about the experiences of those who, like this author, escaped by sea from the Philippines to Australia during World War II. Albert Klestadt's account, however, is above average because of its perspective, objectivity, and technical accuracy in matters maritime. Its value as a history of the first year of the war in the Philippines rivals its value as an escape story. Although the author strongly favored the Allied cause, he was not an American citizen, and the objectivity with which he viewed the fall of the Philippines may make his version of some events more reliable than those presented by emotionally involved Americans and Filipinos.

Having lived in Japan as a refugee from Nazi Germany long enough to learn the language, Klestadt left for Singapore on the eve of Pearl Harbor, but got only as far as Manila, where he was trapped by the Japanese attack. After the first few days of the occupation he managed, with his knowledge of the Japanese language and Japanese ways and with papers identifying him as a stateless person from Germany, to bluff his way out of the city and south through Luzon to the coast. A sailing enthusiast with many years of small-boat experience, he succeeded in island-hopping to Australia in a year's time, one of the few to make it entirely by small sailboat. Ironically, there was no place in the Allied naval forces for this mariner "of uncertain status, but of no uncertain allegiance," and he ended up fighting out the war with the Australian Army.

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Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected. The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents preceding page 1.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are the following:

Allen's *Soviet Economic Warfare*
Cleveland's *The Overseas Americans*
Klestadt's *The Sea Was Kind*

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